| Current File : //root/postfix-3.2.0/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c |
/*++
/* NAME
/* tlsproxy 8
/* SUMMARY
/* Postfix TLS proxy
/* SYNOPSIS
/* \fBtlsproxy\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
/* DESCRIPTION
/* The \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server implements a server-side TLS
/* proxy. It is used by \fBpostscreen\fR(8) to talk SMTP-over-TLS
/* with remote SMTP clients that are not whitelisted (including
/* clients whose whitelist status has expired),
/* but it should also work for non-SMTP protocols.
/*
/* Although one \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) process can serve multiple
/* sessions at the same time, it is a good idea to allow the
/* number of processes to increase with load, so that the
/* service remains responsive.
/* PROTOCOL EXAMPLE
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The example below concerns \fBpostscreen\fR(8). However,
/* the \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server is agnostic of the application
/* protocol, and the example is easily adapted to other
/* applications.
/*
/* After receiving a valid remote SMTP client STARTTLS command,
/* the \fBpostscreen\fR(8) server sends the remote SMTP client
/* endpoint string, the requested role (server), and the
/* requested timeout to \fBtlsproxy\fR(8). \fBpostscreen\fR(8)
/* then receives a "TLS available" indication from \fBtlsproxy\fR(8).
/* If the TLS service is available, \fBpostscreen\fR(8) sends
/* the remote SMTP client file descriptor to \fBtlsproxy\fR(8),
/* and sends the plaintext 220 greeting to the remote SMTP
/* client. This triggers TLS negotiations between the remote
/* SMTP client and \fBtlsproxy\fR(8). Upon completion of the
/* TLS-level handshake, \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) translates between
/* plaintext from/to \fBpostscreen\fR(8) and ciphertext to/from
/* the remote SMTP client.
/* SECURITY
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server is moderately security-sensitive.
/* It talks to untrusted clients on the network. The process
/* can be run chrooted at fixed low privilege.
/* DIAGNOSTICS
/* Problems and transactions are logged to \fBsyslogd\fR(8).
/* CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Changes to \fBmain.cf\fR are not picked up automatically,
/* as \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) processes may run for a long time
/* depending on mail server load. Use the command "\fBpostfix
/* reload\fR" to speed up a change.
/*
/* The text below provides only a parameter summary. See
/* \fBpostconf\fR(5) for more details including examples.
/* STARTTLS SUPPORT CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_CAfile ($smtpd_tls_CAfile)\fR"
/* A file containing (PEM format) CA certificates of root CAs
/* trusted to sign either remote SMTP client certificates or intermediate
/* CA certificates.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_CApath ($smtpd_tls_CApath)\fR"
/* A directory containing (PEM format) CA certificates of root CAs
/* trusted to sign either remote SMTP client certificates or intermediate
/* CA certificates.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_always_issue_session_ids ($smtpd_tls_always_issue_session_ids)\fR"
/* Force the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server to issue a TLS session id,
/* even when TLS session caching is turned off.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_ask_ccert ($smtpd_tls_ask_ccert)\fR"
/* Ask a remote SMTP client for a client certificate.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_ccert_verifydepth ($smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth)\fR"
/* The verification depth for remote SMTP client certificates.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_cert_file ($smtpd_tls_cert_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server RSA certificate in PEM
/* format.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_ciphers ($smtpd_tls_ciphers)\fR"
/* The minimum TLS cipher grade that the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server
/* will use with opportunistic TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_dcert_file ($smtpd_tls_dcert_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server DSA certificate in PEM
/* format.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_dh1024_param_file ($smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file)\fR"
/* File with DH parameters that the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server
/* should use with non-export EDH ciphers.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_dh512_param_file ($smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file)\fR"
/* File with DH parameters that the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server
/* should use with export-grade EDH ciphers.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_dkey_file ($smtpd_tls_dkey_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server DSA private key in PEM
/* format.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_eccert_file ($smtpd_tls_eccert_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server ECDSA certificate in
/* PEM format.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_eckey_file ($smtpd_tls_eckey_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server ECDSA private key in
/* PEM format.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_eecdh_grade ($smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade)\fR"
/* The Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server security grade for ephemeral
/* elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (EECDH) key exchange.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_exclude_ciphers ($smtpd_tls_exclude_ciphers)\fR"
/* List of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the \fBtlsproxy\fR(8)
/* server cipher list at all TLS security levels.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_fingerprint_digest ($smtpd_tls_fingerprint_digest)\fR"
/* The message digest algorithm to construct remote SMTP
/* client-certificate
/* fingerprints.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_key_file ($smtpd_tls_key_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server RSA private key in PEM
/* format.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_loglevel ($smtpd_tls_loglevel)\fR"
/* Enable additional Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server logging of TLS
/* activity.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_mandatory_ciphers ($smtpd_tls_mandatory_ciphers)\fR"
/* The minimum TLS cipher grade that the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server
/* will use with mandatory TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_mandatory_exclude_ciphers ($smtpd_tls_mandatory_exclude_ciphers)\fR"
/* Additional list of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the
/* \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server cipher list at mandatory TLS security levels.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_mandatory_protocols ($smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols)\fR"
/* The SSL/TLS protocols accepted by the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server
/* with mandatory TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_protocols ($smtpd_tls_protocols)\fR"
/* List of TLS protocols that the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server will
/* exclude or include with opportunistic TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_req_ccert ($smtpd_tls_req_ccert)\fR"
/* With mandatory TLS encryption, require a trusted remote SMTP
/* client certificate in order to allow TLS connections to proceed.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_tls_security_level ($smtpd_tls_security_level)\fR"
/* The SMTP TLS security level for the Postfix \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) server;
/* when a non-empty value is specified, this overrides the obsolete
/* parameters smtpd_use_tls and smtpd_enforce_tls.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later:
/* .IP "\fBtlsmgr_service_name (tlsmgr)\fR"
/* The name of the \fBtlsmgr\fR(8) service entry in master.cf.
/* OBSOLETE STARTTLS SUPPORT CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* These parameters are supported for compatibility with
/* \fBsmtpd\fR(8) legacy parameters.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_use_tls ($smtpd_use_tls)\fR"
/* Opportunistic TLS: announce STARTTLS support to remote SMTP clients,
/* but do not require that clients use TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_enforce_tls ($smtpd_enforce_tls)\fR"
/* Mandatory TLS: announce STARTTLS support to remote SMTP clients, and
/* require that clients use TLS encryption.
/* RESOURCE CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* .IP "\fBtlsproxy_watchdog_timeout (10s)\fR"
/* How much time a \fBtlsproxy\fR(8) process may take to process local
/* or remote I/O before it is terminated by a built-in watchdog timer.
/* MISCELLANEOUS CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* .IP "\fBconfig_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The default location of the Postfix main.cf and master.cf
/* configuration files.
/* .IP "\fBprocess_id (read-only)\fR"
/* The process ID of a Postfix command or daemon process.
/* .IP "\fBprocess_name (read-only)\fR"
/* The process name of a Postfix command or daemon process.
/* .IP "\fBsyslog_facility (mail)\fR"
/* The syslog facility of Postfix logging.
/* .IP "\fBsyslog_name (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* A prefix that is prepended to the process name in syslog
/* records, so that, for example, "smtpd" becomes "prefix/smtpd".
/* SEE ALSO
/* postscreen(8), Postfix zombie blocker
/* smtpd(8), Postfix SMTP server
/* postconf(5), configuration parameters
/* syslogd(5), system logging
/* LICENSE
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
/* HISTORY
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* This service was introduced with Postfix version 2.8.
/* AUTHOR(S)
/* Wietse Venema
/* IBM T.J. Watson Research
/* P.O. Box 704
/* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
/*
/* Wietse Venema
/* Google, Inc.
/* 111 8th Avenue
/* New York, NY 10011, USA
/*--*/
/*
* System library.
*/
#include <sys_defs.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H
#include <strings.h>
#endif
/*
* Utility library.
*/
#include <msg.h>
#include <vstream.h>
#include <iostuff.h>
#include <nbbio.h>
#include <mymalloc.h>
/*
* Global library.
*/
#include <mail_proto.h>
#include <mail_params.h>
#include <mail_conf.h>
#include <mail_version.h>
/*
* Master library.
*/
#include <mail_server.h>
/*
* TLS library.
*/
#ifdef USE_TLS
#define TLS_INTERNAL /* XXX */
#include <tls.h>
#include <tls_proxy.h>
/*
* Application-specific.
*/
#include <tlsproxy.h>
/*
* Tunable parameters. We define our clones of the smtpd(8) parameters to
* avoid any confusion about which parameters are used by this program.
*/
int var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
char *var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
bool var_smtpd_use_tls;
bool var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
bool var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
bool var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
bool var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid;
char *var_smtpd_relay_ccerts;
char *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
char *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
char *var_smtpd_tls_ciph;
char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph;
char *var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph;
char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl;
char *var_smtpd_tls_proto;
char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto;
char *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_eecdh;
char *var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst;
char *var_smtpd_tls_level;
int var_tlsp_tls_ccert_vd;
char *var_tlsp_tls_loglevel;
bool var_tlsp_use_tls;
bool var_tlsp_enforce_tls;
bool var_tlsp_tls_ask_ccert;
bool var_tlsp_tls_req_ccert;
bool var_tlsp_tls_set_sessid;
char *var_tlsp_tls_cert_file;
char *var_tlsp_tls_key_file;
char *var_tlsp_tls_dcert_file;
char *var_tlsp_tls_dkey_file;
char *var_tlsp_tls_eccert_file;
char *var_tlsp_tls_eckey_file;
char *var_tlsp_tls_CAfile;
char *var_tlsp_tls_CApath;
char *var_tlsp_tls_ciph;
char *var_tlsp_tls_mand_ciph;
char *var_tlsp_tls_excl_ciph;
char *var_tlsp_tls_mand_excl;
char *var_tlsp_tls_proto;
char *var_tlsp_tls_mand_proto;
char *var_tlsp_tls_dh512_param_file;
char *var_tlsp_tls_dh1024_param_file;
char *var_tlsp_tls_eecdh;
char *var_tlsp_tls_fpt_dgst;
char *var_tlsp_tls_level;
int var_tlsp_watchdog;
/*
* TLS per-process status.
*/
static TLS_APPL_STATE *tlsp_server_ctx;
static int ask_client_cert;
/*
* SLMs.
*/
#define STR(x) vstring_str(x)
/*
* This code looks simpler than expected. That is the result of a great deal
* of effort, mainly in design and analysis.
*
* By design, postscreen(8) is an event-driven server that must scale up to a
* large number of clients. This means that postscreen(8) must avoid doing
* CPU-intensive operations such as those in OpenSSL.
*
* tlsproxy(8) runs the OpenSSL code on behalf of postscreen(8), translating
* plaintext SMTP messages from postscreen(8) into SMTP-over-TLS messages to
* the remote SMTP client, and vice versa. As long as postscreen(8) does not
* receive email messages, the cost of doing TLS operations will be modest.
*
* Like postscreen(8), one tlsproxy(8) process services multiple remote SMTP
* clients. Unlike postscreen(8), there can be more than one tlsproxy(8)
* process, although their number is meant to be much smaller than the
* number of remote SMTP clients that talk TLS.
*
* As with postscreen(8), all I/O must be event-driven: encrypted traffic
* between tlsproxy(8) and remote SMTP clients, and plaintext traffic
* between tlsproxy(8) and postscreen(8). Event-driven plaintext I/O is
* straightforward enough that it could be abstracted away with the nbbio(3)
* module.
*
* The event-driven TLS I/O implementation is founded on on-line OpenSSL
* documentation, supplemented by statements from OpenSSL developers on
* public mailing lists. After some field experience with this code, we may
* be able to factor it out as a library module, like nbbio(3), that can
* become part of the TLS library.
*/
static void tlsp_ciphertext_event(int, void *);
#define TLSP_INIT_TIMEOUT 100
/* tlsp_drain - delayed exit after "postfix reload" */
static void tlsp_drain(char *unused_service, char **unused_argv)
{
int count;
/*
* After "postfix reload", complete work-in-progress in the background,
* instead of dropping already-accepted connections on the floor.
*
* All error retry counts shall be limited. Instead of blocking here, we
* could retry failed fork() operations in the event call-back routines,
* but we don't need perfection. The host system is severely overloaded
* and service levels are already way down.
*/
for (count = 0; /* see below */ ; count++) {
if (count >= 5) {
msg_fatal("fork: %m");
} else if (event_server_drain() != 0) {
msg_warn("fork: %m");
sleep(1);
continue;
} else {
return;
}
}
}
/* tlsp_eval_tls_error - translate TLS "error" result into action */
static int tlsp_eval_tls_error(TLSP_STATE *state, int err)
{
int ciphertext_fd = state->ciphertext_fd;
/*
* The ciphertext file descriptor is in non-blocking mode, meaning that
* each SSL_accept/connect/read/write/shutdown request may return an
* "error" indication that it needs to read or write more ciphertext. The
* purpose of this routine is to translate those "error" indications into
* the appropriate read/write/timeout event requests.
*/
switch (err) {
/*
* No error from SSL_read and SSL_write means that the plaintext
* output buffer is full and that the plaintext input buffer is
* empty. Stop read/write events on the ciphertext stream. Keep the
* timer alive as a safety mechanism for the case that the plaintext
* pseudothreads get stuck.
*/
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
if (state->ssl_last_err != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
event_disable_readwrite(ciphertext_fd);
event_request_timer(tlsp_ciphertext_event, (void *) state,
state->timeout);
state->ssl_last_err = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
}
return (0);
/*
* The TLS engine wants to write to the network. Turn on
* write/timeout events on the ciphertext stream.
*/
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
if (state->ssl_last_err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
event_disable_readwrite(ciphertext_fd);
if (state->ssl_last_err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
event_enable_write(ciphertext_fd, tlsp_ciphertext_event,
(void *) state);
state->ssl_last_err = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
}
event_request_timer(tlsp_ciphertext_event, (void *) state,
state->timeout);
return (0);
/*
* The TLS engine wants to read from the network. Turn on
* read/timeout events on the ciphertext stream.
*/
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
if (state->ssl_last_err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
event_disable_readwrite(ciphertext_fd);
if (state->ssl_last_err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
event_enable_read(ciphertext_fd, tlsp_ciphertext_event,
(void *) state);
state->ssl_last_err = SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
}
event_request_timer(tlsp_ciphertext_event, (void *) state,
state->timeout);
return (0);
/*
* Some error. Self-destruct. This automagically cleans up all
* pending read/write and timeout event requests, making state a
* dangling pointer.
*/
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
tls_print_errors();
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
tlsp_state_free(state);
return (-1);
}
}
/* tlsp_strategy - decide what to read or write next. */
static void tlsp_strategy(TLSP_STATE *state)
{
TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_context = state->tls_context;
NBBIO *plaintext_buf;
int ssl_stat;
int ssl_read_err;
int ssl_write_err;
int handshake_err;
/*
* Be sure to complete the TLS handshake before enabling plain-text I/O.
* In case of an unrecoverable error, this automagically cleans up all
* pending read/write and timeout event requests.
*/
if (state->flags & TLSP_FLAG_DO_HANDSHAKE) {
ssl_stat = SSL_accept(tls_context->con);
if (ssl_stat != 1) {
handshake_err = SSL_get_error(tls_context->con, ssl_stat);
tlsp_eval_tls_error(state, handshake_err);
/* At this point, state could be a dangling pointer. */
return;
}
if ((state->tls_context = tls_server_post_accept(tls_context)) == 0) {
tlsp_state_free(state);
return;
}
if ((state->req_flags & TLS_PROXY_FLAG_SEND_CONTEXT) != 0
&& (attr_print(state->plaintext_stream, ATTR_FLAG_NONE,
SEND_ATTR_FUNC(tls_proxy_context_print,
(void *) state->tls_context),
ATTR_TYPE_END) != 0
|| vstream_fflush(state->plaintext_stream) != 0)) {
msg_warn("cannot send TLS context: %m");
tlsp_state_free(state);
return;
}
state->flags &= ~TLSP_FLAG_DO_HANDSHAKE;
}
/*
* Shutdown and self-destruct after NBBIO error. This automagically
* cleans up all pending read/write and timeout event requests. Before
* shutting down TLS, we stop all plain-text I/O events but keep the
* NBBIO error flags.
*/
plaintext_buf = state->plaintext_buf;
if (NBBIO_ERROR_FLAGS(plaintext_buf)) {
if (NBBIO_ACTIVE_FLAGS(plaintext_buf))
nbbio_disable_readwrite(state->plaintext_buf);
ssl_stat = SSL_shutdown(tls_context->con);
/* XXX Wait for return value 1 if sessions are to be reused? */
if (ssl_stat < 0) {
handshake_err = SSL_get_error(tls_context->con, ssl_stat);
tlsp_eval_tls_error(state, handshake_err);
/* At this point, state could be a dangling pointer. */
return;
}
tlsp_state_free(state);
return;
}
/*
* Try to move data from the plaintext input buffer to the TLS engine.
*
* XXX We're supposed to repeat the exact same SSL_write() call arguments
* after an SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE result. Rumor has
* it that this is because each SSL_write() call reads from the buffer
* incrementally, and returns > 0 only after the final byte is processed.
* Rumor also has it that setting SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE and
* SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER voids this requirement, and that
* repeating the request with an increased request size is OK.
* Unfortunately all this is not or poorly documented, and one has to
* rely on statements from OpenSSL developers in public mailing archives.
*/
ssl_write_err = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
while (NBBIO_READ_PEND(plaintext_buf) > 0) {
ssl_stat = SSL_write(tls_context->con, NBBIO_READ_BUF(plaintext_buf),
NBBIO_READ_PEND(plaintext_buf));
ssl_write_err = SSL_get_error(tls_context->con, ssl_stat);
if (ssl_write_err != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
break;
/* Allow the plaintext pseudothread to read more data. */
NBBIO_READ_PEND(plaintext_buf) -= ssl_stat;
if (NBBIO_READ_PEND(plaintext_buf) > 0)
memmove(NBBIO_READ_BUF(plaintext_buf),
NBBIO_READ_BUF(plaintext_buf) + ssl_stat,
NBBIO_READ_PEND(plaintext_buf));
}
/*
* Try to move data from the TLS engine to the plaintext output buffer.
* Note: data may arrive as a side effect of calling SSL_write(),
* therefore we call SSL_read() after calling SSL_write().
*
* XXX We're supposed to repeat the exact same SSL_read() call arguments
* after an SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE result. This
* supposedly means that our plaintext writer must not memmove() the
* plaintext output buffer until after the SSL_read() call succeeds. For
* now I'll ignore this, because 1) SSL_read() is documented to return
* the bytes available, instead of returning > 0 only after the entire
* buffer is processed like SSL_write() does; and 2) there is no "read"
* equivalent of the SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY, SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
* or SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER features.
*/
ssl_read_err = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
while (NBBIO_WRITE_PEND(state->plaintext_buf) < NBBIO_BUFSIZE(plaintext_buf)) {
ssl_stat = SSL_read(tls_context->con,
NBBIO_WRITE_BUF(plaintext_buf)
+ NBBIO_WRITE_PEND(state->plaintext_buf),
NBBIO_BUFSIZE(plaintext_buf)
- NBBIO_WRITE_PEND(state->plaintext_buf));
ssl_read_err = SSL_get_error(tls_context->con, ssl_stat);
if (ssl_read_err != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
break;
NBBIO_WRITE_PEND(plaintext_buf) += ssl_stat;
}
/*
* Try to enable/disable ciphertext read/write events. If SSL_write() was
* satisfied, see if SSL_read() wants to do some work. In case of an
* unrecoverable error, this automagically destroys the session state
* after cleaning up all pending read/write and timeout event requests.
*/
if (tlsp_eval_tls_error(state, ssl_write_err != SSL_ERROR_NONE ?
ssl_write_err : ssl_read_err) < 0)
return;
/*
* Try to enable/disable plaintext read/write events. Basically, if we
* have nothing to write to the postscreen(8) server, see if there is
* something to read. If the write buffer is empty and the read buffer is
* full, suspend plaintext I/O until conditions change (but keep the
* timer active, as a safety mechanism in case ciphertext I/O gets
* stuck).
*
* XXX In theory, if the client keeps writing fast enough then we would
* never read from postscreen(8), and cause postscreen(8) to block. In
* practice, postscreen(8) limits the number of client commands, and thus
* postscreen(8)'s output will fit in a kernel buffer. This may not be
* true in other scenarios where the tlsproxy(8) server could be used.
*/
if (NBBIO_WRITE_PEND(plaintext_buf) > 0) {
if (NBBIO_ACTIVE_FLAGS(plaintext_buf) & NBBIO_FLAG_READ)
nbbio_disable_readwrite(plaintext_buf);
if ((NBBIO_ACTIVE_FLAGS(plaintext_buf) & NBBIO_FLAG_WRITE) == 0)
nbbio_enable_write(plaintext_buf, state->timeout);
} else if (NBBIO_READ_PEND(plaintext_buf) < NBBIO_BUFSIZE(plaintext_buf)) {
if (NBBIO_ACTIVE_FLAGS(plaintext_buf) & NBBIO_FLAG_WRITE)
nbbio_disable_readwrite(plaintext_buf);
if ((NBBIO_ACTIVE_FLAGS(plaintext_buf) & NBBIO_FLAG_READ) == 0)
nbbio_enable_read(plaintext_buf, state->timeout);
} else {
if (NBBIO_ACTIVE_FLAGS(plaintext_buf))
nbbio_slumber(plaintext_buf, state->timeout);
}
}
/* tlsp_plaintext_event - plaintext was read/written */
static void tlsp_plaintext_event(int event, void *context)
{
TLSP_STATE *state = (TLSP_STATE *) context;
/*
* Safety alert: the plaintext pseudothreads have "slumbered" for too
* long (see code above). This means that the ciphertext pseudothreads
* are stuck.
*/
if ((NBBIO_ERROR_FLAGS(state->plaintext_buf) & NBBIO_FLAG_TIMEOUT) != 0
&& NBBIO_ACTIVE_FLAGS(state->plaintext_buf) == 0)
msg_warn("deadlock on ciphertext stream for %s", state->remote_endpt);
/*
* This is easy, because the NBBIO layer has already done the event
* decoding and plaintext I/O for us. All we need to do is decide if we
* want to read or write more plaintext.
*/
tlsp_strategy(state);
}
/* tlsp_ciphertext_event - ciphertext is ready to read/write */
static void tlsp_ciphertext_event(int event, void *context)
{
TLSP_STATE *state = (TLSP_STATE *) context;
/*
* Without a TLS quivalent of the NBBIO layer, we must decode the events
* ourselves and do the ciphertext I/O. Then, we can decide if we want to
* read or write more ciphertext.
*/
if (event == EVENT_READ || event == EVENT_WRITE) {
tlsp_strategy(state);
} else {
if (event == EVENT_TIME && state->ssl_last_err == SSL_ERROR_NONE)
msg_warn("deadlock on plaintext stream for %s",
state->remote_endpt);
else
msg_warn("ciphertext read/write %s for %s",
event == EVENT_TIME ? "timeout" : "error",
state->remote_endpt);
tlsp_state_free(state);
}
}
/* tlsp_start_tls - turn on TLS or force disconnect */
static void tlsp_start_tls(TLSP_STATE *state)
{
TLS_SERVER_START_PROPS props;
static char *cipher_grade;
static VSTRING *cipher_exclusions;
/*
* The code in this routine is pasted literally from smtpd(8). I am not
* going to sanitize this because doing so surely will break things in
* unexpected ways.
*/
/*
* Perform the before-handshake portion of the per-session initialization.
* Pass a null VSTREAM to indicate that this program, will do the
* ciphertext I/O, not libtls.
*
* The cipher grade and exclusions don't change between sessions. Compute
* just once and cache.
*/
#define ADD_EXCLUDE(vstr, str) \
do { \
if (*(str)) \
vstring_sprintf_append((vstr), "%s%s", \
VSTRING_LEN(vstr) ? " " : "", (str)); \
} while (0)
if (cipher_grade == 0) {
cipher_grade =
var_tlsp_enforce_tls ? var_tlsp_tls_mand_ciph : var_tlsp_tls_ciph;
cipher_exclusions = vstring_alloc(10);
ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, var_tlsp_tls_excl_ciph);
if (var_tlsp_enforce_tls)
ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, var_tlsp_tls_mand_excl);
if (ask_client_cert)
ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, "aNULL");
}
state->tls_context =
TLS_SERVER_START(&props,
ctx = tlsp_server_ctx,
stream = (VSTREAM *) 0,/* unused */
fd = state->ciphertext_fd,
timeout = 0, /* unused */
requirecert = (var_tlsp_tls_req_ccert
&& var_tlsp_enforce_tls),
serverid = state->server_id,
namaddr = state->remote_endpt,
cipher_grade = cipher_grade,
cipher_exclusions = STR(cipher_exclusions),
mdalg = var_tlsp_tls_fpt_dgst);
if (state->tls_context == 0) {
tlsp_state_free(state);
return;
}
/*
* XXX Do we care about TLS session rate limits? Good postscreen(8)
* clients will occasionally require the tlsproxy to renew their
* whitelist status, but bad clients hammering the server can suck up
* lots of CPU cycles. Per-client concurrency limits in postscreen(8)
* will divert only naive security "researchers".
*
* XXX Do we care about certificate verification results? Not as long as
* postscreen(8) doesn't actually receive email.
*/
}
/* tlsp_get_fd_event - receive final postscreen(8) hand-off information */
static void tlsp_get_fd_event(int event, void *context)
{
const char *myname = "tlsp_get_fd_event";
TLSP_STATE *state = (TLSP_STATE *) context;
int plaintext_fd = vstream_fileno(state->plaintext_stream);
/*
* At this point we still manually manage plaintext read/write/timeout
* events. Disable I/O and timer events. Don't assume that the first
* plaintext request will be a read.
*/
event_disable_readwrite(plaintext_fd);
if (event != EVENT_TIME)
event_cancel_timer(tlsp_get_fd_event, (void *) state);
else
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
/*
* Initialize plaintext-related session state. Once we have this behind
* us, the TLSP_STATE destructor will automagically clean up requests for
* read/write/timeout events, which makes error recovery easier.
*
* Register the plaintext event handler for timer cleanup in the TLSP_STATE
* destructor. Insert the NBBIO event-driven I/O layer between the
* postscreen(8) server and the TLS engine.
*/
if (event != EVENT_READ
|| (state->ciphertext_fd = LOCAL_RECV_FD(plaintext_fd)) < 0) {
msg_warn("%s: receive SMTP client file descriptor: %m", myname);
tlsp_state_free(state);
return;
}
non_blocking(state->ciphertext_fd, NON_BLOCKING);
state->ciphertext_timer = tlsp_ciphertext_event;
state->plaintext_buf = nbbio_create(plaintext_fd,
VSTREAM_BUFSIZE, "postscreen",
tlsp_plaintext_event,
(void *) state);
/*
* Perform the TLS layer before-handshake initialization. We perform the
* remainder after the TLS handshake completes.
*/
tlsp_start_tls(state);
/*
* Trigger the initial proxy server I/Os.
*/
tlsp_strategy(state);
}
/* tlsp_get_request_event - receive initial postscreen(8) hand-off info */
static void tlsp_get_request_event(int event, void *context)
{
const char *myname = "tlsp_get_request_event";
TLSP_STATE *state = (TLSP_STATE *) context;
VSTREAM *plaintext_stream = state->plaintext_stream;
int plaintext_fd = vstream_fileno(plaintext_stream);
static VSTRING *remote_endpt;
static VSTRING *server_id;
int req_flags;
int timeout;
int ready;
/*
* One-time initialization.
*/
if (remote_endpt == 0) {
remote_endpt = vstring_alloc(10);
server_id = vstring_alloc(10);
}
/*
* At this point we still manually manage plaintext read/write/timeout
* events. Turn off timer events. Below we disable read events on error,
* and redefine read events on success.
*/
if (event != EVENT_TIME)
event_cancel_timer(tlsp_get_request_event, (void *) state);
else
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
/*
* We must send some data, after receiving the request attributes and
* before receiving the remote file descriptor. We can't assume
* UNIX-domain socket semantics here.
*/
if (event != EVENT_READ
|| attr_scan(plaintext_stream, ATTR_FLAG_STRICT,
RECV_ATTR_STR(MAIL_ATTR_REMOTE_ENDPT, remote_endpt),
RECV_ATTR_INT(MAIL_ATTR_FLAGS, &req_flags),
RECV_ATTR_INT(MAIL_ATTR_TIMEOUT, &timeout),
RECV_ATTR_STR(MAIL_ATTR_SERVER_ID, server_id),
ATTR_TYPE_END) != 4) {
msg_warn("%s: receive request attributes: %m", myname);
event_disable_readwrite(plaintext_fd);
tlsp_state_free(state);
return;
}
/*
* If the requested TLS engine is unavailable, hang up after making sure
* that the plaintext peer has received our "sorry" indication.
*/
ready = ((req_flags & TLS_PROXY_FLAG_ROLE_SERVER) != 0
&& tlsp_server_ctx != 0);
if (attr_print(plaintext_stream, ATTR_FLAG_NONE,
SEND_ATTR_INT(MAIL_ATTR_STATUS, ready),
ATTR_TYPE_END) != 0
|| vstream_fflush(plaintext_stream) != 0
|| ready == 0) {
read_wait(plaintext_fd, TLSP_INIT_TIMEOUT); /* XXX */
event_disable_readwrite(plaintext_fd);
tlsp_state_free(state);
return;
}
/*
* XXX We use the same fixed timeout throughout the entire session for
* both plaintext and ciphertext communication. This timeout is just a
* safety feature; the real timeout will be enforced by our plaintext
* peer.
*/
else {
state->remote_endpt = mystrdup(STR(remote_endpt));
state->server_id = mystrdup(STR(server_id));
msg_info("CONNECT %s %s",
(req_flags & TLS_PROXY_FLAG_ROLE_SERVER) ? "from" :
(req_flags & TLS_PROXY_FLAG_ROLE_CLIENT) ? "to" :
"(bogus_direction)", state->remote_endpt);
state->req_flags = req_flags;
state->timeout = timeout + 10; /* XXX */
event_enable_read(plaintext_fd, tlsp_get_fd_event, (void *) state);
event_request_timer(tlsp_get_fd_event, (void *) state,
TLSP_INIT_TIMEOUT);
return;
}
}
/* tlsp_service - handle new client connection */
static void tlsp_service(VSTREAM *plaintext_stream,
char *service,
char **argv)
{
TLSP_STATE *state;
int plaintext_fd = vstream_fileno(plaintext_stream);
/*
* Sanity check. This service takes no command-line arguments.
*/
if (argv[0])
msg_fatal("unexpected command-line argument: %s", argv[0]);
/*
* This program handles multiple connections, so it must not block. We
* use event-driven code for all operations that introduce latency.
* Except that attribute lists are sent/received synchronously, once the
* socket is found to be ready for transmission.
*/
non_blocking(plaintext_fd, NON_BLOCKING);
vstream_control(plaintext_stream,
CA_VSTREAM_CTL_PATH("plaintext"),
CA_VSTREAM_CTL_TIMEOUT(5),
CA_VSTREAM_CTL_END);
/*
* Receive postscreen's remote SMTP client address/port and socket.
*/
state = tlsp_state_create(service, plaintext_stream);
event_enable_read(plaintext_fd, tlsp_get_request_event, (void *) state);
event_request_timer(tlsp_get_request_event, (void *) state,
TLSP_INIT_TIMEOUT);
}
/* pre_jail_init - pre-jail initialization */
static void pre_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
{
TLS_SERVER_INIT_PROPS props;
const char *cert_file;
int have_server_cert;
int no_server_cert_ok;
int require_server_cert;
/*
* The code in this routine is pasted literally from smtpd(8). I am not
* going to sanitize this because doing so surely will break things in
* unexpected ways.
*/
if (*var_tlsp_tls_level) {
switch (tls_level_lookup(var_tlsp_tls_level)) {
default:
msg_fatal("Invalid TLS level \"%s\"", var_tlsp_tls_level);
/* NOTREACHED */
break;
case TLS_LEV_SECURE:
case TLS_LEV_VERIFY:
case TLS_LEV_FPRINT:
msg_warn("%s: unsupported TLS level \"%s\", using \"encrypt\"",
VAR_TLSP_TLS_LEVEL, var_tlsp_tls_level);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case TLS_LEV_ENCRYPT:
var_tlsp_enforce_tls = var_tlsp_use_tls = 1;
break;
case TLS_LEV_MAY:
var_tlsp_enforce_tls = 0;
var_tlsp_use_tls = 1;
break;
case TLS_LEV_NONE:
var_tlsp_enforce_tls = var_tlsp_use_tls = 0;
break;
}
}
var_tlsp_use_tls = var_tlsp_use_tls || var_tlsp_enforce_tls;
if (!var_tlsp_use_tls) {
msg_warn("TLS service is requested, but disabled with %s or %s",
VAR_TLSP_TLS_LEVEL, VAR_TLSP_USE_TLS);
return;
}
/*
* Load TLS keys before dropping privileges.
*
* Can't use anonymous ciphers if we want client certificates. Must use
* anonymous ciphers if we have no certificates.
*/
ask_client_cert = require_server_cert =
(var_tlsp_tls_ask_ccert
|| (var_tlsp_enforce_tls && var_tlsp_tls_req_ccert));
if (strcasecmp(var_tlsp_tls_cert_file, "none") == 0) {
no_server_cert_ok = 1;
cert_file = "";
} else {
no_server_cert_ok = 0;
cert_file = var_tlsp_tls_cert_file;
}
have_server_cert =
(*cert_file || *var_tlsp_tls_dcert_file || *var_tlsp_tls_eccert_file);
/* Some TLS configuration errors are not show stoppers. */
if (!have_server_cert && require_server_cert)
msg_warn("Need a server cert to request client certs");
if (!var_tlsp_enforce_tls && var_tlsp_tls_req_ccert)
msg_warn("Can't require client certs unless TLS is required");
/* After a show-stopper error, log a warning. */
if (have_server_cert || (no_server_cert_ok && !require_server_cert))
/*
* Large parameter lists are error-prone, so we emulate a language
* feature that C does not have natively: named parameter lists.
*/
tlsp_server_ctx =
TLS_SERVER_INIT(&props,
log_param = VAR_TLSP_TLS_LOGLEVEL,
log_level = var_tlsp_tls_loglevel,
verifydepth = var_tlsp_tls_ccert_vd,
cache_type = TLS_MGR_SCACHE_SMTPD,
set_sessid = var_tlsp_tls_set_sessid,
cert_file = cert_file,
key_file = var_tlsp_tls_key_file,
dcert_file = var_tlsp_tls_dcert_file,
dkey_file = var_tlsp_tls_dkey_file,
eccert_file = var_tlsp_tls_eccert_file,
eckey_file = var_tlsp_tls_eckey_file,
CAfile = var_tlsp_tls_CAfile,
CApath = var_tlsp_tls_CApath,
dh1024_param_file
= var_tlsp_tls_dh1024_param_file,
dh512_param_file
= var_tlsp_tls_dh512_param_file,
eecdh_grade = var_tlsp_tls_eecdh,
protocols = var_tlsp_enforce_tls ?
var_tlsp_tls_mand_proto :
var_tlsp_tls_proto,
ask_ccert = ask_client_cert,
mdalg = var_tlsp_tls_fpt_dgst);
else
msg_warn("No server certs available. TLS can't be enabled");
/*
* To maintain sanity, allow partial SSL_write() operations, and allow
* SSL_write() buffer pointers to change after a WANT_READ or WANT_WRITE
* result. This is based on OpenSSL developers talking on a mailing list,
* but is not supported by documentation. If this code stops working then
* no-one can be held responsible.
*/
if (tlsp_server_ctx)
SSL_CTX_set_mode(tlsp_server_ctx->ssl_ctx,
SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
| SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
}
/* post_jail_init - post-jail initialization */
static void post_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
{
/* void */ ;
}
MAIL_VERSION_STAMP_DECLARE;
/* main - the main program */
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
static const CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, &var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd, 0, 0,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_NINT_TABLE nint_table[] = {
VAR_TLSP_TLS_CCERT_VD, DEF_TLSP_TLS_CCERT_VD, &var_tlsp_tls_ccert_vd, 0, 0,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
VAR_TLSP_WATCHDOG, DEF_TLSP_WATCHDOG, &var_tlsp_watchdog, 10, 0,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_BOOL_TABLE bool_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS, &var_smtpd_use_tls,
VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtpd_enforce_tls,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, &var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, &var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SET_SESSID, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SET_SESSID, &var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_NBOOL_TABLE nbool_table[] = {
VAR_TLSP_USE_TLS, DEF_TLSP_USE_TLS, &var_tlsp_use_tls,
VAR_TLSP_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_TLSP_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_tlsp_enforce_tls,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_ACERT, DEF_TLSP_TLS_ACERT, &var_tlsp_tls_ask_ccert,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_RCERT, DEF_TLSP_TLS_RCERT, &var_tlsp_tls_req_ccert,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_SET_SESSID, DEF_TLSP_TLS_SET_SESSID, &var_tlsp_tls_set_sessid,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtpd_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_ciph, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_EXCL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_EXCL, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_PROTO, &var_smtpd_tls_proto, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_PROTO, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_EECDH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_EECDH, &var_smtpd_tls_eecdh, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_FPT_DGST, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_FPT_DGST, &var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_level, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_eccert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_eckey_file, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_TLSP_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_tlsp_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_CIPH, DEF_TLSP_TLS_CIPH, &var_tlsp_tls_ciph, 1, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_MAND_CIPH, DEF_TLSP_TLS_MAND_CIPH, &var_tlsp_tls_mand_ciph, 1, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, DEF_TLSP_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, &var_tlsp_tls_excl_ciph, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_MAND_EXCL, DEF_TLSP_TLS_MAND_EXCL, &var_tlsp_tls_mand_excl, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_PROTO, DEF_TLSP_TLS_PROTO, &var_tlsp_tls_proto, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_MAND_PROTO, DEF_TLSP_TLS_MAND_PROTO, &var_tlsp_tls_mand_proto, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_512_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_512_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_dh512_param_file, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_1024_FILE, DEF_TLSP_TLS_1024_FILE, &var_tlsp_tls_dh1024_param_file, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_EECDH, DEF_TLSP_TLS_EECDH, &var_tlsp_tls_eecdh, 1, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_FPT_DGST, DEF_TLSP_TLS_FPT_DGST, &var_tlsp_tls_fpt_dgst, 1, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_TLSP_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_tlsp_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
VAR_TLSP_TLS_LEVEL, DEF_TLSP_TLS_LEVEL, &var_tlsp_tls_level, 0, 0,
0,
};
/*
* Fingerprint executables and core dumps.
*/
MAIL_VERSION_STAMP_ALLOCATE;
/*
* Pass control to the single-threaded service skeleton.
*/
event_server_main(argc, argv, tlsp_service,
CA_MAIL_SERVER_INT_TABLE(int_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_NINT_TABLE(nint_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_STR_TABLE(str_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_BOOL_TABLE(bool_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_NBOOL_TABLE(nbool_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_TIME_TABLE(time_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_PRE_INIT(pre_jail_init),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_POST_INIT(post_jail_init),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_SLOW_EXIT(tlsp_drain),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_WATCHDOG(&var_tlsp_watchdog),
0);
}
#else
/* tlsp_service - respond to external trigger(s), non-TLS version */
static void tlsp_service(VSTREAM *stream, char *unused_service,
char **unused_argv)
{
msg_info("TLS support is not compiled in -- exiting");
event_server_disconnect(stream);
}
/* main - the main program */
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
/*
* We can't simply use msg_fatal() here, because the logging hasn't been
* initialized. The text would disappear because stderr is redirected to
* /dev/null.
*
* We invoke event_server_main() to complete program initialization
* (including logging) and then invoke the tlsp_service() routine to log
* the message that says why this program will not run.
*/
event_server_main(argc, argv, tlsp_service,
0);
}
#endif