| Current File : //root/postfix-3.2.0/src/smtpd/smtpd.c |
/*++
/* NAME
/* smtpd 8
/* SUMMARY
/* Postfix SMTP server
/* SYNOPSIS
/* \fBsmtpd\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
/*
/* \fBsendmail -bs\fR
/* DESCRIPTION
/* The SMTP server accepts network connection requests
/* and performs zero or more SMTP transactions per connection.
/* Each received message is piped through the \fBcleanup\fR(8)
/* daemon, and is placed into the \fBincoming\fR queue as one
/* single queue file. For this mode of operation, the program
/* expects to be run from the \fBmaster\fR(8) process manager.
/*
/* Alternatively, the SMTP server be can run in stand-alone
/* mode; this is traditionally obtained with "\fBsendmail
/* -bs\fR". When the SMTP server runs stand-alone with non
/* $\fBmail_owner\fR privileges, it receives mail even while
/* the mail system is not running, deposits messages directly
/* into the \fBmaildrop\fR queue, and disables the SMTP server's
/* access policies. As of Postfix version 2.3, the SMTP server
/* refuses to receive mail from the network when it runs with
/* non $\fBmail_owner\fR privileges.
/*
/* The SMTP server implements a variety of policies for connection
/* requests, and for parameters given to \fBHELO, ETRN, MAIL FROM, VRFY\fR
/* and \fBRCPT TO\fR commands. They are detailed below and in the
/* \fBmain.cf\fR configuration file.
/* SECURITY
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The SMTP server is moderately security-sensitive. It talks to SMTP
/* clients and to DNS servers on the network. The SMTP server can be
/* run chrooted at fixed low privilege.
/* STANDARDS
/* RFC 821 (SMTP protocol)
/* RFC 1123 (Host requirements)
/* RFC 1652 (8bit-MIME transport)
/* RFC 1869 (SMTP service extensions)
/* RFC 1870 (Message size declaration)
/* RFC 1985 (ETRN command)
/* RFC 2034 (SMTP enhanced status codes)
/* RFC 2554 (AUTH command)
/* RFC 2821 (SMTP protocol)
/* RFC 2920 (SMTP pipelining)
/* RFC 3207 (STARTTLS command)
/* RFC 3461 (SMTP DSN extension)
/* RFC 3463 (Enhanced status codes)
/* RFC 3848 (ESMTP transmission types)
/* RFC 4409 (Message submission)
/* RFC 4954 (AUTH command)
/* RFC 5321 (SMTP protocol)
/* RFC 6531 (Internationalized SMTP)
/* RFC 6533 (Internationalized Delivery Status Notifications)
/* RFC 7505 ("Null MX" No Service Resource Record)
/* DIAGNOSTICS
/* Problems and transactions are logged to \fBsyslogd\fR(8).
/*
/* Depending on the setting of the \fBnotify_classes\fR parameter,
/* the postmaster is notified of bounces, protocol problems,
/* policy violations, and of other trouble.
/* CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Changes to \fBmain.cf\fR are picked up automatically, as \fBsmtpd\fR(8)
/* processes run for only a limited amount of time. Use the command
/* "\fBpostfix reload\fR" to speed up a change.
/*
/* The text below provides only a parameter summary. See
/* \fBpostconf\fR(5) for more details including examples.
/* COMPATIBILITY CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The following parameters work around implementation errors in other
/* software, and/or allow you to override standards in order to prevent
/* undesirable use.
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* .IP "\fBbroken_sasl_auth_clients (no)\fR"
/* Enable interoperability with remote SMTP clients that implement an obsolete
/* version of the AUTH command (RFC 4954).
/* .IP "\fBdisable_vrfy_command (no)\fR"
/* Disable the SMTP VRFY command.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_noop_commands (empty)\fR"
/* List of commands that the Postfix SMTP server replies to with "250
/* Ok", without doing any syntax checks and without changing state.
/* .IP "\fBstrict_rfc821_envelopes (no)\fR"
/* Require that addresses received in SMTP MAIL FROM and RCPT TO
/* commands are enclosed with <>, and that those addresses do
/* not contain RFC 822 style comments or phrases.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_sender (no)\fR"
/* Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail from unknown
/* sender addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_sender
/* access restriction is specified.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks (empty)\fR"
/* What remote SMTP clients the Postfix SMTP server will not offer
/* AUTH support to.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Lookup tables, indexed by the remote SMTP client address, with
/* case insensitive lists of EHLO keywords (pipelining, starttls, auth,
/* etc.) that the Postfix SMTP server will not send in the EHLO response
/* to a
/* remote SMTP client.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords (empty)\fR"
/* A case insensitive list of EHLO keywords (pipelining, starttls,
/* auth, etc.) that the Postfix SMTP server will not send in the EHLO
/* response
/* to a remote SMTP client.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_delay_open_until_valid_rcpt (yes)\fR"
/* Postpone the start of an SMTP mail transaction until a valid
/* RCPT TO command is received.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_always_issue_session_ids (yes)\fR"
/* Force the Postfix SMTP server to issue a TLS session id, even
/* when TLS session caching is turned off (smtpd_tls_session_cache_database
/* is empty).
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later:
/* .IP "\fBtcp_windowsize (0)\fR"
/* An optional workaround for routers that break TCP window scaling.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.7 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_command_filter (empty)\fR"
/* A mechanism to transform commands from remote SMTP clients.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.9 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_per_record_deadline (normal: no, overload: yes)\fR"
/* Change the behavior of the smtpd_timeout and smtpd_starttls_timeout
/* time limits, from a
/* time limit per read or write system call, to a time limit to send
/* or receive a complete record (an SMTP command line, SMTP response
/* line, SMTP message content line, or TLS protocol message).
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_dns_reply_filter (empty)\fR"
/* Optional filter for Postfix SMTP server DNS lookup results.
/* ADDRESS REWRITING CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* See the ADDRESS_REWRITING_README document for a detailed
/* discussion of Postfix address rewriting.
/* .IP "\fBreceive_override_options (empty)\fR"
/* Enable or disable recipient validation, built-in content
/* filtering, or address mapping.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later:
/* .IP "\fBlocal_header_rewrite_clients (permit_inet_interfaces)\fR"
/* Rewrite message header addresses in mail from these clients and
/* update incomplete addresses with the domain name in $myorigin or
/* $mydomain; either don't rewrite message headers from other clients
/* at all, or rewrite message headers and update incomplete addresses
/* with the domain specified in the remote_header_rewrite_domain
/* parameter.
/* BEFORE-SMTPD PROXY AGENT
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_upstream_proxy_protocol (empty)\fR"
/* The name of the proxy protocol used by an optional before-smtpd
/* proxy agent.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_upstream_proxy_timeout (5s)\fR"
/* The time limit for the proxy protocol specified with the
/* smtpd_upstream_proxy_protocol parameter.
/* AFTER QUEUE EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* As of version 1.0, Postfix can be configured to send new mail to
/* an external content filter AFTER the mail is queued. This content
/* filter is expected to inject mail back into a (Postfix or other)
/* MTA for further delivery. See the FILTER_README document for details.
/* .IP "\fBcontent_filter (empty)\fR"
/* After the message is queued, send the entire message to the
/* specified \fItransport:destination\fR.
/* BEFORE QUEUE EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* As of version 2.1, the Postfix SMTP server can be configured
/* to send incoming mail to a real-time SMTP-based content filter
/* BEFORE mail is queued. This content filter is expected to inject
/* mail back into Postfix. See the SMTPD_PROXY_README document for
/* details on how to configure and operate this feature.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_filter (empty)\fR"
/* The hostname and TCP port of the mail filtering proxy server.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_ehlo ($myhostname)\fR"
/* How the Postfix SMTP server announces itself to the proxy filter.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_options (empty)\fR"
/* List of options that control how the Postfix SMTP server
/* communicates with a before-queue content filter.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_timeout (100s)\fR"
/* The time limit for connecting to a proxy filter and for sending or
/* receiving information.
/* BEFORE QUEUE MILTER CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* As of version 2.3, Postfix supports the Sendmail version 8
/* Milter (mail filter) protocol. These content filters run
/* outside Postfix. They can inspect the SMTP command stream
/* and the message content, and can request modifications before
/* mail is queued. For details see the MILTER_README document.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_milters (empty)\fR"
/* A list of Milter (mail filter) applications for new mail that
/* arrives via the Postfix \fBsmtpd\fR(8) server.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_protocol (6)\fR"
/* The mail filter protocol version and optional protocol extensions
/* for communication with a Milter application; prior to Postfix 2.6
/* the default protocol is 2.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_default_action (tempfail)\fR"
/* The default action when a Milter (mail filter) application is
/* unavailable or mis-configured.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_daemon_name ($myhostname)\fR"
/* The {daemon_name} macro value for Milter (mail filter) applications.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_v ($mail_name $mail_version)\fR"
/* The {v} macro value for Milter (mail filter) applications.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_connect_timeout (30s)\fR"
/* The time limit for connecting to a Milter (mail filter)
/* application, and for negotiating protocol options.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_command_timeout (30s)\fR"
/* The time limit for sending an SMTP command to a Milter (mail
/* filter) application, and for receiving the response.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_content_timeout (300s)\fR"
/* The time limit for sending message content to a Milter (mail
/* filter) application, and for receiving the response.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_connect_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
/* after completion of an SMTP connection.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_helo_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
/* after the SMTP HELO or EHLO command.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_mail_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
/* after the SMTP MAIL FROM command.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_rcpt_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
/* after the SMTP RCPT TO command.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_data_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The macros that are sent to version 4 or higher Milter (mail
/* filter) applications after the SMTP DATA command.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_unknown_command_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The macros that are sent to version 3 or higher Milter (mail
/* filter) applications after an unknown SMTP command.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_end_of_header_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
/* after the end of the message header.
/* .IP "\fBmilter_end_of_data_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
/* after the message end-of-data.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_defaults (empty)\fR"
/* Optional list of \fIname=value\fR pairs that specify default
/* values for arbitrary macros that Postfix may send to Milter
/* applications.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_milter_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Lookup tables with Milter settings per remote SMTP client IP
/* address.
/* GENERAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The following parameters are applicable for both built-in
/* and external content filters.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBreceive_override_options (empty)\fR"
/* Enable or disable recipient validation, built-in content
/* filtering, or address mapping.
/* EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The following parameters are applicable for both before-queue
/* and after-queue content filtering.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_xforward_hosts (empty)\fR"
/* What remote SMTP clients are allowed to use the XFORWARD feature.
/* SASL AUTHENTICATION CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Postfix SASL support (RFC 4954) can be used to authenticate remote
/* SMTP clients to the Postfix SMTP server, and to authenticate the
/* Postfix SMTP client to a remote SMTP server.
/* See the SASL_README document for details.
/* .IP "\fBbroken_sasl_auth_clients (no)\fR"
/* Enable interoperability with remote SMTP clients that implement an obsolete
/* version of the AUTH command (RFC 4954).
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_auth_enable (no)\fR"
/* Enable SASL authentication in the Postfix SMTP server.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_local_domain (empty)\fR"
/* The name of the Postfix SMTP server's local SASL authentication
/* realm.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_security_options (noanonymous)\fR"
/* Postfix SMTP server SASL security options; as of Postfix 2.3
/* the list of available
/* features depends on the SASL server implementation that is selected
/* with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sender_login_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Optional lookup table with the SASL login names that own the sender
/* (MAIL FROM) addresses.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks (empty)\fR"
/* What remote SMTP clients the Postfix SMTP server will not offer
/* AUTH support to.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and 2.2:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_application_name (smtpd)\fR"
/* The application name that the Postfix SMTP server uses for SASL
/* server initialization.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_authenticated_header (no)\fR"
/* Report the SASL authenticated user name in the \fBsmtpd\fR(8) Received
/* message header.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_path (smtpd)\fR"
/* Implementation-specific information that the Postfix SMTP server
/* passes through to
/* the SASL plug-in implementation that is selected with
/* \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_type (cyrus)\fR"
/* The SASL plug-in type that the Postfix SMTP server should use
/* for authentication.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later:
/* .IP "\fBcyrus_sasl_config_path (empty)\fR"
/* Search path for Cyrus SASL application configuration files,
/* currently used only to locate the $smtpd_sasl_path.conf file.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_service (smtp)\fR"
/* The service name that is passed to the SASL plug-in that is
/* selected with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR and \fBsmtpd_sasl_path\fR.
/* STARTTLS SUPPORT CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Detailed information about STARTTLS configuration may be
/* found in the TLS_README document.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_security_level (empty)\fR"
/* The SMTP TLS security level for the Postfix SMTP server; when
/* a non-empty value is specified, this overrides the obsolete parameters
/* smtpd_use_tls and smtpd_enforce_tls.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_tls_security_options ($smtpd_sasl_security_options)\fR"
/* The SASL authentication security options that the Postfix SMTP
/* server uses for TLS encrypted SMTP sessions.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_starttls_timeout (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The time limit for Postfix SMTP server write and read operations
/* during TLS startup and shutdown handshake procedures.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_CAfile (empty)\fR"
/* A file containing (PEM format) CA certificates of root CAs trusted
/* to sign either remote SMTP client certificates or intermediate CA
/* certificates.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_CApath (empty)\fR"
/* A directory containing (PEM format) CA certificates of root CAs
/* trusted to sign either remote SMTP client certificates or intermediate CA
/* certificates.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_always_issue_session_ids (yes)\fR"
/* Force the Postfix SMTP server to issue a TLS session id, even
/* when TLS session caching is turned off (smtpd_tls_session_cache_database
/* is empty).
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ask_ccert (no)\fR"
/* Ask a remote SMTP client for a client certificate.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_auth_only (no)\fR"
/* When TLS encryption is optional in the Postfix SMTP server, do
/* not announce or accept SASL authentication over unencrypted
/* connections.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth (9)\fR"
/* The verification depth for remote SMTP client certificates.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_cert_file (empty)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix SMTP server RSA certificate in PEM format.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_exclude_ciphers (empty)\fR"
/* List of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the SMTP server
/* cipher list at all TLS security levels.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dcert_file (empty)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix SMTP server DSA certificate in PEM format.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file (empty)\fR"
/* File with DH parameters that the Postfix SMTP server should
/* use with non-export EDH ciphers.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dh512_param_file (empty)\fR"
/* File with DH parameters that the Postfix SMTP server should
/* use with export-grade EDH ciphers.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dkey_file ($smtpd_tls_dcert_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix SMTP server DSA private key in PEM format.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_key_file ($smtpd_tls_cert_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix SMTP server RSA private key in PEM format.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_loglevel (0)\fR"
/* Enable additional Postfix SMTP server logging of TLS activity.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_ciphers (medium)\fR"
/* The minimum TLS cipher grade that the Postfix SMTP server will
/* use with mandatory TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_exclude_ciphers (empty)\fR"
/* Additional list of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the
/* Postfix SMTP server cipher list at mandatory TLS security levels.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols (!SSLv2, !SSLv3)\fR"
/* The SSL/TLS protocols accepted by the Postfix SMTP server with
/* mandatory TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_received_header (no)\fR"
/* Request that the Postfix SMTP server produces Received: message
/* headers that include information about the protocol and cipher used,
/* as well as the remote SMTP client CommonName and client certificate issuer
/* CommonName.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_req_ccert (no)\fR"
/* With mandatory TLS encryption, require a trusted remote SMTP client
/* certificate in order to allow TLS connections to proceed.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_wrappermode (no)\fR"
/* Run the Postfix SMTP server in the non-standard "wrapper" mode,
/* instead of using the STARTTLS command.
/* .IP "\fBtls_daemon_random_bytes (32)\fR"
/* The number of pseudo-random bytes that an \fBsmtp\fR(8) or \fBsmtpd\fR(8)
/* process requests from the \fBtlsmgr\fR(8) server in order to seed its
/* internal pseudo random number generator (PRNG).
/* .IP "\fBtls_high_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "high" grade ciphers.
/* .IP "\fBtls_medium_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "medium" or higher grade ciphers.
/* .IP "\fBtls_low_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "low" or higher grade ciphers.
/* .IP "\fBtls_export_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "export" or higher grade ciphers.
/* .IP "\fBtls_null_cipherlist (eNULL:!aNULL)\fR"
/* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "NULL" grade ciphers that provide
/* authentication without encryption.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_fingerprint_digest (md5)\fR"
/* The message digest algorithm to construct remote SMTP
/* client-certificate
/* fingerprints or public key fingerprints (Postfix 2.9 and later)
/* for \fBcheck_ccert_access\fR and \fBpermit_tls_clientcerts\fR.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_protocols (!SSLv2, !SSLv3)\fR"
/* List of TLS protocols that the Postfix SMTP server will exclude
/* or include with opportunistic TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ciphers (medium)\fR"
/* The minimum TLS cipher grade that the Postfix SMTP server
/* will use with opportunistic TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eccert_file (empty)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix SMTP server ECDSA certificate in PEM format.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eckey_file ($smtpd_tls_eccert_file)\fR"
/* File with the Postfix SMTP server ECDSA private key in PEM format.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eecdh_grade (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server security grade for ephemeral elliptic-curve
/* Diffie-Hellman (EECDH) key exchange.
/* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_strong_curve (prime256v1)\fR"
/* The elliptic curve used by the Postfix SMTP server for sensibly
/* strong
/* ephemeral ECDH key exchange.
/* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_ultra_curve (secp384r1)\fR"
/* The elliptic curve used by the Postfix SMTP server for maximally
/* strong
/* ephemeral ECDH key exchange.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.8 and later:
/* .IP "\fBtls_preempt_cipherlist (no)\fR"
/* With SSLv3 and later, use the Postfix SMTP server's cipher
/* preference order instead of the remote client's cipher preference
/* order.
/* .IP "\fBtls_disable_workarounds (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* List or bit-mask of OpenSSL bug work-arounds to disable.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later:
/* .IP "\fBtlsmgr_service_name (tlsmgr)\fR"
/* The name of the \fBtlsmgr\fR(8) service entry in master.cf.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later:
/* .IP "\fBtls_session_ticket_cipher (Postfix >= 3.0: aes-256-cbc, Postfix < 3.0: aes-128-cbc)\fR"
/* Algorithm used to encrypt RFC5077 TLS session tickets.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later:
/* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_auto_curves (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The prioritized list of elliptic curves supported by the Postfix
/* SMTP client and server.
/* OBSOLETE STARTTLS CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The following configuration parameters exist for compatibility
/* with Postfix versions before 2.3. Support for these will
/* be removed in a future release.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_use_tls (no)\fR"
/* Opportunistic TLS: announce STARTTLS support to remote SMTP clients,
/* but do not require that clients use TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_enforce_tls (no)\fR"
/* Mandatory TLS: announce STARTTLS support to remote SMTP clients,
/* and require that clients use TLS encryption.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_cipherlist (empty)\fR"
/* Obsolete Postfix < 2.3 control for the Postfix SMTP server TLS
/* cipher list.
/* SMTPUTF8 CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Preliminary SMTPUTF8 support is introduced with Postfix 3.0.
/* .IP "\fBsmtputf8_enable (yes)\fR"
/* Enable preliminary SMTPUTF8 support for the protocols described
/* in RFC 6531..6533.
/* .IP "\fBstrict_smtputf8 (no)\fR"
/* Enable stricter enforcement of the SMTPUTF8 protocol.
/* .IP "\fBsmtputf8_autodetect_classes (sendmail, verify)\fR"
/* Detect that a message requires SMTPUTF8 support for the specified
/* mail origin classes.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later:
/* .IP "\fBenable_idna2003_compatibility (no)\fR"
/* Enable 'transitional' compatibility between IDNA2003 and IDNA2008,
/* when converting UTF-8 domain names to/from the ASCII form that is
/* used for DNS lookups.
/* VERP SUPPORT CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* With VERP style delivery, each recipient of a message receives a
/* customized copy of the message with his/her own recipient address
/* encoded in the envelope sender address. The VERP_README file
/* describes configuration and operation details of Postfix support
/* for variable envelope return path addresses. VERP style delivery
/* is requested with the SMTP XVERP command or with the "sendmail
/* -V" command-line option and is available in Postfix version 1.1
/* and later.
/* .IP "\fBdefault_verp_delimiters (+=)\fR"
/* The two default VERP delimiter characters.
/* .IP "\fBverp_delimiter_filter (-=+)\fR"
/* The characters Postfix accepts as VERP delimiter characters on the
/* Postfix \fBsendmail\fR(1) command line and in SMTP commands.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 1.1 and 2.0:
/* .IP "\fBauthorized_verp_clients ($mynetworks)\fR"
/* What remote SMTP clients are allowed to specify the XVERP command.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_verp_clients ($authorized_verp_clients)\fR"
/* What remote SMTP clients are allowed to specify the XVERP command.
/* TROUBLE SHOOTING CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The DEBUG_README document describes how to debug parts of the
/* Postfix mail system. The methods vary from making the software log
/* a lot of detail, to running some daemon processes under control of
/* a call tracer or debugger.
/* .IP "\fBdebug_peer_level (2)\fR"
/* The increment in verbose logging level when a remote client or
/* server matches a pattern in the debug_peer_list parameter.
/* .IP "\fBdebug_peer_list (empty)\fR"
/* Optional list of remote client or server hostname or network
/* address patterns that cause the verbose logging level to increase
/* by the amount specified in $debug_peer_level.
/* .IP "\fBerror_notice_recipient (postmaster)\fR"
/* The recipient of postmaster notifications about mail delivery
/* problems that are caused by policy, resource, software or protocol
/* errors.
/* .IP "\fBinternal_mail_filter_classes (empty)\fR"
/* What categories of Postfix-generated mail are subject to
/* before-queue content inspection by non_smtpd_milters, header_checks
/* and body_checks.
/* .IP "\fBnotify_classes (resource, software)\fR"
/* The list of error classes that are reported to the postmaster.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_footer (empty)\fR"
/* Optional information that is appended after each Postfix SMTP
/* server
/* 4XX or 5XX response.
/* .IP "\fBsoft_bounce (no)\fR"
/* Safety net to keep mail queued that would otherwise be returned to
/* the sender.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_xclient_hosts (empty)\fR"
/* What remote SMTP clients are allowed to use the XCLIENT feature.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_log_access_permit_actions (empty)\fR"
/* Enable logging of the named "permit" actions in SMTP server
/* access lists (by default, the SMTP server logs "reject" actions but
/* not "permit" actions).
/* KNOWN VERSUS UNKNOWN RECIPIENT CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* As of Postfix version 2.0, the SMTP server rejects mail for
/* unknown recipients. This prevents the mail queue from clogging up
/* with undeliverable MAILER-DAEMON messages. Additional information
/* on this topic is in the LOCAL_RECIPIENT_README and ADDRESS_CLASS_README
/* documents.
/* .IP "\fBshow_user_unknown_table_name (yes)\fR"
/* Display the name of the recipient table in the "User unknown"
/* responses.
/* .IP "\fBcanonical_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Optional address mapping lookup tables for message headers and
/* envelopes.
/* .IP "\fBrecipient_canonical_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Optional address mapping lookup tables for envelope and header
/* recipient addresses.
/* .IP "\fBsender_canonical_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Optional address mapping lookup tables for envelope and header
/* sender addresses.
/* .PP
/* Parameters concerning known/unknown local recipients:
/* .IP "\fBmydestination ($myhostname, localhost.$mydomain, localhost)\fR"
/* The list of domains that are delivered via the $local_transport
/* mail delivery transport.
/* .IP "\fBinet_interfaces (all)\fR"
/* The network interface addresses that this mail system receives
/* mail on.
/* .IP "\fBproxy_interfaces (empty)\fR"
/* The network interface addresses that this mail system receives mail
/* on by way of a proxy or network address translation unit.
/* .IP "\fBinet_protocols (all)\fR"
/* The Internet protocols Postfix will attempt to use when making
/* or accepting connections.
/* .IP "\fBlocal_recipient_maps (proxy:unix:passwd.byname $alias_maps)\fR"
/* Lookup tables with all names or addresses of local recipients:
/* a recipient address is local when its domain matches $mydestination,
/* $inet_interfaces or $proxy_interfaces.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_local_recipient_reject_code (550)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a recipient
/* address is local, and $local_recipient_maps specifies a list of
/* lookup tables that does not match the recipient.
/* .PP
/* Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients of relay destinations:
/* .IP "\fBrelay_domains (Postfix >= 3.0: empty, Postfix < 3.0: $mydestination)\fR"
/* What destination domains (and subdomains thereof) this system
/* will relay mail to.
/* .IP "\fBrelay_recipient_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Optional lookup tables with all valid addresses in the domains
/* that match $relay_domains.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_relay_recipient_reject_code (550)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient
/* address matches $relay_domains, and relay_recipient_maps specifies
/* a list of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address.
/* .PP
/* Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients in virtual alias
/* domains:
/* .IP "\fBvirtual_alias_domains ($virtual_alias_maps)\fR"
/* Postfix is final destination for the specified list of virtual
/* alias domains, that is, domains for which all addresses are aliased
/* to addresses in other local or remote domains.
/* .IP "\fBvirtual_alias_maps ($virtual_maps)\fR"
/* Optional lookup tables that alias specific mail addresses or domains
/* to other local or remote address.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_virtual_alias_reject_code (550)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient address matches
/* $virtual_alias_domains, and $virtual_alias_maps specifies a list
/* of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address.
/* .PP
/* Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients in virtual mailbox
/* domains:
/* .IP "\fBvirtual_mailbox_domains ($virtual_mailbox_maps)\fR"
/* Postfix is final destination for the specified list of domains;
/* mail is delivered via the $virtual_transport mail delivery transport.
/* .IP "\fBvirtual_mailbox_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Optional lookup tables with all valid addresses in the domains that
/* match $virtual_mailbox_domains.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_virtual_mailbox_reject_code (550)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient address matches
/* $virtual_mailbox_domains, and $virtual_mailbox_maps specifies a list
/* of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address.
/* RESOURCE AND RATE CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The following parameters limit resource usage by the SMTP
/* server and/or control client request rates.
/* .IP "\fBline_length_limit (2048)\fR"
/* Upon input, long lines are chopped up into pieces of at most
/* this length; upon delivery, long lines are reconstructed.
/* .IP "\fBqueue_minfree (0)\fR"
/* The minimal amount of free space in bytes in the queue file system
/* that is needed to receive mail.
/* .IP "\fBmessage_size_limit (10240000)\fR"
/* The maximal size in bytes of a message, including envelope information.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_limit (1000)\fR"
/* The maximal number of recipients that the Postfix SMTP server
/* accepts per message delivery request.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_timeout (normal: 300s, overload: 10s)\fR"
/* The time limit for sending a Postfix SMTP server response and for
/* receiving a remote SMTP client request.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_history_flush_threshold (100)\fR"
/* The maximal number of lines in the Postfix SMTP server command history
/* before it is flushed upon receipt of EHLO, RSET, or end of DATA.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_peername_lookup (yes)\fR"
/* Attempt to look up the remote SMTP client hostname, and verify that
/* the name matches the client IP address.
/* .PP
/* The per SMTP client connection count and request rate limits are
/* implemented in co-operation with the \fBanvil\fR(8) service, and
/* are available in Postfix version 2.2 and later.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_connection_count_limit (50)\fR"
/* How many simultaneous connections any client is allowed to
/* make to this service.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_connection_rate_limit (0)\fR"
/* The maximal number of connection attempts any client is allowed to
/* make to this service per time unit.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_message_rate_limit (0)\fR"
/* The maximal number of message delivery requests that any client is
/* allowed to make to this service per time unit, regardless of whether
/* or not Postfix actually accepts those messages.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_recipient_rate_limit (0)\fR"
/* The maximal number of recipient addresses that any client is allowed
/* to send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not
/* Postfix actually accepts those recipients.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_event_limit_exceptions ($mynetworks)\fR"
/* Clients that are excluded from smtpd_client_*_count/rate_limit
/* restrictions.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_new_tls_session_rate_limit (0)\fR"
/* The maximal number of new (i.e., uncached) TLS sessions that a
/* remote SMTP client is allowed to negotiate with this service per
/* time unit.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.9 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_per_record_deadline (normal: no, overload: yes)\fR"
/* Change the behavior of the smtpd_timeout and smtpd_starttls_timeout
/* time limits, from a
/* time limit per read or write system call, to a time limit to send
/* or receive a complete record (an SMTP command line, SMTP response
/* line, SMTP message content line, or TLS protocol message).
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_auth_rate_limit (0)\fR"
/* The maximal number of AUTH commands that any client is allowed to
/* send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not
/* Postfix actually accepts those commands.
/* TARPIT CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* When a remote SMTP client makes errors, the Postfix SMTP server
/* can insert delays before responding. This can help to slow down
/* run-away software. The behavior is controlled by an error counter
/* that counts the number of errors within an SMTP session that a
/* client makes without delivering mail.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_error_sleep_time (1s)\fR"
/* With Postfix version 2.1 and later: the SMTP server response delay after
/* a client has made more than $smtpd_soft_error_limit errors, and
/* fewer than $smtpd_hard_error_limit errors, without delivering mail.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_soft_error_limit (10)\fR"
/* The number of errors a remote SMTP client is allowed to make without
/* delivering mail before the Postfix SMTP server slows down all its
/* responses.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_hard_error_limit (normal: 20, overload: 1)\fR"
/* The maximal number of errors a remote SMTP client is allowed to
/* make without delivering mail.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_junk_command_limit (normal: 100, overload: 1)\fR"
/* The number of junk commands (NOOP, VRFY, ETRN or RSET) that a remote
/* SMTP client can send before the Postfix SMTP server starts to
/* increment the error counter with each junk command.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_overshoot_limit (1000)\fR"
/* The number of recipients that a remote SMTP client can send in
/* excess of the limit specified with $smtpd_recipient_limit, before
/* the Postfix SMTP server increments the per-session error count
/* for each excess recipient.
/* ACCESS POLICY DELEGATION CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* As of version 2.1, Postfix can be configured to delegate access
/* policy decisions to an external server that runs outside Postfix.
/* See the file SMTPD_POLICY_README for more information.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_max_idle (300s)\fR"
/* The time after which an idle SMTPD policy service connection is
/* closed.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_max_ttl (1000s)\fR"
/* The time after which an active SMTPD policy service connection is
/* closed.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_timeout (100s)\fR"
/* The time limit for connecting to, writing to, or receiving from a
/* delegated SMTPD policy server.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_default_action (451 4.3.5 Server configuration problem)\fR"
/* The default action when an SMTPD policy service request fails.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_request_limit (0)\fR"
/* The maximal number of requests per SMTPD policy service connection,
/* or zero (no limit).
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_try_limit (2)\fR"
/* The maximal number of attempts to send an SMTPD policy service
/* request before giving up.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_retry_delay (1s)\fR"
/* The delay between attempts to resend a failed SMTPD policy
/* service request.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_policy_context (empty)\fR"
/* Optional information that the Postfix SMTP server specifies in
/* the "policy_context" attribute of a policy service request (originally,
/* to share the same service endpoint among multiple check_policy_service
/* clients).
/* ACCESS CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The SMTPD_ACCESS_README document gives an introduction to all the
/* SMTP server access control features.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_delay_reject (yes)\fR"
/* Wait until the RCPT TO command before evaluating
/* $smtpd_client_restrictions, $smtpd_helo_restrictions and
/* $smtpd_sender_restrictions, or wait until the ETRN command before
/* evaluating $smtpd_client_restrictions and $smtpd_helo_restrictions.
/* .IP "\fBparent_domain_matches_subdomains (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* A list of Postfix features where the pattern "example.com" also
/* matches subdomains of example.com,
/* instead of requiring an explicit ".example.com" pattern.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_restrictions (empty)\fR"
/* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
/* context of a client connection request.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_helo_required (no)\fR"
/* Require that a remote SMTP client introduces itself with the HELO
/* or EHLO command before sending the MAIL command or other commands
/* that require EHLO negotiation.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_helo_restrictions (empty)\fR"
/* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
/* context of a client HELO command.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sender_restrictions (empty)\fR"
/* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
/* context of a client MAIL FROM command.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_restrictions (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
/* context of a client RCPT TO command, after smtpd_relay_restrictions.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_etrn_restrictions (empty)\fR"
/* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
/* context of a client ETRN command.
/* .IP "\fBallow_untrusted_routing (no)\fR"
/* Forward mail with sender-specified routing (user[@%!]remote[@%!]site)
/* from untrusted clients to destinations matching $relay_domains.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_restriction_classes (empty)\fR"
/* User-defined aliases for groups of access restrictions.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_null_access_lookup_key (<>)\fR"
/* The lookup key to be used in SMTP \fBaccess\fR(5) tables instead of the
/* null sender address.
/* .IP "\fBpermit_mx_backup_networks (empty)\fR"
/* Restrict the use of the permit_mx_backup SMTP access feature to
/* only domains whose primary MX hosts match the listed networks.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.0 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_data_restrictions (empty)\fR"
/* Optional access restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies
/* in the context of the SMTP DATA command.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_expansion_filter (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* What characters are allowed in $name expansions of RBL reply
/* templates.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_sender (no)\fR"
/* Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail from unknown
/* sender addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_sender
/* access restriction is specified.
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_recipient (yes)\fR"
/* Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail for unknown
/* recipient addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_recipient
/* access restriction is specified.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_end_of_data_restrictions (empty)\fR"
/* Optional access restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server
/* applies in the context of the SMTP END-OF-DATA command.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_relay_restrictions (permit_mynetworks, permit_sasl_authenticated, defer_unauth_destination)\fR"
/* Access restrictions for mail relay control that the Postfix
/* SMTP server applies in the context of the RCPT TO command, before
/* smtpd_recipient_restrictions.
/* SENDER AND RECIPIENT ADDRESS VERIFICATION CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Postfix version 2.1 introduces sender and recipient address verification.
/* This feature is implemented by sending probe email messages that
/* are not actually delivered.
/* This feature is requested via the reject_unverified_sender and
/* reject_unverified_recipient access restrictions. The status of
/* verification probes is maintained by the \fBverify\fR(8) server.
/* See the file ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_README for information
/* about how to configure and operate the Postfix sender/recipient
/* address verification service.
/* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_poll_count (normal: 3, overload: 1)\fR"
/* How many times to query the \fBverify\fR(8) service for the completion
/* of an address verification request in progress.
/* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_poll_delay (3s)\fR"
/* The delay between queries for the completion of an address
/* verification request in progress.
/* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_sender ($double_bounce_sender)\fR"
/* The sender address to use in address verification probes; prior
/* to Postfix 2.5 the default was "postmaster".
/* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_reject_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a recipient
/* address is rejected by the reject_unverified_sender restriction.
/* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_reject_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response when a recipient address
/* is rejected by the reject_unverified_recipient restriction.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later:
/* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_defer_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a sender address
/* probe fails due to a temporary error condition.
/* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_defer_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response when a recipient address
/* probe fails due to a temporary error condition.
/* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_reject_reason (empty)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server's reply when rejecting mail with
/* reject_unverified_sender.
/* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_reject_reason (empty)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server's reply when rejecting mail with
/* reject_unverified_recipient.
/* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unverified_sender
/* fails due to a temporary error condition.
/* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unverified_recipient
/* fails due to a temporary error condition.
/* .PP
/* Available with Postfix 2.9 and later:
/* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_sender_ttl (0s)\fR"
/* The time between changes in the time-dependent portion of address
/* verification probe sender addresses.
/* ACCESS CONTROL RESPONSES
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The following parameters control numerical SMTP reply codes
/* and/or text responses.
/* .IP "\fBaccess_map_reject_code (554)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code for
/* an \fBaccess\fR(5) map "reject" action.
/* .IP "\fBdefer_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP
/* client request is rejected by the "defer" restriction.
/* .IP "\fBinvalid_hostname_reject_code (501)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when the client
/* HELO or EHLO command parameter is rejected by the reject_invalid_helo_hostname
/* restriction.
/* .IP "\fBmaps_rbl_reject_code (554)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP
/* client request is blocked by the reject_rbl_client, reject_rhsbl_client,
/* reject_rhsbl_reverse_client, reject_rhsbl_sender or
/* reject_rhsbl_recipient restriction.
/* .IP "\fBnon_fqdn_reject_code (504)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server reply code when a client request
/* is rejected by the reject_non_fqdn_helo_hostname, reject_non_fqdn_sender
/* or reject_non_fqdn_recipient restriction.
/* .IP "\fBplaintext_reject_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a request
/* is rejected by the \fBreject_plaintext_session\fR restriction.
/* .IP "\fBreject_code (554)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP
/* client request is rejected by the "reject" restriction.
/* .IP "\fBrelay_domains_reject_code (554)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a client
/* request is rejected by the reject_unauth_destination recipient
/* restriction.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_address_reject_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical response code when the Postfix SMTP server rejects a
/* sender or recipient address because its domain is unknown.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_client_reject_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a client
/* without valid address <=> name mapping is rejected by the
/* reject_unknown_client_hostname restriction.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_hostname_reject_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when the hostname
/* specified with the HELO or EHLO command is rejected by the
/* reject_unknown_helo_hostname restriction.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.0 and later:
/* .IP "\fBdefault_rbl_reply (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The default Postfix SMTP server response template for a request that is
/* rejected by an RBL-based restriction.
/* .IP "\fBmulti_recipient_bounce_reject_code (550)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP
/* client request is blocked by the reject_multi_recipient_bounce
/* restriction.
/* .IP "\fBrbl_reply_maps (empty)\fR"
/* Optional lookup tables with RBL response templates.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later:
/* .IP "\fBaccess_map_defer_code (450)\fR"
/* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code for
/* an \fBaccess\fR(5) map "defer" action, including "defer_if_permit"
/* or "defer_if_reject".
/* .IP "\fBreject_tempfail_action (defer_if_permit)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server's action when a reject-type restriction
/* fails due to a temporary error condition.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_helo_hostname_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unknown_helo_hostname
/* fails due to an temporary error condition.
/* .IP "\fBunknown_address_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR"
/* The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unknown_sender_domain
/* or reject_unknown_recipient_domain fail due to a temporary error
/* condition.
/* MISCELLANEOUS CONTROLS
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* .IP "\fBconfig_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The default location of the Postfix main.cf and master.cf
/* configuration files.
/* .IP "\fBdaemon_timeout (18000s)\fR"
/* How much time a Postfix daemon process may take to handle a
/* request before it is terminated by a built-in watchdog timer.
/* .IP "\fBcommand_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The location of all postfix administrative commands.
/* .IP "\fBdouble_bounce_sender (double-bounce)\fR"
/* The sender address of postmaster notifications that are generated
/* by the mail system.
/* .IP "\fBipc_timeout (3600s)\fR"
/* The time limit for sending or receiving information over an internal
/* communication channel.
/* .IP "\fBmail_name (Postfix)\fR"
/* The mail system name that is displayed in Received: headers, in
/* the SMTP greeting banner, and in bounced mail.
/* .IP "\fBmail_owner (postfix)\fR"
/* The UNIX system account that owns the Postfix queue and most Postfix
/* daemon processes.
/* .IP "\fBmax_idle (100s)\fR"
/* The maximum amount of time that an idle Postfix daemon process waits
/* for an incoming connection before terminating voluntarily.
/* .IP "\fBmax_use (100)\fR"
/* The maximal number of incoming connections that a Postfix daemon
/* process will service before terminating voluntarily.
/* .IP "\fBmyhostname (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The internet hostname of this mail system.
/* .IP "\fBmynetworks (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The list of "trusted" remote SMTP clients that have more privileges than
/* "strangers".
/* .IP "\fBmyorigin ($myhostname)\fR"
/* The domain name that locally-posted mail appears to come
/* from, and that locally posted mail is delivered to.
/* .IP "\fBprocess_id (read-only)\fR"
/* The process ID of a Postfix command or daemon process.
/* .IP "\fBprocess_name (read-only)\fR"
/* The process name of a Postfix command or daemon process.
/* .IP "\fBqueue_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* The location of the Postfix top-level queue directory.
/* .IP "\fBrecipient_delimiter (empty)\fR"
/* The set of characters that can separate a user name from its
/* extension (example: user+foo), or a .forward file name from its
/* extension (example: .forward+foo).
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_banner ($myhostname ESMTP $mail_name)\fR"
/* The text that follows the 220 status code in the SMTP greeting
/* banner.
/* .IP "\fBsyslog_facility (mail)\fR"
/* The syslog facility of Postfix logging.
/* .IP "\fBsyslog_name (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
/* A prefix that is prepended to the process name in syslog
/* records, so that, for example, "smtpd" becomes "prefix/smtpd".
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbidden_commands (CONNECT, GET, POST)\fR"
/* List of commands that cause the Postfix SMTP server to immediately
/* terminate the session with a 221 code.
/* .PP
/* Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later:
/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_port_logging (no)\fR"
/* Enable logging of the remote SMTP client port in addition to
/* the hostname and IP address.
/* SEE ALSO
/* anvil(8), connection/rate limiting
/* cleanup(8), message canonicalization
/* tlsmgr(8), TLS session and PRNG management
/* trivial-rewrite(8), address resolver
/* verify(8), address verification service
/* postconf(5), configuration parameters
/* master(5), generic daemon options
/* master(8), process manager
/* syslogd(8), system logging
/* README FILES
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* Use "\fBpostconf readme_directory\fR" or
/* "\fBpostconf html_directory\fR" to locate this information.
/* .na
/* .nf
/* ADDRESS_CLASS_README, blocking unknown hosted or relay recipients
/* ADDRESS_REWRITING_README Postfix address manipulation
/* FILTER_README, external after-queue content filter
/* LOCAL_RECIPIENT_README, blocking unknown local recipients
/* MILTER_README, before-queue mail filter applications
/* SMTPD_ACCESS_README, built-in access policies
/* SMTPD_POLICY_README, external policy server
/* SMTPD_PROXY_README, external before-queue content filter
/* SASL_README, Postfix SASL howto
/* TLS_README, Postfix STARTTLS howto
/* VERP_README, Postfix XVERP extension
/* XCLIENT_README, Postfix XCLIENT extension
/* XFORWARD_README, Postfix XFORWARD extension
/* LICENSE
/* .ad
/* .fi
/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
/* AUTHOR(S)
/* Wietse Venema
/* IBM T.J. Watson Research
/* P.O. Box 704
/* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
/*
/* Wietse Venema
/* Google, Inc.
/* 111 8th Avenue
/* New York, NY 10011, USA
/*
/* SASL support originally by:
/* Till Franke
/* SuSE Rhein/Main AG
/* 65760 Eschborn, Germany
/*
/* TLS support originally by:
/* Lutz Jaenicke
/* BTU Cottbus
/* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
/* Universitaetsplatz 3-4
/* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
/*
/* Revised TLS support by:
/* Victor Duchovni
/* Morgan Stanley
/*--*/
/* System library. */
#include <sys_defs.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h> /* remove() */
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stddef.h> /* offsetof() */
#ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H
#include <strings.h>
#endif
/* Utility library. */
#include <msg.h>
#include <mymalloc.h>
#include <vstring.h>
#include <vstream.h>
#include <vstring_vstream.h>
#include <stringops.h>
#include <events.h>
#include <smtp_stream.h>
#include <valid_hostname.h>
#include <dict.h>
#include <watchdog.h>
#include <iostuff.h>
#include <split_at.h>
#include <name_code.h>
#include <inet_proto.h>
/* Global library. */
#include <mail_params.h>
#include <mail_version.h> /* milter_macro_v */
#include <record.h>
#include <rec_type.h>
#include <mail_proto.h>
#include <cleanup_user.h>
#include <mail_date.h>
#include <mail_conf.h>
#include <off_cvt.h>
#include <debug_peer.h>
#include <mail_error.h>
#include <flush_clnt.h>
#include <mail_stream.h>
#include <mail_queue.h>
#include <tok822.h>
#include <verp_sender.h>
#include <string_list.h>
#include <quote_822_local.h>
#include <lex_822.h>
#include <namadr_list.h>
#include <input_transp.h>
#include <is_header.h>
#include <anvil_clnt.h>
#include <flush_clnt.h>
#include <ehlo_mask.h> /* ehlo filter */
#include <maps.h> /* ehlo filter */
#include <valid_mailhost_addr.h>
#include <dsn_mask.h>
#include <xtext.h>
#include <uxtext.h>
#include <tls_proxy.h>
#include <verify_sender_addr.h>
#include <smtputf8.h>
#include <match_parent_style.h>
/* Single-threaded server skeleton. */
#include <mail_server.h>
/* Mail filter library. */
#include <milter.h>
/* DNS library. */
#include <dns.h>
/* Application-specific */
#include <smtpd_token.h>
#include <smtpd.h>
#include <smtpd_check.h>
#include <smtpd_chat.h>
#include <smtpd_sasl_proto.h>
#include <smtpd_sasl_glue.h>
#include <smtpd_proxy.h>
#include <smtpd_milter.h>
#include <smtpd_expand.h>
/*
* Tunable parameters. Make sure that there is some bound on the length of
* an SMTP command, so that the mail system stays in control even when a
* malicious client sends commands of unreasonable length (qmail-dos-1).
* Make sure there is some bound on the number of recipients, so that the
* mail system stays in control even when a malicious client sends an
* unreasonable number of recipients (qmail-dos-2).
*/
int var_smtpd_rcpt_limit;
int var_smtpd_tmout;
int var_smtpd_soft_erlim;
int var_smtpd_hard_erlim;
int var_queue_minfree; /* XXX use off_t */
char *var_smtpd_banner;
char *var_notify_classes;
char *var_client_checks;
char *var_helo_checks;
char *var_mail_checks;
char *var_relay_checks;
char *var_rcpt_checks;
char *var_etrn_checks;
char *var_data_checks;
char *var_eod_checks;
int var_unk_client_code;
int var_bad_name_code;
int var_unk_name_code;
int var_unk_addr_code;
int var_relay_code;
int var_maps_rbl_code;
int var_map_reject_code;
int var_map_defer_code;
char *var_maps_rbl_domains;
char *var_rbl_reply_maps;
int var_helo_required;
int var_reject_code;
int var_defer_code;
int var_smtpd_err_sleep;
int var_non_fqdn_code;
char *var_error_rcpt;
int var_smtpd_delay_reject;
char *var_rest_classes;
int var_strict_rfc821_env;
bool var_disable_vrfy_cmd;
char *var_canonical_maps;
char *var_send_canon_maps;
char *var_rcpt_canon_maps;
char *var_virt_alias_maps;
char *var_virt_mailbox_maps;
char *var_alias_maps;
char *var_local_rcpt_maps;
bool var_allow_untrust_route;
int var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit;
int var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim;
bool var_smtpd_sasl_enable;
bool var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr;
char *var_smtpd_sasl_opts;
char *var_smtpd_sasl_path;
char *var_smtpd_sasl_service;
char *var_cyrus_conf_path;
char *var_smtpd_sasl_realm;
char *var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks;
char *var_smtpd_sasl_type;
char *var_filter_xport;
bool var_broken_auth_clients;
char *var_perm_mx_networks;
char *var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps;
char *var_smtpd_noop_cmds;
char *var_smtpd_null_key;
int var_smtpd_hist_thrsh;
char *var_smtpd_exp_filter;
char *var_def_rbl_reply;
int var_unv_from_rcode;
int var_unv_rcpt_rcode;
int var_unv_from_dcode;
int var_unv_rcpt_dcode;
char *var_unv_from_why;
char *var_unv_rcpt_why;
int var_mul_rcpt_code;
char *var_relay_rcpt_maps;
int var_local_rcpt_code;
int var_virt_alias_code;
int var_virt_mailbox_code;
int var_relay_rcpt_code;
char *var_verp_clients;
int var_show_unk_rcpt_table;
int var_verify_poll_count;
int var_verify_poll_delay;
char *var_smtpd_proxy_filt;
int var_smtpd_proxy_tmout;
char *var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo;
char *var_smtpd_proxy_opts;
char *var_input_transp;
int var_smtpd_policy_tmout;
int var_smtpd_policy_req_limit;
int var_smtpd_policy_try_limit;
int var_smtpd_policy_try_delay;
char *var_smtpd_policy_def_action;
char *var_smtpd_policy_context;
int var_smtpd_policy_idle;
int var_smtpd_policy_ttl;
char *var_xclient_hosts;
char *var_xforward_hosts;
bool var_smtpd_rej_unl_from;
bool var_smtpd_rej_unl_rcpt;
char *var_smtpd_forbid_cmds;
int var_smtpd_crate_limit;
int var_smtpd_cconn_limit;
int var_smtpd_cmail_limit;
int var_smtpd_crcpt_limit;
int var_smtpd_cntls_limit;
int var_smtpd_cauth_limit;
char *var_smtpd_hoggers;
char *var_local_rwr_clients;
char *var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words;
char *var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps;
char *var_smtpd_tls_level;
bool var_smtpd_use_tls;
bool var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
bool var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode;
bool var_smtpd_tls_auth_only;
char *var_smtpd_cmd_filter;
char *var_smtpd_rej_footer;
char *var_smtpd_acl_perm_log;
char *var_smtpd_dns_re_filter;
#ifdef USE_TLS
char *var_smtpd_relay_ccerts;
char *var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts;
int var_smtpd_starttls_tmout;
char *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
char *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
bool var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
int var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
char *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph;
char *var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph;
char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl;
char *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto;
bool var_smtpd_tls_received_header;
bool var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
bool var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid;
char *var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst;
char *var_smtpd_tls_ciph;
char *var_smtpd_tls_proto;
char *var_smtpd_tls_eecdh;
char *var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file;
char *var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file;
#endif
bool var_smtpd_peername_lookup;
int var_plaintext_code;
bool var_smtpd_delay_open;
char *var_smtpd_milters;
char *var_smtpd_milter_maps;
int var_milt_conn_time;
int var_milt_cmd_time;
int var_milt_msg_time;
char *var_milt_protocol;
char *var_milt_def_action;
char *var_milt_daemon_name;
char *var_milt_v;
char *var_milt_conn_macros;
char *var_milt_helo_macros;
char *var_milt_mail_macros;
char *var_milt_rcpt_macros;
char *var_milt_data_macros;
char *var_milt_eoh_macros;
char *var_milt_eod_macros;
char *var_milt_unk_macros;
char *var_milt_macro_deflts;
bool var_smtpd_client_port_log;
char *var_stress;
char *var_reject_tmpf_act;
char *var_unk_name_tf_act;
char *var_unk_addr_tf_act;
char *var_unv_rcpt_tf_act;
char *var_unv_from_tf_act;
bool var_smtpd_rec_deadline;
int smtpd_proxy_opts;
#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
char *var_tlsproxy_service;
#endif
char *var_smtpd_uproxy_proto;
int var_smtpd_uproxy_tmout;
/*
* Silly little macros.
*/
#define STR(x) vstring_str(x)
#define LEN(x) VSTRING_LEN(x)
/*
* EHLO keyword filter
*/
static MAPS *ehlo_discard_maps;
/*
* Per-client Milter support.
*/
static MAPS *smtpd_milter_maps;
static void setup_milters(SMTPD_STATE *);
static void teardown_milters(SMTPD_STATE *);
/*
* VERP command name.
*/
#define VERP_CMD "XVERP"
#define VERP_CMD_LEN 5
static NAMADR_LIST *verp_clients;
/*
* XCLIENT command. Access control is cached, so that XCLIENT can't override
* its own access control.
*/
static NAMADR_LIST *xclient_hosts;
static int xclient_allowed; /* XXX should be SMTPD_STATE member */
/*
* XFORWARD command. Access control is cached.
*/
static NAMADR_LIST *xforward_hosts;
static int xforward_allowed; /* XXX should be SMTPD_STATE member */
/*
* Client connection and rate limiting.
*/
ANVIL_CLNT *anvil_clnt;
static NAMADR_LIST *hogger_list;
/*
* Other application-specific globals.
*/
int smtpd_input_transp_mask;
/*
* Forward declarations.
*/
static void helo_reset(SMTPD_STATE *);
static void mail_reset(SMTPD_STATE *);
static void rcpt_reset(SMTPD_STATE *);
static void chat_reset(SMTPD_STATE *, int);
#ifdef USE_TLS
static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *);
#endif
/*
* This filter is applied after printable().
*/
#define NEUTER_CHARACTERS " <>()\\\";@"
/*
* Reasons for losing the client.
*/
#define REASON_TIMEOUT "timeout"
#define REASON_LOST_CONNECTION "lost connection"
#define REASON_ERROR_LIMIT "too many errors"
#ifdef USE_TLS
/*
* TLS initialization status.
*/
static TLS_APPL_STATE *smtpd_tls_ctx;
static int ask_client_cert;
#endif
/*
* SMTP command mapping for broken clients.
*/
static DICT *smtpd_cmd_filter;
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
/*
* SASL exceptions.
*/
static NAMADR_LIST *sasl_exceptions_networks;
/* sasl_client_exception - can we offer AUTH for this client */
static int sasl_client_exception(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
int match;
/*
* This is to work around a Netscape mail client bug where it tries to
* use AUTH if available, even if user has not configured it. Returns
* TRUE if AUTH should be offered in the EHLO.
*/
if (sasl_exceptions_networks == 0)
return (0);
if ((match = namadr_list_match(sasl_exceptions_networks,
state->name, state->addr)) == 0)
match = sasl_exceptions_networks->error;
if (msg_verbose)
msg_info("sasl_exceptions: %s, match=%d",
state->namaddr, match);
return (match);
}
#endif
/* smtpd_whatsup - gather available evidence for logging */
static const char *smtpd_whatsup(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
static VSTRING *buf = 0;
if (buf == 0)
buf = vstring_alloc(100);
else
VSTRING_RESET(buf);
if (state->sender)
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " from=<%s>", state->sender);
if (state->recipient)
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " to=<%s>", state->recipient);
if (state->protocol)
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " proto=%s", state->protocol);
if (state->helo_name)
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " helo=<%s>", state->helo_name);
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (state->sasl_username)
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " sasl_username=<%s>",
state->sasl_username);
#endif
return (STR(buf));
}
/* collapse_args - put arguments together again */
static void collapse_args(int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
int i;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
vstring_strcat(argv[0].vstrval, " ");
vstring_strcat(argv[0].vstrval, argv[i].strval);
}
argv[0].strval = STR(argv[0].vstrval);
}
/* check_milter_reply - process reply from Milter */
static const char *check_milter_reply(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *reply)
{
const char *queue_id = state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE";
const char *action;
const char *text;
/*
* The syntax of user-specified SMTP replies is checked by the Milter
* module, because the replies are also used in the cleanup server.
* Automatically disconnect after 421 (shutdown) reply. The Sendmail 8
* Milter quarantine action is not final, so it is not included in
* MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS.
*/
#define MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS (CLEANUP_FLAG_DISCARD)
switch (reply[0]) {
case 'H':
state->saved_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_HOLD;
action = "milter-hold";
reply = 0;
text = "milter triggers HOLD action";
break;
case 'D':
state->saved_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_DISCARD;
action = "milter-discard";
reply = 0;
text = "milter triggers DISCARD action";
break;
case 'S':
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
action = "milter-reject";
reply = "421 4.7.0 Server closing connection";
text = 0;
break;
case '4':
case '5':
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
action = "milter-reject";
text = 0;
break;
default:
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
action = "reject";
reply = "421 4.3.5 Server configuration error";
text = 0;
break;
}
msg_info("%s: %s: %s from %s: %s;%s", queue_id, action, state->where,
state->namaddr, reply ? reply : text, smtpd_whatsup(state));
return (reply);
}
/* helo_cmd - process HELO command */
static int helo_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
const char *err;
/*
* RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses other
* than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO are
* prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463.
*/
if (argc < 2) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: HELO hostname");
return (-1);
}
if (argc > 2)
collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1);
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0
&& (err = smtpd_check_helo(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
/*
* XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or
* HELO, reply with 250 except in case of 421 (disconnect). The reply
* persists so it will apply to MAIL FROM and to other commands such as
* AUTH, STARTTLS, and VRFY.
*/
#define PUSH_STRING(old, curr, new) { char *old = (curr); (curr) = (new);
#define POP_STRING(old, curr) (curr) = old; }
if (state->milters != 0
&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0
&& (err = milter_helo_event(state->milters, argv[1].strval, 0)) != 0) {
/* Log reject etc. with correct HELO information. */
PUSH_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name, argv[1].strval);
err = check_milter_reply(state, err);
POP_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name);
if (err != 0 && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
}
if (state->helo_name != 0)
helo_reset(state);
chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh);
mail_reset(state);
rcpt_reset(state);
state->helo_name = mystrdup(printable(argv[1].strval, '?'));
neuter(state->helo_name, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
/* Downgrading the protocol name breaks the unauthorized pipelining test. */
if (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0
&& strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_SMTP) != 0) {
myfree(state->protocol);
state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_SMTP);
}
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 %s", var_myhostname);
return (0);
}
/* cant_announce_feature - explain and terminate this session */
static NORETURN cant_announce_feature(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *feature)
{
msg_warn("don't know if EHLO feature %s should be announced to %s",
feature, state->namaddr);
vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA);
}
/* cant_permit_command - explain and terminate this session */
static NORETURN cant_permit_command(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *command)
{
msg_warn("don't know if command %s should be allowed from %s",
command, state->namaddr);
vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA);
}
/* ehlo_cmd - process EHLO command */
static int ehlo_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
const char *err;
int discard_mask;
char **cpp;
/*
* XXX 2821 new feature: Section 4.1.4 specifies that a server must clear
* all buffers and reset the state exactly as if a RSET command had been
* issued.
*
* RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses other
* than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO are
* prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463.
*/
if (argc < 2) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: EHLO hostname");
return (-1);
}
if (argc > 2)
collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1);
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0
&& (err = smtpd_check_helo(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
/*
* XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter 5xx rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or
* HELO, reply with ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES except in case of immediate
* disconnect. The reply persists so it will apply to MAIL FROM and to
* other commands such as AUTH, STARTTLS, and VRFY.
*/
err = 0;
if (state->milters != 0
&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0
&& (err = milter_helo_event(state->milters, argv[1].strval, 1)) != 0) {
/* Log reject etc. with correct HELO information. */
PUSH_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name, argv[1].strval);
err = check_milter_reply(state, err);
POP_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name);
if (err != 0 && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
}
if (state->helo_name != 0)
helo_reset(state);
chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh);
mail_reset(state);
rcpt_reset(state);
state->helo_name = mystrdup(printable(argv[1].strval, '?'));
neuter(state->helo_name, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
/*
* XXX reject_unauth_pipelining depends on the following. If the user
* sends EHLO then we announce PIPELINING and we can't accuse them of
* using pipelining in places where it is allowed.
*
* XXX The reject_unauth_pipelining test needs to change and also account
* for mechanisms that disable PIPELINING selectively.
*/
if (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0) {
myfree(state->protocol);
state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP);
}
/*
* Build the EHLO response, producing no output until we know what to
* send - this simplifies exception handling. The CRLF record boundaries
* don't exist at this level in the code, so we represent multi-line
* output as an array of single-line responses.
*/
#define EHLO_APPEND(state, cmd) \
do { \
vstring_sprintf((state)->ehlo_buf, (cmd)); \
argv_add((state)->ehlo_argv, STR((state)->ehlo_buf), (char *) 0); \
} while (0)
#define EHLO_APPEND1(state, cmd, arg) \
do { \
vstring_sprintf((state)->ehlo_buf, (cmd), (arg)); \
argv_add((state)->ehlo_argv, STR((state)->ehlo_buf), (char *) 0); \
} while (0)
/*
* XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter 5XX rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or
* HELO, reply with ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES only. The reply persists so it
* will apply to MAIL FROM, but we currently don't have a proper
* mechanism to apply Milter rejects to AUTH, STARTTLS, VRFY, and other
* commands while still allowing HELO/EHLO.
*/
discard_mask = state->ehlo_discard_mask;
if (err != 0 && err[0] == '5')
discard_mask |= ~EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES;
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES) == 0)
if (discard_mask && !(discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SILENT))
msg_info("discarding EHLO keywords: %s", str_ehlo_mask(discard_mask));
if (ehlo_discard_maps && ehlo_discard_maps->error) {
msg_warn("don't know what EHLO features to announce to %s",
state->namaddr);
vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA);
}
/*
* These may still exist after a prior exception.
*/
if (state->ehlo_argv == 0) {
state->ehlo_argv = argv_alloc(10);
state->ehlo_buf = vstring_alloc(10);
} else
argv_truncate(state->ehlo_argv, 0);
EHLO_APPEND1(state, "%s", var_myhostname);
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_PIPELINING) == 0)
EHLO_APPEND(state, "PIPELINING");
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SIZE) == 0) {
if (var_message_limit)
EHLO_APPEND1(state, "SIZE %lu",
(unsigned long) var_message_limit); /* XXX */
else
EHLO_APPEND(state, "SIZE");
}
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_VRFY) == 0)
if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd == 0)
EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_VRFY);
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ETRN) == 0)
EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_ETRN);
#ifdef USE_TLS
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_STARTTLS) == 0)
if (var_smtpd_use_tls && (!state->tls_context))
EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS);
#endif
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
#ifndef AUTH_CMD
#define AUTH_CMD "AUTH"
#endif
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_AUTH) == 0) {
if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) && !sasl_client_exception(state)) {
EHLO_APPEND1(state, "AUTH %s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
if (var_broken_auth_clients)
EHLO_APPEND1(state, "AUTH=%s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
} else if (sasl_exceptions_networks && sasl_exceptions_networks->error)
cant_announce_feature(state, AUTH_CMD);
}
#define XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE " " XCLIENT_LOGIN
#else
#define XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE ""
#endif
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_VERP) == 0) {
if (namadr_list_match(verp_clients, state->name, state->addr))
EHLO_APPEND(state, VERP_CMD);
else if (verp_clients && verp_clients->error)
cant_announce_feature(state, VERP_CMD);
}
/* XCLIENT must not override its own access control. */
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_XCLIENT) == 0) {
if (xclient_allowed)
EHLO_APPEND(state, XCLIENT_CMD
" " XCLIENT_NAME " " XCLIENT_ADDR
" " XCLIENT_PROTO " " XCLIENT_HELO
" " XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME " " XCLIENT_PORT
XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE
" " XCLIENT_DESTADDR
" " XCLIENT_DESTPORT);
else if (xclient_hosts && xclient_hosts->error)
cant_announce_feature(state, XCLIENT_CMD);
}
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_XFORWARD) == 0) {
if (xforward_allowed)
EHLO_APPEND(state, XFORWARD_CMD
" " XFORWARD_NAME " " XFORWARD_ADDR
" " XFORWARD_PROTO " " XFORWARD_HELO
" " XFORWARD_DOMAIN " " XFORWARD_PORT
" " XFORWARD_IDENT);
else if (xforward_hosts && xforward_hosts->error)
cant_announce_feature(state, XFORWARD_CMD);
}
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES) == 0)
EHLO_APPEND(state, "ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES");
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_8BITMIME) == 0)
EHLO_APPEND(state, "8BITMIME");
if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) == 0)
EHLO_APPEND(state, "DSN");
if (var_smtputf8_enable && (discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0)
EHLO_APPEND(state, "SMTPUTF8");
/*
* Send the reply.
*/
for (cpp = state->ehlo_argv->argv; *cpp; cpp++)
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250%c%s", cpp[1] ? '-' : ' ', *cpp);
/*
* Clean up.
*/
argv_free(state->ehlo_argv);
state->ehlo_argv = 0;
vstring_free(state->ehlo_buf);
state->ehlo_buf = 0;
return (0);
}
/* helo_reset - reset HELO/EHLO command stuff */
static void helo_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
if (state->helo_name) {
myfree(state->helo_name);
state->helo_name = 0;
if (state->milters != 0)
milter_abort(state->milters);
}
if (state->ehlo_argv) {
argv_free(state->ehlo_argv);
state->ehlo_argv = 0;
}
if (state->ehlo_buf) {
vstring_free(state->ehlo_buf);
state->ehlo_buf = 0;
}
}
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
/* smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper - smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd front-end */
static int smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc,
SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
int rate;
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& var_smtpd_cauth_limit > 0
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
&& anvil_clnt_auth(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
&rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
&& rate > var_smtpd_cauth_limit) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
msg_warn("AUTH command rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"450 4.7.1 Error: too many AUTH commands from %s",
state->addr);
return (-1);
}
return (smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd(state, argc, argv));
}
#endif
/* mail_open_stream - open mail queue file or IPC stream */
static int mail_open_stream(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
/*
* Connect to the before-queue filter when one is configured. The MAIL
* FROM and RCPT TO commands are forwarded as received (including DSN
* attributes), with the exception that the before-filter smtpd process
* handles all authentication, encryption, access control and relay
* control, and that the before-filter smtpd process does not forward
* blocked commands. If the after-filter smtp server does not support
* some of Postfix's ESMTP features, then they must be turned off in the
* before-filter smtpd process with the smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords
* feature.
*/
if (state->proxy_mail) {
if (smtpd_proxy_create(state, smtpd_proxy_opts, var_smtpd_proxy_filt,
var_smtpd_proxy_tmout, var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo,
state->proxy_mail) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(state->proxy->reply));
smtpd_proxy_free(state);
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* If running from the master or from inetd, connect to the cleanup
* service.
*
* XXX 2821: An SMTP server is not allowed to "clean up" mail except in the
* case of original submissions.
*
* We implement this by distinguishing between mail that we are willing to
* rewrite (the local rewrite context) and mail from elsewhere.
*/
else if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
int cleanup_flags;
cleanup_flags = input_transp_cleanup(CLEANUP_FLAG_MASK_EXTERNAL,
smtpd_input_transp_mask)
| CLEANUP_FLAG_SMTP_REPLY;
if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8)
cleanup_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_SMTPUTF8;
else
cleanup_flags |= smtputf8_autodetect(MAIL_SRC_MASK_SMTPD);
state->dest = mail_stream_service(MAIL_CLASS_PUBLIC,
var_cleanup_service);
if (state->dest == 0
|| attr_print(state->dest->stream, ATTR_FLAG_NONE,
SEND_ATTR_INT(MAIL_ATTR_FLAGS, cleanup_flags),
ATTR_TYPE_END) != 0)
msg_fatal("unable to connect to the %s %s service",
MAIL_CLASS_PUBLIC, var_cleanup_service);
}
/*
* Otherwise, pipe the message through the privileged postdrop helper.
* XXX Make postdrop a manifest constant.
*/
else {
char *postdrop_command;
postdrop_command = concatenate(var_command_dir, "/postdrop",
msg_verbose ? " -v" : (char *) 0, (char *) 0);
state->dest = mail_stream_command(postdrop_command);
if (state->dest == 0)
msg_fatal("unable to execute %s", postdrop_command);
myfree(postdrop_command);
}
/*
* Record the time of arrival, the SASL-related stuff if applicable, the
* sender envelope address, some session information, and some additional
* attributes.
*
* XXX Send Milter information first, because this will hang when cleanup
* goes into "throw away" mode. Also, cleanup needs to know early on
* whether or not it has to do its own SMTP event emulation.
*
* XXX At this point we send only dummy information to keep the cleanup
* server from using its non_smtpd_milters settings. We have to send
* up-to-date Milter information after DATA so that the cleanup server
* knows the actual Milter state.
*/
if (state->dest) {
state->cleanup = state->dest->stream;
state->queue_id = mystrdup(state->dest->id);
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
if (state->milters != 0
&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0)
/* Send place-holder smtpd_milters list. */
(void) milter_dummy(state->milters, state->cleanup);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_TIME, REC_TYPE_TIME_FORMAT,
REC_TYPE_TIME_ARG(state->arrival_time));
if (*var_filter_xport)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FILT, "%s", var_filter_xport);
if (FORWARD_IDENT(state))
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_LOG_IDENT, FORWARD_IDENT(state));
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_RWR_CONTEXT, FORWARD_DOMAIN(state));
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
/* Make external authentication painless (e.g., XCLIENT). */
if (state->sasl_method)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_SASL_METHOD, state->sasl_method);
if (state->sasl_username)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_SASL_USERNAME, state->sasl_username);
if (state->sasl_sender)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_SASL_SENDER, state->sasl_sender);
#endif
/*
* Record DSN related information that was received with the MAIL
* FROM command.
*
* RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1. If no ENVID parameter was included in the
* MAIL command when the message was received, the ENVID
* parameter MUST NOT be supplied when the message is relayed.
* Ditto for the RET parameter.
*
* In other words, we can't simply make up our default ENVID or RET
* values. We have to remember whether the client sent any.
*
* We store DSN information as named attribute records so that we
* don't have to pollute the queue file with records that are
* incompatible with past Postfix versions. Preferably, people
* should be able to back out from an upgrade without losing
* mail.
*/
if (state->dsn_envid)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_DSN_ENVID, state->dsn_envid);
if (state->dsn_ret)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d",
MAIL_ATTR_DSN_RET, state->dsn_ret);
}
rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FROM, state->sender);
if (state->encoding != 0)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ENCODING, state->encoding);
/*
* Store client attributes.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
/*
* Attributes for logging, also used for XFORWARD.
*
* We store all client attributes, including ones with unknown
* values. Otherwise, an unknown client hostname would be treated
* as a non-existent hostname (i.e. local submission).
*/
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_NAME, FORWARD_NAME(state));
/* XXX Note: state->rfc_addr, not state->addr. */
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_ADDR, FORWARD_ADDR(state));
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_PORT, FORWARD_PORT(state));
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_LOG_ORIGIN, FORWARD_NAMADDR(state));
if (FORWARD_HELO(state))
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_LOG_HELO_NAME, FORWARD_HELO(state));
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_LOG_PROTO_NAME, FORWARD_PROTO(state));
/*
* Attributes with actual client information. These are used by
* the smtpd Milter client for policy decisions. Mail that is
* requeued with "postsuper -r" is not subject to processing by
* the cleanup Milter client, because a) it has already been
* filtered, and b) we don't have sufficient information to
* reproduce the exact same SMTP events and Sendmail macros that
* the smtpd Milter client received when the message originally
* arrived in Postfix.
*/
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_NAME, state->name);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_REVERSE_CLIENT_NAME, state->reverse_name);
/* XXX Note: state->addr, not state->rfc_addr. */
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_ADDR, state->addr);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_PORT, state->port);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_SERVER_ADDR, state->dest_addr);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_SERVER_PORT, state->dest_port);
if (state->helo_name)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_HELO_NAME, state->helo_name);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_PROTO_NAME, state->protocol);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%u",
MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_AF, state->addr_family);
/*
* Don't send client certificate down the pipeline unless it is
* a) verified or b) just a fingerprint.
*/
}
if (state->verp_delims)
rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_VERP, state->verp_delims);
}
/*
* Log the queue ID with the message origin.
*/
#define PRINT_OR_NULL(cond, str) \
((cond) ? (str) : "")
#define PRINT2_OR_NULL(cond, name, value) \
PRINT_OR_NULL((cond), (name)), PRINT_OR_NULL((cond), (value))
msg_info("%s: client=%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
(state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"),
state->namaddr,
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_method,
", sasl_method=", state->sasl_method),
PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_username,
", sasl_username=", state->sasl_username),
PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_sender,
", sasl_sender=", state->sasl_sender),
#else
"", "", "", "", "", "",
#endif
/* Insert transaction TLS status here. */
PRINT2_OR_NULL(HAVE_FORWARDED_IDENT(state),
", orig_queue_id=", FORWARD_IDENT(state)),
PRINT2_OR_NULL(HAVE_FORWARDED_CLIENT_ATTR(state),
", orig_client=", FORWARD_NAMADDR(state)));
return (0);
}
/* extract_addr - extract address from rubble */
static int extract_addr(SMTPD_STATE *state, SMTPD_TOKEN *arg,
int allow_empty_addr, int strict_rfc821,
int smtputf8)
{
const char *myname = "extract_addr";
TOK822 *tree;
TOK822 *tp;
TOK822 *addr = 0;
int naddr;
int non_addr;
int err = 0;
char *junk = 0;
char *text;
char *colon;
/*
* Special case.
*/
#define PERMIT_EMPTY_ADDR 1
#define REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR 0
/*
* Some mailers send RFC822-style address forms (with comments and such)
* in SMTP envelopes. We cannot blame users for this: the blame is with
* programmers violating the RFC, and with sendmail for being permissive.
*
* XXX The SMTP command tokenizer must leave the address in externalized
* (quoted) form, so that the address parser can correctly extract the
* address from surrounding junk.
*
* XXX We have only one address parser, written according to the rules of
* RFC 822. That standard differs subtly from RFC 821.
*/
if (msg_verbose)
msg_info("%s: input: %s", myname, STR(arg->vstrval));
if (STR(arg->vstrval)[0] == '<'
&& STR(arg->vstrval)[LEN(arg->vstrval) - 1] == '>') {
junk = text = mystrndup(STR(arg->vstrval) + 1, LEN(arg->vstrval) - 2);
} else
text = STR(arg->vstrval);
/*
* Truncate deprecated route address form.
*/
if (*text == '@' && (colon = strchr(text, ':')) != 0)
text = colon + 1;
tree = tok822_parse(text);
if (junk)
myfree(junk);
/*
* Find trouble.
*/
for (naddr = non_addr = 0, tp = tree; tp != 0; tp = tp->next) {
if (tp->type == TOK822_ADDR) {
addr = tp;
naddr += 1; /* count address forms */
} else if (tp->type == '<' || tp->type == '>') {
/* void */ ; /* ignore brackets */
} else {
non_addr += 1; /* count non-address forms */
}
}
/*
* Report trouble. XXX Should log a warning only if we are going to
* sleep+reject so that attackers can't flood our logfiles.
*
* XXX Unfortunately, the sleep-before-reject feature had to be abandoned
* (at least for small error counts) because servers were DOS-ing
* themselves when flooded by backscatter traffic.
*/
if (naddr > 1
|| (strict_rfc821 && (non_addr || *STR(arg->vstrval) != '<'))) {
msg_warn("Illegal address syntax from %s in %s command: %s",
state->namaddr, state->where,
printable(STR(arg->vstrval), '?'));
err = 1;
}
/*
* Don't overwrite the input with the extracted address. We need the
* original (external) form in case the client does not send ORCPT
* information; and error messages are more accurate if we log the
* unmodified form. We need the internal form for all other purposes.
*/
if (addr)
tok822_internalize(state->addr_buf, addr->head, TOK822_STR_DEFL);
else
vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, "");
/*
* Report trouble. XXX Should log a warning only if we are going to
* sleep+reject so that attackers can't flood our logfiles. Log the
* original address.
*/
if (err == 0)
if ((STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == 0 && !allow_empty_addr)
|| (strict_rfc821 && STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == '@')
|| (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& smtpd_check_addr(strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_CMD_MAIL) == 0 ?
state->recipient : state->sender,
STR(state->addr_buf), smtputf8) != 0)) {
msg_warn("Illegal address syntax from %s in %s command: %s",
state->namaddr, state->where,
printable(STR(arg->vstrval), '?'));
err = 1;
}
/*
* Cleanup.
*/
tok822_free_tree(tree);
if (msg_verbose)
msg_info("%s: in: %s, result: %s",
myname, STR(arg->vstrval), STR(state->addr_buf));
return (err);
}
/* milter_argv - impedance adapter */
static const char **milter_argv(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
int n;
ssize_t len = argc + 1;
if (state->milter_argc < len) {
if (state->milter_argc > 0)
state->milter_argv = (const char **)
myrealloc((void *) state->milter_argv,
sizeof(const char *) * len);
else
state->milter_argv = (const char **)
mymalloc(sizeof(const char *) * len);
state->milter_argc = len;
}
for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
state->milter_argv[n] = argv[n].strval;
state->milter_argv[n] = 0;
return (state->milter_argv);
}
/* mail_cmd - process MAIL command */
static int mail_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
const char *err;
int narg;
char *arg;
char *verp_delims = 0;
int rate;
int dsn_envid = 0;
state->flags &= ~SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8;
state->encoding = 0;
state->dsn_ret = 0;
/*
* Sanity checks.
*
* XXX 2821 pedantism: Section 4.1.2 says that SMTP servers that receive a
* command in which invalid character codes have been employed, and for
* which there are no other reasons for rejection, MUST reject that
* command with a 501 response. Postfix attempts to be 8-bit clean.
*/
if (var_helo_required && state->helo_name == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: send HELO/EHLO first");
return (-1);
}
if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: nested MAIL command");
return (-1);
}
if (argc < 3
|| strcasecmp(argv[1].strval, "from:") != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: MAIL FROM:<address>");
return (-1);
}
/*
* XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use
* of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For
* now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& var_smtpd_cmail_limit > 0
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
&& anvil_clnt_mail(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
&rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
&& rate > var_smtpd_cmail_limit) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too much mail from %s",
state->addr);
msg_warn("Message delivery request rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
return (-1);
}
if (argv[2].tokval == SMTPD_TOK_ERROR) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.7 Bad sender address syntax");
return (-1);
}
/*
* XXX The sender address comes first, but the optional SMTPUTF8
* parameter determines what address syntax is permitted. We must process
* this parameter early.
*/
if (var_smtputf8_enable
&& (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0) {
for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) {
arg = argv[narg].strval;
if (strcasecmp(arg, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) { /* RFC 6531 */
/* Fix 20161206: allow UTF8 in smtpd_sender_restrictions. */
state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8;
break;
}
}
}
if (extract_addr(state, argv + 2, PERMIT_EMPTY_ADDR,
var_strict_rfc821_env,
state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.7 Bad sender address syntax");
return (-1);
}
for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) {
arg = argv[narg].strval;
if (strcasecmp(arg, "BODY=8BITMIME") == 0) { /* RFC 1652 */
state->encoding = MAIL_ATTR_ENC_8BIT;
} else if (strcasecmp(arg, "BODY=7BIT") == 0) { /* RFC 1652 */
state->encoding = MAIL_ATTR_ENC_7BIT;
} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "SIZE=", 5) == 0) { /* RFC 1870 */
/* Reject non-numeric size. */
if (!alldig(arg + 5)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad message size syntax");
return (-1);
}
/* Reject size overflow. */
if ((state->msg_size = off_cvt_string(arg + 5)) < 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "552 5.3.4 Message size exceeds file system imposed limit");
return (-1);
}
} else if (var_smtputf8_enable
&& (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0
&& strcasecmp(arg, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) { /* RFC 6531 */
/* Already processed early. */ ;
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "AUTH=", 5) == 0) {
if ((err = smtpd_sasl_mail_opt(state, arg + 5)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
#endif
} else if (namadr_list_match(verp_clients, state->name, state->addr)
&& strncasecmp(arg, VERP_CMD, VERP_CMD_LEN) == 0
&& (arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == '=' || arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == 0)) {
if (arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == 0) {
verp_delims = var_verp_delims;
} else {
verp_delims = arg + VERP_CMD_LEN + 1;
if (verp_delims_verify(verp_delims) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"501 5.5.4 Error: %s needs two characters from %s",
VERP_CMD, var_verp_filter);
return (-1);
}
}
} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "RET=", 4) == 0) { /* RFC 3461 */
/* Sanitized on input. */
if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled");
return (-1);
}
if (state->dsn_ret
|| (state->dsn_ret = dsn_ret_code(arg + 4)) == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"501 5.5.4 Bad RET parameter syntax");
return (-1);
}
} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "ENVID=", 6) == 0) { /* RFC 3461 */
/* Sanitized by bounce server. */
if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled");
return (-1);
}
if (dsn_envid
|| xtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, arg + 6) == 0
|| !allprint(STR(state->dsn_buf))) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad ENVID parameter syntax");
return (-1);
}
dsn_envid = 1;
} else {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "555 5.5.4 Unsupported option: %s", arg);
return (-1);
}
}
/* Fix 20161205: show the envelope sender in reject logging. */
PUSH_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender, STR(state->addr_buf));
err = smtpd_check_size(state, state->msg_size);
POP_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender);
if (err != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
if (verp_delims && STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.4 Error: %s requires non-null sender",
VERP_CMD);
return (-1);
}
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
const char *verify_sender;
/*
* XXX Don't reject the address when we're probed with our own
* address verification sender address. Otherwise, some timeout or
* some UCE block may result in mutual negative caching, making it
* painful to get the mail through. Unfortunately we still have to
* send the address to the Milters otherwise they may bail out with a
* "missing recipient" protocol error.
*/
verify_sender = valid_verify_sender_addr(STR(state->addr_buf));
if (verify_sender != 0)
vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, verify_sender);
}
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0
&& (err = smtpd_check_mail(state, STR(state->addr_buf))) != 0) {
/* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
mail_reset(state);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
if (state->milters != 0
&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0) {
PUSH_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender, STR(state->addr_buf));
err = milter_mail_event(state->milters,
milter_argv(state, argc - 2, argv + 2));
if (err != 0) {
/* Log reject etc. with correct sender information. */
err = check_milter_reply(state, err);
}
POP_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender);
if (err != 0) {
/* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
mail_reset(state);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
}
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
err = smtpd_check_rewrite(state);
if (err != 0) {
/* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
mail_reset(state);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* Historically, Postfix does not forbid 8-bit envelope localparts.
* Changing this would be a compatibility break. That can't happen in the
* foreseeable future.
*/
if ((var_strict_smtputf8 || warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable)
&& (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) == 0
&& *STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) {
if (var_strict_smtputf8) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to "
"send unicode address");
return (-1);
}
/*
* Not: #ifndef NO_EAI. They must configure SMTPUTF8_ENABLE=no if a
* warning message is logged, so that they don't suddenly start to
* lose mail after Postfix is built with EAI support.
*/
if (warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable)
msg_info("using backwards-compatible default setting "
VAR_SMTPUTF8_ENABLE "=no to accept non-ASCII sender "
"address \"%s\" from %s", STR(state->addr_buf),
state->namaddr);
}
/*
* Check the queue file space, if applicable. The optional before-filter
* speed-adjust buffers use disk space. However, we don't know if they
* compete for storage space with the after-filter queue, so we can't
* simply bump up the free space requirement to 2.5 * message_size_limit.
*/
if (!USE_SMTPD_PROXY(state)
|| (smtpd_proxy_opts & SMTPD_PROXY_FLAG_SPEED_ADJUST)) {
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& (err = smtpd_check_queue(state)) != 0) {
/* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
mail_reset(state);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* No more early returns. The mail transaction is in progress.
*/
GETTIMEOFDAY(&state->arrival_time);
state->sender = mystrdup(STR(state->addr_buf));
vstring_sprintf(state->instance, "%x.%lx.%lx.%x",
var_pid, (unsigned long) state->arrival_time.tv_sec,
(unsigned long) state->arrival_time.tv_usec, state->seqno++);
if (verp_delims)
state->verp_delims = mystrdup(verp_delims);
if (dsn_envid)
state->dsn_envid = mystrdup(STR(state->dsn_buf));
if (USE_SMTPD_PROXY(state))
state->proxy_mail = mystrdup(STR(state->buffer));
if (var_smtpd_delay_open == 0 && mail_open_stream(state) < 0) {
/* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
mail_reset(state);
return (-1);
}
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.1.0 Ok");
return (0);
}
/* mail_reset - reset MAIL command stuff */
static void mail_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
state->msg_size = 0;
state->act_size = 0;
state->flags &= SMTPD_MASK_MAIL_KEEP;
/*
* Unceremoniously close the pipe to the cleanup service. The cleanup
* service will delete the queue file when it detects a premature
* end-of-file condition on input.
*/
if (state->cleanup != 0) {
mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest);
state->dest = 0;
state->cleanup = 0;
}
state->err = 0;
if (state->queue_id != 0) {
myfree(state->queue_id);
state->queue_id = 0;
}
if (state->sender) {
if (state->milters != 0)
milter_abort(state->milters);
myfree(state->sender);
state->sender = 0;
}
if (state->verp_delims) {
myfree(state->verp_delims);
state->verp_delims = 0;
}
if (state->proxy_mail) {
myfree(state->proxy_mail);
state->proxy_mail = 0;
}
if (state->saved_filter) {
myfree(state->saved_filter);
state->saved_filter = 0;
}
if (state->saved_redirect) {
myfree(state->saved_redirect);
state->saved_redirect = 0;
}
if (state->saved_bcc) {
argv_free(state->saved_bcc);
state->saved_bcc = 0;
}
state->saved_flags = 0;
#ifdef DELAY_ACTION
state->saved_delay = 0;
#endif
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (state->sasl_sender)
smtpd_sasl_mail_reset(state);
#endif
state->discard = 0;
VSTRING_RESET(state->instance);
VSTRING_TERMINATE(state->instance);
if (state->proxy)
smtpd_proxy_free(state);
if (state->xforward.flags)
smtpd_xforward_reset(state);
if (state->prepend)
state->prepend = argv_free(state->prepend);
if (state->dsn_envid) {
myfree(state->dsn_envid);
state->dsn_envid = 0;
}
if (state->milter_argv) {
myfree((void *) state->milter_argv);
state->milter_argv = 0;
state->milter_argc = 0;
}
}
/* rcpt_cmd - process RCPT TO command */
static int rcpt_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
SMTPD_PROXY *proxy;
const char *err;
int narg;
char *arg;
int rate;
const char *dsn_orcpt_addr = 0;
ssize_t dsn_orcpt_addr_len = 0;
const char *dsn_orcpt_type = 0;
int dsn_notify = 0;
const char *coded_addr;
const char *milter_err;
/*
* Sanity checks.
*
* XXX 2821 pedantism: Section 4.1.2 says that SMTP servers that receive a
* command in which invalid character codes have been employed, and for
* which there are no other reasons for rejection, MUST reject that
* command with a 501 response. So much for the principle of "be liberal
* in what you accept, be strict in what you send".
*/
if (!SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: need MAIL command");
return (-1);
}
if (argc < 3
|| strcasecmp(argv[1].strval, "to:") != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: RCPT TO:<address>");
return (-1);
}
/*
* XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use
* of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For
* now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& var_smtpd_crcpt_limit > 0
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
&& anvil_clnt_rcpt(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
&rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
&& rate > var_smtpd_crcpt_limit) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
msg_warn("Recipient address rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too many recipients from %s",
state->addr);
return (-1);
}
if (argv[2].tokval == SMTPD_TOK_ERROR) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax");
return (-1);
}
if (extract_addr(state, argv + 2, REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR, var_strict_rfc821_env,
state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax");
return (-1);
}
for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) {
arg = argv[narg].strval;
if (strncasecmp(arg, "NOTIFY=", 7) == 0) { /* RFC 3461 */
/* Sanitized on input. */
if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled");
return (-1);
}
if (dsn_notify || (dsn_notify = dsn_notify_mask(arg + 7)) == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"501 5.5.4 Error: Bad NOTIFY parameter syntax");
return (-1);
}
} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "ORCPT=", 6) == 0) { /* RFC 3461 */
/* Sanitized by bounce server. */
if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled");
return (-1);
}
vstring_strcpy(state->dsn_orcpt_buf, arg + 6);
if (dsn_orcpt_addr
|| (coded_addr = split_at(STR(state->dsn_orcpt_buf), ';')) == 0
|| *(dsn_orcpt_type = STR(state->dsn_orcpt_buf)) == 0
|| (strcasecmp(dsn_orcpt_type, "utf-8") == 0 ?
uxtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, coded_addr) == 0 :
xtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, coded_addr) == 0)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"501 5.5.4 Error: Bad ORCPT parameter syntax");
return (-1);
}
dsn_orcpt_addr = STR(state->dsn_buf);
dsn_orcpt_addr_len = LEN(state->dsn_buf);
} else {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "555 5.5.4 Unsupported option: %s", arg);
return (-1);
}
}
if (var_smtpd_rcpt_limit && state->rcpt_count >= var_smtpd_rcpt_limit) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "452 4.5.3 Error: too many recipients");
if (state->rcpt_overshoot++ < var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim)
return (0);
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
return (-1);
}
/*
* Historically, Postfix does not forbid 8-bit envelope localparts.
* Changing this would be a compatibility break. That can't happen in the
* foreseeable future.
*/
if ((var_strict_smtputf8 || warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable)
&& (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) == 0
&& *STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) {
if (var_strict_smtputf8) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to "
"send unicode address");
return (-1);
}
/*
* Not: #ifndef NO_EAI. They must configure SMTPUTF8_ENABLE=no if a
* warning message is logged, so that they don't suddenly start to
* lose mail after Postfix is built with EAI support.
*/
if (warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable)
msg_info("using backwards-compatible default setting "
VAR_SMTPUTF8_ENABLE "=no to accept non-ASCII recipient "
"address \"%s\" from %s", STR(state->addr_buf),
state->namaddr);
}
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
const char *verify_sender;
/*
* XXX Don't reject the address when we're probed with our own
* address verification sender address. Otherwise, some timeout or
* some UCE block may result in mutual negative caching, making it
* painful to get the mail through. Unfortunately we still have to
* send the address to the Milters otherwise they may bail out with a
* "missing recipient" protocol error.
*/
verify_sender = valid_verify_sender_addr(STR(state->addr_buf));
if (verify_sender != 0) {
vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, verify_sender);
err = 0;
} else {
err = smtpd_check_rcpt(state, STR(state->addr_buf));
}
if (state->milters != 0
&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0) {
PUSH_STRING(saved_rcpt, state->recipient, STR(state->addr_buf));
state->milter_reject_text = err;
milter_err = milter_rcpt_event(state->milters,
err == 0 ? MILTER_FLAG_NONE :
MILTER_FLAG_WANT_RCPT_REJ,
milter_argv(state, argc - 2, argv + 2));
if (err == 0 && milter_err != 0) {
/* Log reject etc. with correct recipient information. */
err = check_milter_reply(state, milter_err);
}
POP_STRING(saved_rcpt, state->recipient);
}
if (err != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* Don't access the proxy, queue file, or queue file writer process until
* we have a valid recipient address.
*/
if (state->proxy == 0 && state->cleanup == 0 && mail_open_stream(state) < 0)
return (-1);
/*
* Proxy the recipient. OK, so we lied. If the real-time proxy rejects
* the recipient then we can have a proxy connection without having
* accepted a recipient.
*/
proxy = state->proxy;
if (proxy != 0 && proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_OK,
"%s", STR(state->buffer)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
return (-1);
}
/*
* Store the recipient. Remember the first one.
*
* Flush recipients to maintain a stiffer coupling with the next stage and
* to better utilize parallelism.
*
* RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1: If the NOTIFY parameter was not supplied for a
* recipient when the message was received, the NOTIFY parameter MUST NOT
* be supplied for that recipient when the message is relayed.
*
* In other words, we can't simply make up our default NOTIFY value. We have
* to remember whether the client sent any.
*
* RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1: If no ORCPT parameter was present when the
* message was received, an ORCPT parameter MAY be added to the RCPT
* command when the message is relayed. If an ORCPT parameter is added
* by the relaying MTA, it MUST contain the recipient address from the
* RCPT command used when the message was received by that MTA.
*
* In other words, it is OK to make up our own DSN original recipient when
* the client didn't send one. Although the RFC mentions mail relaying
* only, we also make up our own original recipient for the purpose of
* final delivery. For now, we do this here, rather than on the fly.
*
* XXX We use REC_TYPE_ATTR for DSN-related recipient attributes even though
* 1) REC_TYPE_ATTR is not meant for multiple instances of the same named
* attribute, and 2) mixing REC_TYPE_ATTR with REC_TYPE_(not attr)
* requires that we map attributes with rec_attr_map() in order to
* simplify the recipient record processing loops in the cleanup and qmgr
* servers.
*
* Another possibility, yet to be explored, is to leave the additional
* recipient information in the queue file and just pass queue file
* offsets along with the delivery request. This is a trade off between
* memory allocation versus numeric conversion overhead.
*
* Since we have no record grouping mechanism, all recipient-specific
* parameters must be sent to the cleanup server before the actual
* recipient address.
*/
state->rcpt_count++;
if (state->recipient == 0)
state->recipient = mystrdup(STR(state->addr_buf));
if (state->cleanup) {
/* Note: RFC(2)821 externalized address! */
if (dsn_orcpt_addr == 0) {
dsn_orcpt_type = "rfc822";
dsn_orcpt_addr = argv[2].strval;
dsn_orcpt_addr_len = strlen(argv[2].strval);
if (dsn_orcpt_addr[0] == '<'
&& dsn_orcpt_addr[dsn_orcpt_addr_len - 1] == '>') {
dsn_orcpt_addr += 1;
dsn_orcpt_addr_len -= 2;
}
}
if (dsn_notify)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d",
MAIL_ATTR_DSN_NOTIFY, dsn_notify);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s;%.*s",
MAIL_ATTR_DSN_ORCPT, dsn_orcpt_type,
(int) dsn_orcpt_addr_len, dsn_orcpt_addr);
rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RCPT, STR(state->addr_buf));
vstream_fflush(state->cleanup);
}
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.1.5 Ok");
return (0);
}
/* rcpt_reset - reset RCPT stuff */
static void rcpt_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
if (state->recipient) {
myfree(state->recipient);
state->recipient = 0;
}
state->rcpt_count = 0;
/* XXX Must flush the command history. */
state->rcpt_overshoot = 0;
}
#if 0
/* rfc2047_comment_encode - encode comment string */
static VSTRING *rfc2047_comment_encode(const char *str, const char *charset)
{
VSTRING *buf = vstring_alloc(30);
const unsigned char *cp;
int ch;
/*
* XXX This is problematic code.
*
* XXX Most of the RFC 2047 "especials" are not special in RFC*822 comments,
* but we encode them anyway to avoid complaints.
*
* XXX In Received: header comments we enclose peer and issuer common names
* with "" quotes (inherited from the Lutz Jaenicke patch). This is the
* cause of several quirks.
*
* 1) We encode text that contains the " character, even though that
* character is not special for RFC*822 comments.
*
* 2) We ignore the recommended limit of 75 characters per encoded word,
* because long comments look ugly when folded in-between quotes.
*
* 3) We encode the enclosing quotes, to avoid producing invalid encoded
* words. Microsoft abuses RFC 2047 encoding with attachment names, but
* we have no information on what decoders do with malformed encoding in
* comments. This means the comments are Jaenicke-compatible only after
* decoding.
*/
#define ESPECIALS "()<>@,;:\"/[]?.=" /* Special in RFC 2047 */
#define QSPECIALS "_" ESPECIALS /* Special in RFC 2047 'Q' */
#define CSPECIALS "\\\"()" /* Special in our comments */
/* Don't encode if not needed. */
for (cp = (unsigned char *) str; /* see below */ ; ++cp) {
if ((ch = *cp) == 0) {
vstring_sprintf(buf, "\"%s\"", str);
return (buf);
}
if (!ISPRINT(ch) || strchr(CSPECIALS, ch))
break;
}
/*
* Use quoted-printable (like) encoding with spaces mapped to underscore.
*/
vstring_sprintf(buf, "=?%s?Q?=%02X", charset, '"');
for (cp = (unsigned char *) str; (ch = *cp) != 0; ++cp) {
if (!ISPRINT(ch) || strchr(QSPECIALS CSPECIALS, ch)) {
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "=%02X", ch);
} else if (ch == ' ') {
VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, '_');
} else {
VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, ch);
}
}
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "=%02X?=", '"');
return (buf);
}
#endif
/* comment_sanitize - clean up comment string */
static void comment_sanitize(VSTRING *comment_string)
{
unsigned char *cp;
int ch;
int pc;
/*
* Postfix Received: headers can be configured to include a comment with
* the CN (CommonName) of the peer and its issuer, or the login name of a
* SASL authenticated user. To avoid problems with RFC 822 etc. syntax,
* we limit this information to printable ASCII text, and neutralize
* characters that affect comment parsing: the backslash and unbalanced
* parentheses.
*/
for (pc = 0, cp = (unsigned char *) STR(comment_string); (ch = *cp) != 0; cp++) {
if (!ISASCII(ch) || !ISPRINT(ch) || ch == '\\') {
*cp = '?';
} else if (ch == '(') {
pc++;
} else if (ch == ')') {
if (pc > 0)
pc--;
else
*cp = '?';
}
}
while (pc-- > 0)
VSTRING_ADDCH(comment_string, ')');
VSTRING_TERMINATE(comment_string);
}
/* data_cmd - process DATA command */
static int data_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
{
SMTPD_PROXY *proxy;
const char *err;
char *start;
int len;
int curr_rec_type;
int prev_rec_type;
int first = 1;
VSTRING *why = 0;
int saved_err;
int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t);
int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...);
VSTREAM *out_stream;
int out_error;
char **cpp;
const CLEANUP_STAT_DETAIL *detail;
const char *rfc3848_sess;
const char *rfc3848_auth;
const char *with_protocol = (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) ?
"UTF8SMTP" : state->protocol;
#ifdef USE_TLS
VSTRING *peer_CN;
VSTRING *issuer_CN;
#endif
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
VSTRING *username;
#endif
/*
* Sanity checks. With ESMTP command pipelining the client can send DATA
* before all recipients are rejected, so don't report that as a protocol
* error.
*/
if (state->rcpt_count == 0) {
if (!SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: need RCPT command");
} else {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 5.5.1 Error: no valid recipients");
}
return (-1);
}
if (argc != 1) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: DATA");
return (-1);
}
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_data(state)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
if (state->milters != 0
&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0
&& (err = milter_data_event(state->milters)) != 0
&& (err = check_milter_reply(state, err)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
proxy = state->proxy;
if (proxy != 0 && proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_MORE,
"%s", STR(state->buffer)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
return (-1);
}
/*
* One level of indirection to choose between normal or proxied
* operation. We want to avoid massive code duplication within tons of
* if-else clauses.
*/
if (proxy) {
out_stream = proxy->stream;
out_record = proxy->rec_put;
out_fprintf = proxy->rec_fprintf;
out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY;
} else {
out_stream = state->cleanup;
out_record = rec_put;
out_fprintf = rec_fprintf;
out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE;
}
/*
* Flush out a first batch of access table actions that are delegated to
* the cleanup server, and that may trigger before we accept the first
* valid recipient. There will be more after end-of-data.
*
* Terminate the message envelope segment. Start the message content
* segment, and prepend our own Received: header. If there is only one
* recipient, list the recipient address.
*/
if (state->cleanup) {
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
if (state->milters != 0
&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0)
/* Send actual smtpd_milters list. */
(void) milter_send(state->milters, state->cleanup);
if (state->saved_flags)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FLGS, "%d",
state->saved_flags);
}
rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_MESG, "");
}
/*
* PREPEND message headers above our own Received: header.
*/
if (state->prepend)
for (cpp = state->prepend->argv; *cpp; cpp++)
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "%s", *cpp);
/*
* Suppress our own Received: header in the unlikely case that we are an
* intermediate proxy.
*/
if (!proxy || state->xforward.flags == 0) {
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"Received: from %s (%s [%s])",
state->helo_name ? state->helo_name : state->name,
state->name, state->rfc_addr);
#define VSTRING_STRDUP(s) vstring_strcpy(vstring_alloc(strlen(s) + 1), (s))
#ifdef USE_TLS
if (var_smtpd_tls_received_header && state->tls_context) {
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\t(using %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits))",
state->tls_context->protocol,
state->tls_context->cipher_name,
state->tls_context->cipher_usebits,
state->tls_context->cipher_algbits);
if (TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(state->tls_context)) {
peer_CN = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->tls_context->peer_CN);
comment_sanitize(peer_CN);
issuer_CN = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->tls_context->issuer_CN ?
state->tls_context->issuer_CN : "");
comment_sanitize(issuer_CN);
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (%s))",
STR(peer_CN), STR(issuer_CN),
TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(state->tls_context) ?
"verified OK" : "not verified");
vstring_free(issuer_CN);
vstring_free(peer_CN);
} else if (var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert)
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\t(Client did not present a certificate)");
else
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\t(No client certificate requested)");
}
/* RFC 3848 is defined for ESMTP only. */
if (state->tls_context != 0
&& strcmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) == 0)
rfc3848_sess = "S";
else
#endif
rfc3848_sess = "";
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr && state->sasl_username) {
username = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->sasl_username);
comment_sanitize(username);
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\t(Authenticated sender: %s)", STR(username));
vstring_free(username);
}
/* RFC 3848 is defined for ESMTP only. */
if (state->sasl_username
&& strcmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) == 0)
rfc3848_auth = "A";
else
#endif
rfc3848_auth = "";
if (state->rcpt_count == 1 && state->recipient) {
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
state->cleanup ? "\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s id %s" :
"\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s",
var_myhostname, var_mail_name,
with_protocol, rfc3848_sess,
rfc3848_auth, state->queue_id);
quote_822_local(state->buffer, state->recipient);
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\tfor <%s>; %s", STR(state->buffer),
mail_date(state->arrival_time.tv_sec));
} else {
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
state->cleanup ? "\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s id %s;" :
"\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s;",
var_myhostname, var_mail_name,
with_protocol, rfc3848_sess,
rfc3848_auth, state->queue_id);
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\t%s", mail_date(state->arrival_time.tv_sec));
}
#ifdef RECEIVED_ENVELOPE_FROM
quote_822_local(state->buffer, state->sender);
out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\t(envelope-from %s)", STR(state->buffer));
#endif
}
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>");
state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_DATA;
/*
* Copy the message content. If the cleanup process has a problem, keep
* reading until the remote stops sending, then complain. Produce typed
* records from the SMTP stream so we can handle data that spans buffers.
*
* XXX Force an empty record when the queue file content begins with
* whitespace, so that it won't be considered as being part of our own
* Received: header. What an ugly Kluge.
*
* XXX Deal with UNIX-style From_ lines at the start of message content
* because sendmail permits it.
*/
for (prev_rec_type = 0; /* void */ ; prev_rec_type = curr_rec_type) {
if (smtp_get(state->buffer, state->client, var_line_limit,
SMTP_GET_FLAG_NONE) == '\n')
curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_NORM;
else
curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_CONT;
start = vstring_str(state->buffer);
len = VSTRING_LEN(state->buffer);
if (first) {
if (strncmp(start + strspn(start, ">"), "From ", 5) == 0) {
out_fprintf(out_stream, curr_rec_type,
"X-Mailbox-Line: %s", start);
continue;
}
first = 0;
if (len > 0 && IS_SPACE_TAB(start[0]))
out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "", 0);
}
if (prev_rec_type != REC_TYPE_CONT && *start == '.'
&& (proxy == 0 ? (++start, --len) == 0 : len == 1))
break;
if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
if (var_message_limit > 0 && var_message_limit - state->act_size < len + 2) {
state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE;
msg_warn("%s: queue file size limit exceeded",
state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE");
} else {
state->act_size += len + 2;
if (out_record(out_stream, curr_rec_type, start, len) < 0)
state->err = out_error;
}
}
}
state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_DOT;
if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK
&& SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& (err = smtpd_check_eod(state)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
if (proxy) {
smtpd_proxy_close(state);
} else {
mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest);
state->dest = 0;
state->cleanup = 0;
}
return (-1);
}
/*
* Send the end of DATA and finish the proxy connection. Set the
* CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY error flag in case of trouble.
*/
if (proxy) {
if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
(void) proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_ANY, ".");
if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK &&
*STR(proxy->reply) != '2')
state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_CONT;
}
}
/*
* Flush out access table actions that are delegated to the cleanup
* server. There is similar code at the beginning of the DATA command.
*
* Send the end-of-segment markers and finish the queue file record stream.
*/
else {
if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_XTRA, "");
if (state->saved_filter)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FILT, "%s",
state->saved_filter);
if (state->saved_redirect)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RDR, "%s",
state->saved_redirect);
if (state->saved_bcc) {
char **cpp;
for (cpp = state->saved_bcc->argv; *cpp; cpp++) {
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RCPT, "%s",
*cpp);
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d",
MAIL_ATTR_DSN_NOTIFY, DSN_NOTIFY_NEVER);
}
}
if (state->saved_flags)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FLGS, "%d",
state->saved_flags);
#ifdef DELAY_ACTION
if (state->saved_delay)
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_DELAY, "%d",
state->saved_delay);
#endif
if (vstream_ferror(state->cleanup))
state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE;
}
if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK)
if (rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_END, "") < 0
|| vstream_fflush(state->cleanup))
state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE;
if (state->err == 0) {
why = vstring_alloc(10);
state->err = mail_stream_finish(state->dest, why);
printable(STR(why), ' ');
} else
mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest);
state->dest = 0;
state->cleanup = 0;
}
/*
* XXX If we lose the cleanup server while it is editing a queue file,
* the Postfix SMTP server will be out of sync with Milter applications.
* Sending an ABORT to the Milters is not sufficient to restore
* synchronization, because there may be any number of Milter replies
* already in flight. Destroying and recreating the Milters (and faking
* the connect and ehlo events) is too much trouble for testing and
* maintenance. Workaround: force the Postfix SMTP server to hang up with
* a 421 response in the rare case that the cleanup server breaks AND
* that the remote SMTP client continues the session after end-of-data.
*
* XXX Should use something other than CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE when we lose
* contact with the cleanup server. This requires changes to the
* mail_stream module and its users (smtpd, qmqpd, perhaps sendmail).
*
* XXX See exception below in code that overrides state->access_denied for
* compliance with RFC 2821 Sec 3.1.
*/
if (state->milters != 0 && (state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE) != 0)
state->access_denied = mystrdup("421 4.3.0 Mail system error");
/*
* Handle any errors. One message may suffer from multiple errors, so
* complain only about the most severe error. Forgive any previous client
* errors when a message was received successfully.
*
* See also: qmqpd.c
*/
#define IS_SMTP_REJECT(s) \
(((s)[0] == '4' || (s)[0] == '5') \
&& ISDIGIT((s)[1]) && ISDIGIT((s)[2]) \
&& ((s)[3] == '\0' || (s)[3] == ' ' || (s)[3] == '-'))
if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
state->error_count = 0;
state->error_mask = 0;
state->junk_cmds = 0;
if (proxy)
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
else
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as %s", state->queue_id);
} else if (why && IS_SMTP_REJECT(STR(why))) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(why));
} else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_DEFER) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_DEFER);
if (why && LEN(why) > 0) {
/* Allow address-specific DSN status in header/body_checks. */
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s", detail->smtp, STR(why));
} else {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
}
} else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_BAD) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_BAD);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: internal error %d",
detail->smtp, detail->dsn, state->err);
} else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_BOUNCE;
detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
} else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_HOPS) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_BOUNCE;
detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_HOPS);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
} else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_CONT) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_CONT);
if (proxy) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
} else if (why && LEN(why) > 0) {
/* Allow address-specific DSN status in header/body_checks. */
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s", detail->smtp, STR(why));
} else {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
}
} else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_RESOURCE;
detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
} else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
} else {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_BAD);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: internal error %d",
detail->smtp, detail->dsn, state->err);
}
/*
* By popular command: the proxy's end-of-data reply.
*/
if (proxy)
msg_info("proxy-%s: %s: %s;%s",
(state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) ? "accept" : "reject",
state->where, STR(proxy->reply), smtpd_whatsup(state));
/*
* Cleanup. The client may send another MAIL command.
*/
saved_err = state->err;
chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh);
mail_reset(state);
rcpt_reset(state);
if (why)
vstring_free(why);
return (saved_err);
}
/* rset_cmd - process RSET */
static int rset_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
{
/*
* Sanity checks.
*/
if (argc != 1) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: RSET");
return (-1);
}
/*
* Restore state to right after HELO/EHLO command.
*/
chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh);
mail_reset(state);
rcpt_reset(state);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
return (0);
}
/* noop_cmd - process NOOP */
static int noop_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
{
/*
* XXX 2821 incompatibility: Section 4.1.1.9 says that NOOP can have a
* parameter string which is to be ignored. NOOP instructions with
* parameters? Go figure.
*
* RFC 2821 violates RFC 821, which says that NOOP takes no parameters.
*/
#ifdef RFC821_SYNTAX
/*
* Sanity checks.
*/
if (argc != 1) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: NOOP");
return (-1);
}
#endif
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
return (0);
}
/* vrfy_cmd - process VRFY */
static int vrfy_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
const char *err = 0;
int rate;
int smtputf8 = 0;
int saved_flags;
/*
* The SMTP standard (RFC 821) disallows unquoted special characters in
* the VRFY argument. Common practice violates the standard, however.
* Postfix accommodates common practice where it violates the standard.
*
* XXX Impedance mismatch! The SMTP command tokenizer preserves quoting,
* whereas the recipient restrictions checks expect unquoted (internal)
* address forms. Therefore we must parse out the address, or we must
* stop doing recipient restriction checks and lose the opportunity to
* say "user unknown" at the SMTP port.
*
* XXX 2821 incompatibility and brain damage: Section 4.5.1 requires that
* VRFY is implemented. RFC 821 specifies that VRFY is optional. It gets
* even worse: section 3.5.3 says that a 502 (command recognized but not
* implemented) reply is not fully compliant.
*
* Thus, an RFC 2821 compliant implementation cannot refuse to supply
* information in reply to VRFY queries. That is simply bogus. The only
* reply we could supply is a generic 252 reply. This causes spammers to
* add tons of bogus addresses to their mailing lists (spam harvesting by
* trying out large lists of potential recipient names with VRFY).
*/
#define SLOPPY 0
if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 VRFY command is disabled");
return (-1);
}
/* Fix 20140707: handle missing address. */
if (var_smtputf8_enable
&& (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0
&& argc > 1 && strcasecmp(argv[argc - 1].strval, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) {
argc--; /* RFC 6531 */
smtputf8 = 1;
}
if (argc < 2) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: VRFY address%s",
var_smtputf8_enable ? " [SMTPUTF8]" : "");
return (-1);
}
/*
* XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use
* of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For
* now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& var_smtpd_crcpt_limit > 0
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
&& anvil_clnt_rcpt(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
&rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
&& rate > var_smtpd_crcpt_limit) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
msg_warn("Recipient address rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too many recipients from %s",
state->addr);
return (-1);
}
if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0
&& (err[0] == '5' || err[0] == '4')) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
if (argc > 2)
collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1);
if (extract_addr(state, argv + 1, REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR, SLOPPY, smtputf8) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax");
return (-1);
}
/* Fix 20140707: Check the VRFY command. */
if (smtputf8 == 0 && var_strict_smtputf8) {
if (*STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) {
mail_reset(state);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to send unicode address");
return (-1);
}
}
/* Use state->addr_buf, with the unquoted result from extract_addr() */
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
/* Fix 20161206: allow UTF8 in smtpd_recipient_restrictions. */
saved_flags = state->flags;
if (smtputf8)
state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8;
err = smtpd_check_rcpt(state, STR(state->addr_buf));
state->flags = saved_flags;
if (err != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* XXX 2821 new feature: Section 3.5.1 requires that the VRFY response is
* either "full name <user@domain>" or "user@domain". Postfix replies
* with the string that was provided by the client, whether or not it is
* in fully qualified domain form and the address is in <>.
*
* Reply code 250 is reserved for the case where the address is verified;
* reply code 252 should be used when no definitive certainty exists.
*/
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "252 2.0.0 %s", argv[1].strval);
return (0);
}
/* etrn_cmd - process ETRN command */
static int etrn_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
const char *err;
/*
* Sanity checks.
*/
if (var_helo_required && state->helo_name == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: send HELO/EHLO first");
return (-1);
}
if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0
&& (err[0] == '5' || err[0] == '4')) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: MAIL transaction in progress");
return (-1);
}
if (argc != 2) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 Syntax: ETRN domain");
return (-1);
}
if (argv[1].strval[0] == '@' || argv[1].strval[0] == '#')
argv[1].strval++;
/*
* As an extension to RFC 1985 we also allow an RFC 2821 address literal
* enclosed in [].
*
* XXX There does not appear to be an ETRN parameter to indicate that the
* domain name is UTF-8.
*/
if (!valid_hostname(argv[1].strval, DONT_GRIPE)
&& !valid_mailhost_literal(argv[1].strval, DONT_GRIPE)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Error: invalid parameter syntax");
return (-1);
}
/*
* XXX The implementation borrows heavily from the code that implements
* UCE restrictions. These typically return 450 or 550 when a request is
* rejected. RFC 1985 requires that 459 be sent when the server refuses
* to perform the request.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state)) {
msg_warn("do not use ETRN in \"sendmail -bs\" mode");
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages");
return (-1);
}
if ((err = smtpd_check_etrn(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
switch (flush_send_site(argv[1].strval)) {
case FLUSH_STAT_OK:
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 Queuing started");
return (0);
case FLUSH_STAT_DENY:
msg_warn("reject: ETRN %.100s... from %s",
argv[1].strval, state->namaddr);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "459 <%s>: service unavailable",
argv[1].strval);
return (-1);
case FLUSH_STAT_BAD:
msg_warn("bad ETRN %.100s... from %s", argv[1].strval, state->namaddr);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages");
return (-1);
default:
msg_warn("unable to talk to fast flush service");
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages");
return (-1);
}
}
/* quit_cmd - process QUIT command */
static int quit_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int unused_argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
{
int out_pending = vstream_bufstat(state->client, VSTREAM_BST_OUT_PEND);
/*
* Don't bother checking the syntax.
*/
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "221 2.0.0 Bye");
/*
* When the "." and quit replies are pipelined, make sure they are
* flushed now, to avoid repeated mail deliveries in case of a crash in
* the "clean up before disconnect" code.
*
* XXX When this was added in Postfix 2.1 we used vstream_fflush(). As of
* Postfix 2.3 we use smtp_flush() for better error reporting.
*/
if (out_pending > 0)
smtp_flush(state->client);
return (0);
}
/* xclient_cmd - override SMTP client attributes */
static int xclient_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
SMTPD_TOKEN *argp;
char *raw_value;
char *attr_value;
const char *bare_value;
char *attr_name;
int update_namaddr = 0;
int name_status;
static const NAME_CODE peer_codes[] = {
XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_PERM,
XCLIENT_TEMPORARY, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_TEMP,
0, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK,
};
static const NAME_CODE proto_names[] = {
MAIL_PROTO_SMTP, 1,
MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP, 2,
0, -1,
};
int got_helo = 0;
int got_proto = 0;
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
int got_login = 0;
char *saved_username;
#endif
/*
* Sanity checks.
*
* XXX The XCLIENT command will override its own access control, so that
* connection count/rate restrictions can be correctly simulated.
*/
if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: MAIL transaction in progress");
return (-1);
}
if (argc < 2) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: %s attribute=value...",
XCLIENT_CMD);
return (-1);
}
if (xclient_hosts && xclient_hosts->error)
cant_permit_command(state, XCLIENT_CMD);
if (!xclient_allowed) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "550 5.7.0 Error: insufficient authorization");
return (-1);
}
#define STREQ(x,y) (strcasecmp((x), (y)) == 0)
#define UPDATE_STR(s, v) do { \
const char *_v = (v); \
if (s) myfree(s); \
s = (_v) ? mystrdup(_v) : 0; \
} while(0)
/*
* Initialize.
*/
if (state->expand_buf == 0)
state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
/*
* Iterate over all attribute=value elements.
*/
for (argp = argv + 1; argp < argv + argc; argp++) {
attr_name = argp->strval;
if ((raw_value = split_at(attr_name, '=')) == 0 || *raw_value == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute=value expected");
return (-1);
}
if (strlen(raw_value) > 255) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute value too long");
return (-1);
}
/*
* Backwards compatibility: Postfix prior to version 2.3 does not
* xtext encode attribute values.
*/
attr_value = xtext_unquote(state->expand_buf, raw_value) ?
STR(state->expand_buf) : raw_value;
/*
* For safety's sake mask non-printable characters. We'll do more
* specific censoring later.
*/
printable(attr_value, '?');
/*
* NAME=substitute SMTP client hostname (and reverse/forward name, in
* case of success). Also updates the client hostname lookup status
* code.
*/
if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_NAME)) {
name_status = name_code(peer_codes, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value);
if (name_status != SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) {
attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN;
} else {
/* XXX EAI */
if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XCLIENT_NAME, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
state->name_status = name_status;
UPDATE_STR(state->name, attr_value);
update_namaddr = 1;
if (name_status == SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) {
UPDATE_STR(state->reverse_name, attr_value);
state->reverse_name_status = name_status;
}
}
/*
* REVERSE_NAME=substitute SMTP client reverse hostname. Also updates
* the client reverse hostname lookup status code.
*/
else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME)) {
name_status = name_code(peer_codes, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value);
if (name_status != SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) {
attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN;
} else {
/* XXX EAI */
if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
state->reverse_name_status = name_status;
UPDATE_STR(state->reverse_name, attr_value);
}
/*
* ADDR=substitute SMTP client network address.
*/
else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_ADDR)) {
if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_ADDR_UNKNOWN;
bare_value = attr_value;
} else {
if ((bare_value = valid_mailhost_addr(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XCLIENT_ADDR, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
UPDATE_STR(state->addr, bare_value);
UPDATE_STR(state->rfc_addr, attr_value);
#ifdef HAS_IPV6
if (strncasecmp(attr_value, INET_PROTO_NAME_IPV6 ":",
sizeof(INET_PROTO_NAME_IPV6 ":") - 1) == 0)
state->addr_family = AF_INET6;
else
#endif
state->addr_family = AF_INET;
update_namaddr = 1;
}
/*
* PORT=substitute SMTP client port number.
*/
else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_PORT)) {
if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN;
} else {
if (!alldig(attr_value)
|| strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XCLIENT_PORT, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
UPDATE_STR(state->port, attr_value);
update_namaddr = 1;
}
/*
* HELO=substitute SMTP client HELO parameter. Censor special
* characters that could mess up message headers.
*/
else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_HELO)) {
if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_HELO_UNKNOWN;
} else {
if (strlen(attr_value) > VALID_HOSTNAME_LEN) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XCLIENT_HELO, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
}
UPDATE_STR(state->helo_name, attr_value);
got_helo = 1;
}
/*
* PROTO=SMTP protocol name.
*/
else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_PROTO)) {
if (name_code(proto_names, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value) < 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XCLIENT_PROTO, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
UPDATE_STR(state->protocol, uppercase(attr_value));
got_proto = 1;
}
/*
* LOGIN=sasl_username. Sets the authentication method as XCLIENT.
* This can be used even if SASL authentication is turned off in
* main.cf. We can't make it easier than that.
*/
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_LOGIN)) {
if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE) == 0) {
smtpd_sasl_auth_extern(state, attr_value, XCLIENT_CMD);
got_login = 1;
}
}
#endif
/*
* DESTADDR=substitute SMTP server network address.
*/
else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_DESTADDR)) {
if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = SERVER_ADDR_UNKNOWN;
bare_value = attr_value;
} else {
if ((bare_value = valid_mailhost_addr(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XCLIENT_DESTADDR, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
UPDATE_STR(state->dest_addr, bare_value);
/* XXX Require same address family as client address. */
}
/*
* DESTPORT=substitute SMTP server port number.
*/
else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_DESTPORT)) {
if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = SERVER_PORT_UNKNOWN;
} else {
if (!alldig(attr_value)
|| strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XCLIENT_DESTPORT, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
UPDATE_STR(state->dest_port, attr_value);
}
/*
* Unknown attribute name. Complain.
*/
else {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s attribute name: %s",
XCLIENT_CMD, attr_name);
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* Update the combined name and address when either has changed.
*/
if (update_namaddr) {
if (state->namaddr)
myfree(state->namaddr);
state->namaddr =
SMTPD_BUILD_NAMADDRPORT(state->name, state->addr, state->port);
}
/*
* XXX Compatibility: when the client issues XCLIENT then we have to go
* back to initial server greeting stage, otherwise we can't correctly
* simulate smtpd_client_restrictions (with smtpd_delay_reject=0) and
* Milter connect restrictions.
*
* XXX Compatibility: for accurate simulation we must also reset the HELO
* information. We keep the information if it was specified in the
* XCLIENT command.
*
* XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in its
* use of client address information in connect and disconnect events. We
* re-evaluate xclient so that we correctly simulate connection
* concurrency and connection rate restrictions.
*
* XXX Duplicated from smtpd_proto().
*/
xclient_allowed =
namadr_list_match(xclient_hosts, state->name, state->addr);
/* NOT: tls_reset() */
if (got_helo == 0)
helo_reset(state);
if (got_proto == 0 && strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_SMTP) != 0) {
myfree(state->protocol);
state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_SMTP);
}
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
/* XXX What if they send the parameters via multiple commands? */
if (got_login == 0)
smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state);
if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) {
if (got_login)
saved_username = mystrdup(state->sasl_username);
smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state);
#ifdef USE_TLS
if (state->tls_context != 0) /* TLS from XCLIENT proxy? */
smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS,
var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts);
else
#endif
smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS,
var_smtpd_sasl_opts);
if (got_login) {
smtpd_sasl_auth_extern(state, saved_username, XCLIENT_CMD);
myfree(saved_username);
}
}
#endif
chat_reset(state, 0);
mail_reset(state);
rcpt_reset(state);
if (state->milters)
milter_disc_event(state->milters);
/* Following duplicates the top-level connect/disconnect handler. */
teardown_milters(state);
setup_milters(state);
vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_NONE);
return (0);
}
/* xforward_cmd - forward logging attributes */
static int xforward_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
{
SMTPD_TOKEN *argp;
char *raw_value;
char *attr_value;
const char *bare_value;
char *attr_name;
int updated = 0;
static const NAME_CODE xforward_flags[] = {
XFORWARD_NAME, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME,
XFORWARD_ADDR, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR,
XFORWARD_PORT, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PORT,
XFORWARD_PROTO, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PROTO,
XFORWARD_HELO, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_HELO,
XFORWARD_IDENT, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_IDENT,
XFORWARD_DOMAIN, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_DOMAIN,
0, 0,
};
static const char *context_name[] = {
MAIL_ATTR_RWR_LOCAL, /* Postfix internal form */
MAIL_ATTR_RWR_REMOTE, /* Postfix internal form */
};
static const NAME_CODE xforward_to_context[] = {
XFORWARD_DOM_LOCAL, 0, /* XFORWARD representation */
XFORWARD_DOM_REMOTE, 1, /* XFORWARD representation */
0, -1,
};
int flag;
int context_code;
/*
* Sanity checks.
*/
if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: MAIL transaction in progress");
return (-1);
}
if (argc < 2) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: %s attribute=value...",
XFORWARD_CMD);
return (-1);
}
if (xforward_hosts && xforward_hosts->error)
cant_permit_command(state, XFORWARD_CMD);
if (!xforward_allowed) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "550 5.7.0 Error: insufficient authorization");
return (-1);
}
/*
* Initialize.
*/
if (state->xforward.flags == 0)
smtpd_xforward_preset(state);
if (state->expand_buf == 0)
state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
/*
* Iterate over all attribute=value elements.
*/
for (argp = argv + 1; argp < argv + argc; argp++) {
attr_name = argp->strval;
if ((raw_value = split_at(attr_name, '=')) == 0 || *raw_value == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute=value expected");
return (-1);
}
if (strlen(raw_value) > 255) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute value too long");
return (-1);
}
/*
* Backwards compatibility: Postfix prior to version 2.3 does not
* xtext encode attribute values.
*/
attr_value = xtext_unquote(state->expand_buf, raw_value) ?
STR(state->expand_buf) : raw_value;
/*
* For safety's sake mask non-printable characters. We'll do more
* specific censoring later.
*/
printable(attr_value, '?');
flag = name_code(xforward_flags, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_name);
switch (flag) {
/*
* NAME=up-stream host name, not necessarily in the DNS. Censor
* special characters that could mess up message headers.
*/
case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME:
if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN;
} else {
/* XXX EAI */
neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XFORWARD_NAME, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.name, attr_value);
break;
/*
* ADDR=up-stream host network address, not necessarily on the
* Internet. Censor special characters that could mess up message
* headers.
*/
case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR:
if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_ADDR_UNKNOWN;
bare_value = attr_value;
} else {
neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
if ((bare_value = valid_mailhost_addr(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XFORWARD_ADDR, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.addr, bare_value);
UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.rfc_addr, attr_value);
break;
/*
* PORT=up-stream port number.
*/
case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PORT:
if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN;
} else {
if (!alldig(attr_value)
|| strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XFORWARD_PORT, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
}
UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.port, attr_value);
break;
/*
* HELO=hostname that the up-stream MTA introduced itself with
* (not necessarily SMTP HELO). Censor special characters that
* could mess up message headers.
*/
case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_HELO:
if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_HELO_UNKNOWN;
} else {
neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
}
UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.helo_name, attr_value);
break;
/*
* PROTO=up-stream protocol, not necessarily SMTP or ESMTP.
* Censor special characters that could mess up message headers.
*/
case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PROTO:
if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
} else {
if (strlen(attr_value) > 64) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XFORWARD_PROTO, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
}
UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.protocol, attr_value);
break;
/*
* IDENT=local message identifier on the up-stream MTA. Censor
* special characters that could mess up logging or macro
* expansions.
*/
case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_IDENT:
if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
attr_value = CLIENT_IDENT_UNKNOWN;
} else {
neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
}
UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.ident, attr_value);
break;
/*
* DOMAIN=local or remote.
*/
case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_DOMAIN:
if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE))
attr_value = XFORWARD_DOM_LOCAL;
if ((context_code = name_code(xforward_to_context,
NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE,
attr_value)) < 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
XFORWARD_DOMAIN, attr_value);
return (-1);
}
UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.domain, context_name[context_code]);
break;
/*
* Unknown attribute name. Complain.
*/
default:
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s attribute name: %s",
XFORWARD_CMD, attr_name);
return (-1);
}
updated |= flag;
}
state->xforward.flags |= updated;
/*
* Update the combined name and address when either has changed. Use only
* the name when no address is available.
*/
if (updated & (SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME | SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR)) {
if (state->xforward.namaddr)
myfree(state->xforward.namaddr);
state->xforward.namaddr =
IS_AVAIL_CLIENT_ADDR(state->xforward.addr) ?
SMTPD_BUILD_NAMADDRPORT(state->xforward.name,
state->xforward.addr,
state->xforward.port) :
mystrdup(state->xforward.name);
}
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
return (0);
}
/* chat_reset - notify postmaster and reset conversation log */
static void chat_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state, int threshold)
{
/*
* Notify the postmaster if there were errors. This usually indicates a
* client configuration problem, or that someone is trying nasty things.
* Either is significant enough to bother the postmaster. XXX Can't
* report problems when running in stand-alone mode: postmaster notices
* require availability of the cleanup service.
*/
if (state->history != 0 && state->history->argc > threshold) {
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& (state->error_mask & state->notify_mask))
smtpd_chat_notify(state);
state->error_mask = 0;
smtpd_chat_reset(state);
}
}
#ifdef USE_TLS
/* smtpd_start_tls - turn on TLS or force disconnect */
static void smtpd_start_tls(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
int rate;
int cert_present;
int requirecert;
#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
/*
* This is non-production code, for tlsproxy(8) load testing only. It
* implements enough to enable some Postfix features that depend on TLS
* encryption.
*
* To insert tlsproxy(8) between this process and the SMTP client, we swap
* the file descriptors between the state->tlsproxy and state->client
* VSTREAMS, so that we don't lose all the user-configurable
* state->client attributes (such as longjump buffers or timeouts).
*
* As we implement tlsproxy support in the Postfix SMTP client we should
* develop a usable abstraction that encapsulates this stream plumbing in
* a library module.
*/
vstream_control(state->tlsproxy, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_DOUBLE, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_END);
vstream_control(state->client, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_SWAP_FD(state->tlsproxy),
CA_VSTREAM_CTL_END);
(void) vstream_fclose(state->tlsproxy); /* direct-to-client stream! */
state->tlsproxy = 0;
/*
* After plumbing the plaintext stream, receive the TLS context object.
* For this we must use the same VSTREAM buffer that we also use to
* receive subsequent SMTP commands. The attribute protocol is robust
* enough that an adversary cannot inject their own bogus TLS context
* attributes into the stream.
*/
state->tls_context = tls_proxy_context_receive(state->client);
/*
* XXX Maybe it is better to send this information to tlsproxy(8) when
* requesting service, effectively making a remote tls_server_start()
* call.
*/
requirecert = (var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && var_smtpd_enforce_tls);
#else /* USE_TLSPROXY */
TLS_SERVER_START_PROPS props;
static char *cipher_grade;
static VSTRING *cipher_exclusions;
/*
* Wrapper mode uses a dedicated port and always requires TLS.
*
* XXX In non-wrapper mode, it is possible to require client certificate
* verification without requiring TLS. Since certificates can be verified
* only while TLS is turned on, this means that Postfix will happily
* perform SMTP transactions when the client does not use the STARTTLS
* command. For this reason, Postfix does not require client certificate
* verification unless TLS is required.
*
* The cipher grade and exclusions don't change between sessions. Compute
* just once and cache.
*/
#define ADD_EXCLUDE(vstr, str) \
do { \
if (*(str)) \
vstring_sprintf_append((vstr), "%s%s", \
VSTRING_LEN(vstr) ? " " : "", (str)); \
} while (0)
if (cipher_grade == 0) {
cipher_grade = var_smtpd_enforce_tls ?
var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph : var_smtpd_tls_ciph;
cipher_exclusions = vstring_alloc(10);
ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph);
if (var_smtpd_enforce_tls)
ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl);
if (ask_client_cert)
ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, "aNULL");
}
/*
* Perform the TLS handshake now. Check the client certificate
* requirements later, if necessary.
*/
requirecert = (var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && var_smtpd_enforce_tls);
state->tls_context =
TLS_SERVER_START(&props,
ctx = smtpd_tls_ctx,
stream = state->client,
fd = -1,
timeout = var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
requirecert = requirecert,
serverid = state->service,
namaddr = state->namaddr,
cipher_grade = cipher_grade,
cipher_exclusions = STR(cipher_exclusions),
mdalg = var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst);
#endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */
/*
* For new (i.e. not re-used) TLS sessions, increment the client's new
* TLS session rate counter. We enforce the limit here only for human
* factors reasons (reduce the WTF factor), even though it is too late to
* save the CPU that was already burnt on PKI ops. The real safety
* mechanism applies with future STARTTLS commands (or wrappermode
* connections), prior to the SSL handshake.
*
* XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use of
* client address information in connect and disconnect events. For now
* we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
*/
if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0
&& (state->tls_context == 0 || state->tls_context->session_reused == 0)
&& SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
&& anvil_clnt_newtls(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
&rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
&& rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
msg_warn("New TLS session rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
if (state->tls_context)
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many new TLS sessions from %s",
var_myhostname, state->namaddr);
/* XXX Use regular return to signal end of session. */
vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_QUIET);
}
/*
* When the TLS handshake fails, the conversation is in an unknown state.
* There is nothing we can do except to disconnect from the client.
*/
if (state->tls_context == 0)
vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_EOF);
/*
* If we are requiring verified client certs, enforce the constraint
* here. We have a usable TLS session with the client, so no need to
* disable I/O, ... we can even be polite and send "421 ...".
*/
if (requirecert && TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(state->tls_context) == 0) {
/*
* Fetch and reject the next command (should be EHLO), then
* disconnect (side-effect of returning "421 ...".
*/
cert_present = TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(state->tls_context);
msg_info("NOQUEUE: abort: TLS from %s: %s",
state->namaddr, cert_present ?
"Client certificate not trusted" :
"No client certificate presented");
smtpd_chat_query(state);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.1 %s Error: %s",
var_myhostname, cert_present ?
"Client certificate not trusted" :
"No client certificate presented");
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
return;
}
/*
* When TLS is turned on, we may offer AUTH methods that would not be
* offered within a plain-text session.
*
* XXX Always refresh SASL the mechanism list after STARTTLS. Dovecot
* responses may depend on whether the SMTP connection is encrypted.
*/
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable) {
/* Non-wrappermode, presumably. */
if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) {
smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state);
smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state);
}
/* Wrappermode and non-wrappermode. */
if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) == 0)
smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS,
var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts);
}
#endif
}
/* starttls_cmd - respond to STARTTLS */
static int starttls_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
{
const char *err;
int rate;
if (argc != 1) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: STARTTLS");
return (-1);
}
if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0) {
if (err[0] == '5') {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
return (-1);
}
/* Sendmail compatibility: map 4xx into 454. */
else if (err[0] == '4') {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.3.0 Try again later");
return (-1);
}
}
if (state->tls_context != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 5.5.1 Error: TLS already active");
return (-1);
}
if (var_smtpd_use_tls == 0
|| (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_STARTTLS)) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 Error: command not implemented");
return (-1);
}
#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
/*
* Note: state->tlsproxy is left open when smtp_flush() calls longjmp(),
* so we garbage-collect the VSTREAM in smtpd_state_reset().
*/
#define PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS \
(TLS_PROXY_FLAG_ROLE_SERVER | TLS_PROXY_FLAG_SEND_CONTEXT)
state->tlsproxy = tls_proxy_open(var_tlsproxy_service, PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS,
state->client, state->addr,
state->port, var_smtpd_tmout);
if (state->tlsproxy == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
/* RFC 3207 Section 4. */
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.7.0 TLS not available due to local problem");
return (-1);
}
#else /* USE_TLSPROXY */
if (smtpd_tls_ctx == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
/* RFC 3207 Section 4. */
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.7.0 TLS not available due to local problem");
return (-1);
}
#endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */
/*
* Enforce TLS handshake rate limit when this client negotiated too many
* new TLS sessions in the recent past.
*
* XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use of
* client address information in connect and disconnect events. For now
* we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
*/
if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0
&& SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
&& anvil_clnt_newtls_stat(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
&rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
&& rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
msg_warn("Refusing STARTTLS request from %s for service %s",
state->namaddr, state->service);
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"454 4.7.0 Error: too many new TLS sessions from %s",
state->namaddr);
#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
(void) vstream_fclose(state->tlsproxy);
state->tlsproxy = 0;
#endif
return (-1);
}
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 2.0.0 Ready to start TLS");
/* Flush before we switch read/write routines or file descriptors. */
smtp_flush(state->client);
/* At this point there must not be any pending plaintext. */
vstream_fpurge(state->client, VSTREAM_PURGE_BOTH);
/*
* Reset all inputs to the initial state.
*
* XXX RFC 2487 does not forbid the use of STARTTLS while mail transfer is
* in progress, so we have to allow it even when it makes no sense.
*/
helo_reset(state);
mail_reset(state);
rcpt_reset(state);
/*
* Turn on TLS, using code that is shared with TLS wrapper mode. This
* code does not return when the handshake fails.
*/
smtpd_start_tls(state);
return (0);
}
/* tls_reset - undo STARTTLS */
static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
int failure = 0;
/*
* Don't waste time when we lost contact.
*/
if (state->tls_context) {
if (vstream_feof(state->client) || vstream_ferror(state->client))
failure = 1;
vstream_fflush(state->client); /* NOT: smtp_flush() */
#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
tls_proxy_context_free(state->tls_context);
#else
tls_server_stop(smtpd_tls_ctx, state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
failure, state->tls_context);
#endif
state->tls_context = 0;
}
}
#endif
#if !defined(USE_TLS) || !defined(USE_SASL_AUTH)
/* unimpl_cmd - dummy for functionality that is not compiled in */
static int unimpl_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
{
/*
* When a connection is closed we want to log the request counts for
* unimplemented STARTTLS or AUTH commands separately, instead of logging
* those commands as "unknown". By handling unimplemented commands with
* this dummy function, we avoid messing up the command processing loop.
*/
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 Error: command not implemented");
return (-1);
}
#endif
/*
* The table of all SMTP commands that we know. Set the junk limit flag on
* any command that can be repeated an arbitrary number of times without
* triggering a tarpit delay of some sort.
*/
typedef struct SMTPD_CMD {
char *name;
int (*action) (SMTPD_STATE *, int, SMTPD_TOKEN *);
int flags;
int success_count;
int total_count;
} SMTPD_CMD;
#define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT (1<<0) /* limit usage */
#define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS (1<<1) /* allow before STARTTLS */
#define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST (1<<2) /* last in PIPELINING command group */
static SMTPD_CMD smtpd_cmd_table[] = {
{SMTPD_CMD_HELO, helo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
{SMTPD_CMD_EHLO, ehlo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
{SMTPD_CMD_XCLIENT, xclient_cmd,},
{SMTPD_CMD_XFORWARD, xforward_cmd,},
#ifdef USE_TLS
{SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS, starttls_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,},
#else
{SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS, unimpl_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,},
#endif
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
{SMTPD_CMD_AUTH, smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper,},
#else
{SMTPD_CMD_AUTH, unimpl_cmd,},
#endif
{SMTPD_CMD_MAIL, mail_cmd,},
{SMTPD_CMD_RCPT, rcpt_cmd,},
{SMTPD_CMD_DATA, data_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
{SMTPD_CMD_RSET, rset_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,},
{SMTPD_CMD_NOOP, noop_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
{SMTPD_CMD_VRFY, vrfy_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
{SMTPD_CMD_ETRN, etrn_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,},
{SMTPD_CMD_QUIT, quit_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,},
{0,},
};
static STRING_LIST *smtpd_noop_cmds;
static STRING_LIST *smtpd_forbid_cmds;
/* smtpd_proto - talk the SMTP protocol */
static void smtpd_proto(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
int argc;
SMTPD_TOKEN *argv;
SMTPD_CMD *cmdp;
const char *ehlo_words;
const char *err;
int status;
const char *cp;
#ifdef USE_TLS
int tls_rate;
#endif
/*
* Print a greeting banner and run the state machine. Read SMTP commands
* one line at a time. According to the standard, a sender or recipient
* address could contain an escaped newline. I think this is perverse,
* and anyone depending on this is really asking for trouble.
*
* In case of mail protocol trouble, the program jumps back to this place,
* so that it can perform the necessary cleanup before talking to the
* next client. The setjmp/longjmp primitives are like a sharp tool: use
* with care. I would certainly recommend against the use of
* setjmp/longjmp in programs that change privilege levels.
*
* In case of file system trouble the program terminates after logging the
* error and after informing the client. In all other cases (out of
* memory, panic) the error is logged, and the msg_cleanup() exit handler
* cleans up, but no attempt is made to inform the client of the nature
* of the problem.
*/
smtp_stream_setup(state->client, var_smtpd_tmout, var_smtpd_rec_deadline);
while ((status = vstream_setjmp(state->client)) == SMTP_ERR_NONE)
/* void */ ;
switch (status) {
default:
msg_panic("smtpd_proto: unknown error reading from %s",
state->namaddr);
break;
case SMTP_ERR_TIME:
state->reason = REASON_TIMEOUT;
if (vstream_setjmp(state->client) == 0)
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.4.2 %s Error: timeout exceeded",
var_myhostname);
break;
case SMTP_ERR_EOF:
state->reason = REASON_LOST_CONNECTION;
break;
case SMTP_ERR_QUIET:
break;
case SMTP_ERR_DATA:
msg_info("%s: reject: %s from %s: "
"421 4.3.0 %s Server local data error",
(state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"),
state->where, state->namaddr, var_myhostname);
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_DATA;
if (vstream_setjmp(state->client) == 0)
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.3.0 %s Server local data error",
var_myhostname);
break;
case 0:
/*
* Reset the per-command counters.
*/
for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; /* see below */ ; cmdp++) {
cmdp->success_count = cmdp->total_count = 0;
if (cmdp->name == 0)
break;
}
/*
* In TLS wrapper mode, turn on TLS using code that is shared with
* the STARTTLS command. This code does not return when the handshake
* fails.
*
* Enforce TLS handshake rate limit when this client negotiated too many
* new TLS sessions in the recent past.
*
* XXX This means we don't complete a TLS handshake just to tell the
* client that we don't provide service. TLS wrapper mode is
* obsolete, so we don't have to provide perfect support.
*/
#ifdef USE_TLS
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode) {
#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
/* We garbage-collect the VSTREAM in smtpd_state_reset() */
state->tlsproxy = tls_proxy_open(var_tlsproxy_service,
PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS,
state->client, state->addr,
state->port, var_smtpd_tmout);
if (state->tlsproxy == 0) {
msg_warn("Wrapper-mode request dropped from %s for service %s."
" TLS context initialization failed. For details see"
" earlier warnings in your logs.",
state->namaddr, state->service);
break;
}
#else /* USE_TLSPROXY */
if (smtpd_tls_ctx == 0) {
msg_warn("Wrapper-mode request dropped from %s for service %s."
" TLS context initialization failed. For details see"
" earlier warnings in your logs.",
state->namaddr, state->service);
break;
}
#endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */
if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
&& anvil_clnt_newtls_stat(anvil_clnt, state->service,
state->addr, &tls_rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
&& tls_rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
msg_warn("Refusing TLS service request from %s for service %s",
state->namaddr, state->service);
break;
}
smtpd_start_tls(state);
}
#endif
/*
* XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in
* its use of client address information in connect and disconnect
* events. For now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from
* connection count/rate control.
*
* XXX Must send connect/disconnect events to the anvil server even when
* this service is not connection count or rate limited, otherwise it
* will discard client message or recipient rate information too
* early or too late.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
&& anvil_clnt_connect(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
&state->conn_count, &state->conn_rate)
== ANVIL_STAT_OK) {
if (var_smtpd_cconn_limit > 0
&& state->conn_count > var_smtpd_cconn_limit) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
msg_warn("Connection concurrency limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
state->conn_count, state->namaddr, state->service);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many connections from %s",
var_myhostname, state->addr);
break;
}
if (var_smtpd_crate_limit > 0
&& state->conn_rate > var_smtpd_crate_limit) {
msg_warn("Connection rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
state->conn_rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many connections from %s",
var_myhostname, state->addr);
break;
}
}
/*
* Determine what server ESMTP features to suppress, typically to
* avoid inter-operability problems. Moved up so we don't send 421
* immediately after sending the initial server response.
*/
if (ehlo_discard_maps == 0
|| (ehlo_words = maps_find(ehlo_discard_maps, state->addr, 0)) == 0)
ehlo_words = var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words;
state->ehlo_discard_mask = ehlo_mask(ehlo_words);
/* XXX We use the real client for connect access control. */
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0
&& (err = smtpd_check_client(state)) != 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
state->access_denied = mystrdup(err);
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", state->access_denied);
state->error_count++;
}
/*
* RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses
* other than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO
* are prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463.
*/
/*
* XXX If a Milter rejects CONNECT, reply with 220 except in case of
* hard reject or 421 (disconnect). The reply persists so it will
* apply to MAIL FROM and to other commands such as AUTH, STARTTLS,
* and VRFY. Note: after a Milter CONNECT reject, we must not reject
* HELO or EHLO, but we do change the feature list that is announced
* in the EHLO response.
*/
else {
err = 0;
if (state->milters != 0) {
milter_macro_callback(state->milters, smtpd_milter_eval,
(void *) state);
if ((err = milter_conn_event(state->milters, state->name,
state->addr,
strcmp(state->port, CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN) ?
state->port : "0",
state->addr_family)) != 0)
err = check_milter_reply(state, err);
}
if (err && err[0] == '5') {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 %s ESMTP not accepting connections",
var_myhostname);
state->error_count++;
} else if (err && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 %s Service unavailable - try again later",
var_myhostname);
/* Not: state->error_count++; */
} else {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 %s", var_smtpd_banner);
}
}
/*
* SASL initialization for plaintext mode.
*
* XXX Backwards compatibility: allow AUTH commands when the AUTH
* announcement is suppressed via smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks.
*
* XXX Safety: don't enable SASL with "smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes" and
* non-TLS build.
*/
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable && smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) == 0
#ifdef USE_TLS
&& state->tls_context == 0 && !var_smtpd_tls_auth_only
#else
&& var_smtpd_tls_auth_only == 0
#endif
)
smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS,
var_smtpd_sasl_opts);
#endif
/*
* The command read/execute loop.
*/
for (;;) {
if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_HANGUP)
break;
if (state->error_count >= var_smtpd_hard_erlim) {
state->reason = REASON_ERROR_LIMIT;
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many errors",
var_myhostname);
break;
}
watchdog_pat();
smtpd_chat_query(state);
/* Safety: protect internal interfaces against malformed UTF-8. */
if (var_smtputf8_enable && valid_utf8_string(STR(state->buffer),
LEN(state->buffer)) == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 5.5.2 Error: bad UTF-8 syntax");
state->error_count++;
continue;
}
/* Move into smtpd_chat_query() and update session transcript. */
if (smtpd_cmd_filter != 0) {
for (cp = STR(state->buffer); *cp && IS_SPACE_TAB(*cp); cp++)
/* void */ ;
if ((cp = dict_get(smtpd_cmd_filter, cp)) != 0) {
msg_info("%s: replacing command \"%.100s\" with \"%.100s\"",
state->namaddr, STR(state->buffer), cp);
vstring_strcpy(state->buffer, cp);
} else if (smtpd_cmd_filter->error != 0) {
msg_warn("%s:%s lookup error for \"%.100s\"",
smtpd_cmd_filter->type, smtpd_cmd_filter->name,
printable(STR(state->buffer), '?'));
vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA);
}
}
if ((argc = smtpd_token(vstring_str(state->buffer), &argv)) == 0) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 5.5.2 Error: bad syntax");
state->error_count++;
continue;
}
/* Ignore smtpd_noop_cmds lookup errors. Non-critical feature. */
if (*var_smtpd_noop_cmds
&& string_list_match(smtpd_noop_cmds, argv[0].strval)) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
if (state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit)
state->error_count++;
continue;
}
for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; cmdp->name != 0; cmdp++)
if (strcasecmp(argv[0].strval, cmdp->name) == 0)
break;
cmdp->total_count += 1;
/* Ignore smtpd_forbid_cmds lookup errors. Non-critical feature. */
if (cmdp->name == 0) {
state->where = SMTPD_CMD_UNKNOWN;
if (is_header(argv[0].strval)
|| (*var_smtpd_forbid_cmds
&& string_list_match(smtpd_forbid_cmds, argv[0].strval))) {
msg_warn("non-SMTP command from %s: %.100s",
state->namaddr, vstring_str(state->buffer));
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "221 2.7.0 Error: I can break rules, too. Goodbye.");
break;
}
}
/* XXX We use the real client for connect access control. */
if (state->access_denied && cmdp->action != quit_cmd) {
/* XXX Exception for Milter override. */
if (strncmp(state->access_denied + 1, "21", 2) == 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", state->access_denied);
continue;
}
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.7.0 Error: access denied for %s",
state->namaddr); /* RFC 2821 Sec 3.1 */
state->error_count++;
continue;
}
/* state->access_denied == 0 || cmdp->action == quit_cmd */
if (cmdp->name == 0) {
if (state->milters != 0
&& (err = milter_unknown_event(state->milters,
argv[0].strval)) != 0
&& (err = check_milter_reply(state, err)) != 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
} else
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.2 Error: command not recognized");
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
state->error_count++;
continue;
}
#ifdef USE_TLS
if (var_smtpd_enforce_tls &&
!state->tls_context &&
(cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS) == 0) {
smtpd_chat_reply(state,
"530 5.7.0 Must issue a STARTTLS command first");
state->error_count++;
continue;
}
#endif
state->where = cmdp->name;
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0
|| (cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST))
&& (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_ILL_PIPELINING) == 0
&& (vstream_peek(state->client) > 0
|| peekfd(vstream_fileno(state->client)) > 0)) {
if (state->expand_buf == 0)
state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
escape(state->expand_buf, vstream_peek_data(state->client),
vstream_peek(state->client) < 100 ?
vstream_peek(state->client) : 100);
msg_info("improper command pipelining after %s from %s: %s",
cmdp->name, state->namaddr, STR(state->expand_buf));
state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_ILL_PIPELINING;
}
if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0)
state->error_count++;
else
cmdp->success_count += 1;
if ((cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT)
&& state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit)
state->error_count++;
if (cmdp->action == quit_cmd)
break;
}
break;
}
/*
* XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in its
* use of client address information in connect and disconnect events.
* For now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from connection count/rate
* control.
*
* XXX Must send connect/disconnect events to the anvil server even when
* this service is not connection count or rate limited, otherwise it
* will discard client message or recipient rate information too early or
* too late.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& !xclient_allowed
&& anvil_clnt
&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr))
anvil_clnt_disconnect(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr);
/*
* Log abnormal session termination, in case postmaster notification has
* been turned off. In the log, indicate the last recognized state before
* things went wrong. Don't complain about clients that go away without
* sending QUIT. Log the byte count after DATA to help diagnose MTU
* troubles.
*/
if (state->reason && state->where) {
if (strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_DATA) == 0) {
msg_info("%s after %s (%lu bytes) from %s", /* 2.5 compat */
state->reason, SMTPD_CMD_DATA, /* 2.5 compat */
(long) (state->act_size + vstream_peek(state->client)),
state->namaddr);
} else if (strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_DOT)
|| strcmp(state->reason, REASON_LOST_CONNECTION)) {
msg_info("%s after %s from %s",
state->reason, state->where, state->namaddr);
}
}
/*
* Cleanup whatever information the client gave us during the SMTP
* dialog.
*
* XXX Duplicated in xclient_cmd().
*/
#ifdef USE_TLS
tls_reset(state);
#endif
helo_reset(state);
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state);
if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) {
smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state);
}
#endif
chat_reset(state, 0);
mail_reset(state);
rcpt_reset(state);
if (state->milters)
milter_disc_event(state->milters);
}
/* smtpd_format_cmd_stats - format per-command statistics */
static char *smtpd_format_cmd_stats(VSTRING *buf)
{
SMTPD_CMD *cmdp;
int all_success = 0;
int all_total = 0;
/*
* Log the statistics. Note that this loop produces no output when no
* command was received. We address that after the loop.
*/
VSTRING_RESET(buf);
for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; /* see below */ ; cmdp++) {
if (cmdp->total_count > 0) {
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " %s=%d",
cmdp->name ? cmdp->name : "unknown",
cmdp->success_count);
if (cmdp->success_count != cmdp->total_count)
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "/%d", cmdp->total_count);
all_success += cmdp->success_count;
all_total += cmdp->total_count;
}
if (cmdp->name == 0)
break;
}
/*
* Log total numbers, so that logfile analyzers will see something even
* if the above loop produced no output. When no commands were received
* log "0/0" to simplify the identification of abnormal sessions: any
* statistics with [0-9]/ indicate that there was a problem.
*/
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " commands=%d", all_success);
if (all_success != all_total || all_total == 0)
vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "/%d", all_total);
return (lowercase(STR(buf)));
}
/* setup_milters - set up Milters after a connection is established */
static void setup_milters(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
const char *milter_string;
/*
* Postcondition: either state->milters is set, or the
* INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER flag is passed down-stream.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
&& (smtpd_input_transp_mask & INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER) == 0
&& ((smtpd_milter_maps
&& (milter_string =
maps_find(smtpd_milter_maps, state->addr, 0)) != 0)
|| *(milter_string = var_smtpd_milters) != 0)
&& strcasecmp(milter_string, SMTPD_MILTERS_DISABLE) != 0) {
state->milters = milter_create(milter_string,
var_milt_conn_time,
var_milt_cmd_time,
var_milt_msg_time,
var_milt_protocol,
var_milt_def_action,
var_milt_conn_macros,
var_milt_helo_macros,
var_milt_mail_macros,
var_milt_rcpt_macros,
var_milt_data_macros,
var_milt_eoh_macros,
var_milt_eod_macros,
var_milt_unk_macros,
var_milt_macro_deflts);
}
/*
* Safety: disable non_smtpd_milters when not sending our own mail filter
* list. Otherwise the next stage could handle this message as a local
* submission.
*/
if (state->milters == 0)
smtpd_input_transp_mask |= INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER;
}
/* teardown_milters - release resources */
static void teardown_milters(SMTPD_STATE *state)
{
if (state->milters) {
milter_free(state->milters);
state->milters = 0;
}
}
/* smtpd_service - service one client */
static void smtpd_service(VSTREAM *stream, char *service, char **argv)
{
SMTPD_STATE state;
/*
* Sanity check. This service takes no command-line arguments.
*/
if (argv[0])
msg_fatal("unexpected command-line argument: %s", argv[0]);
/*
* For sanity, require that at least one of INET or INET6 is enabled.
* Otherwise, we can't look up interface information, and we can't
* convert names or addresses.
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE_STREAM(stream) == 0
&& inet_proto_info()->ai_family_list[0] == 0)
msg_fatal("all network protocols are disabled (%s = %s)",
VAR_INET_PROTOCOLS, var_inet_protocols);
/*
* This routine runs when a client has connected to our network port, or
* when the smtp server is run in stand-alone mode (input from pipe).
*
* Look up and sanitize the peer name, then initialize some connection-
* specific state. When the name service is hosed, hostname lookup will
* take a while. This is why I always run a local name server on critical
* machines.
*/
smtpd_state_init(&state, stream, service);
msg_info("connect from %s", state.namaddr);
/*
* Disable TLS when running in stand-alone mode via "sendmail -bs".
*/
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state))) {
var_smtpd_use_tls = 0;
var_smtpd_enforce_tls = 0;
var_smtpd_tls_auth_only = 0;
}
/*
* XCLIENT must not override its own access control.
*/
xclient_allowed = SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 &&
namadr_list_match(xclient_hosts, state.name, state.addr);
/*
* Overriding XFORWARD access control makes no sense, either.
*/
xforward_allowed = SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 &&
namadr_list_match(xforward_hosts, state.name, state.addr);
/*
* See if we need to turn on verbose logging for this client.
*/
debug_peer_check(state.name, state.addr);
/*
* Set up Milters, or disable Milters down-stream.
*/
setup_milters(&state); /* duplicates xclient_cmd */
/*
* Provide the SMTP service.
*/
if ((state.flags & SMTPD_FLAG_HANGUP) == 0)
smtpd_proto(&state);
/*
* After the client has gone away, clean up whatever we have set up at
* connection time.
*/
msg_info("disconnect from %s%s", state.namaddr,
smtpd_format_cmd_stats(state.buffer));
teardown_milters(&state); /* duplicates xclient_cmd */
smtpd_state_reset(&state);
debug_peer_restore();
}
/* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */
static void pre_accept(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
{
const char *table;
if ((table = dict_changed_name()) != 0) {
msg_info("table %s has changed -- restarting", table);
exit(0);
}
}
/* pre_jail_init - pre-jail initialization */
static void pre_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
{
/*
* Initialize blacklist/etc. patterns before entering the chroot jail, in
* case they specify a filename pattern.
*/
smtpd_noop_cmds = string_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
var_smtpd_noop_cmds);
smtpd_forbid_cmds = string_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS,
MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
var_smtpd_forbid_cmds);
verp_clients = namadr_list_init(VAR_VERP_CLIENTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
var_verp_clients);
xclient_hosts = namadr_list_init(VAR_XCLIENT_HOSTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
var_xclient_hosts);
xforward_hosts = namadr_list_init(VAR_XFORWARD_HOSTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
var_xforward_hosts);
hogger_list = namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN
| match_parent_style(VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS),
var_smtpd_hoggers);
/*
* Open maps before dropping privileges so we can read passwords etc.
*
* XXX We should not do this in stand-alone (sendmail -bs) mode, but we
* can't use SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) here. This means "sendmail -bs"
* will try to connect to proxymap when invoked by root for mail
* submission. To fix, we would have to pass stand-alone mode information
* via different means. For now we have to tell people not to run mail
* clients as root.
*/
if (getuid() == 0 || getuid() == var_owner_uid)
smtpd_check_init();
smtpd_expand_init();
debug_peer_init();
if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable)
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
smtpd_sasl_initialize();
if (*var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks)
sasl_exceptions_networks =
namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS,
MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks);
#else
msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in",
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE);
#endif
if (*var_smtpd_cmd_filter)
smtpd_cmd_filter = dict_open(var_smtpd_cmd_filter, O_RDONLY,
DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_FOLD_FIX);
/*
* XXX Temporary fix to pretend that we consistently implement TLS
* security levels. We implement only a subset for now. If we implement
* more levels, wrappermode should override only weaker TLS security
* levels.
*
* Note: tls_level_lookup() logs no warning.
*/
if (!var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode && *var_smtpd_tls_level) {
switch (tls_level_lookup(var_smtpd_tls_level)) {
default:
msg_fatal("Invalid TLS level \"%s\"", var_smtpd_tls_level);
/* NOTREACHED */
break;
case TLS_LEV_SECURE:
case TLS_LEV_VERIFY:
case TLS_LEV_FPRINT:
msg_warn("%s: unsupported TLS level \"%s\", using \"encrypt\"",
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, var_smtpd_tls_level);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case TLS_LEV_ENCRYPT:
var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls = 1;
break;
case TLS_LEV_MAY:
var_smtpd_enforce_tls = 0;
var_smtpd_use_tls = 1;
break;
case TLS_LEV_NONE:
var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls = 0;
break;
}
}
/*
* With TLS wrapper mode, we run on a dedicated port and turn on TLS
* before actually speaking the SMTP protocol. This implies TLS enforce
* mode.
*
* With non-wrapper mode, TLS enforce mode implies that we don't advertise
* AUTH before the client issues STARTTLS.
*/
var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode || var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
var_smtpd_tls_auth_only = var_smtpd_tls_auth_only || var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
var_smtpd_use_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls || var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
/*
* Keys can only be loaded when running with suitable permissions. When
* called from "sendmail -bs" this is not the case, so we must not
* announce STARTTLS support.
*/
if (getuid() == 0 || getuid() == var_owner_uid) {
if (var_smtpd_use_tls) {
#ifdef USE_TLS
#ifndef USE_TLSPROXY
TLS_SERVER_INIT_PROPS props;
const char *cert_file;
int have_server_cert;
int no_server_cert_ok;
int require_server_cert;
/*
* Can't use anonymous ciphers if we want client certificates.
* Must use anonymous ciphers if we have no certificates.
*
* XXX: Ugh! Too many booleans!
*/
ask_client_cert = require_server_cert =
(var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert
|| (var_smtpd_enforce_tls && var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert));
if (strcasecmp(var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, "none") == 0) {
no_server_cert_ok = 1;
cert_file = "";
} else {
no_server_cert_ok = 0;
cert_file = var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
}
have_server_cert =
(*cert_file || *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file || *var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file);
/* Some TLS configuration errors are not show stoppers. */
if (!have_server_cert && require_server_cert)
msg_warn("Need a server cert to request client certs");
if (!var_smtpd_enforce_tls && var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert)
msg_warn("Can't require client certs unless TLS is required");
/* After a show-stopper error, reply with 454 to STARTTLS. */
if (have_server_cert || (no_server_cert_ok && !require_server_cert))
/*
* Large parameter lists are error-prone, so we emulate a
* language feature that C does not have natively: named
* parameter lists.
*/
smtpd_tls_ctx =
TLS_SERVER_INIT(&props,
log_param = VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL,
log_level = var_smtpd_tls_loglevel,
verifydepth = var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd,
cache_type = TLS_MGR_SCACHE_SMTPD,
set_sessid = var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid,
cert_file = cert_file,
key_file = var_smtpd_tls_key_file,
dcert_file = var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file,
dkey_file = var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file,
eccert_file = var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file,
eckey_file = var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file,
CAfile = var_smtpd_tls_CAfile,
CApath = var_smtpd_tls_CApath,
dh1024_param_file
= var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file,
dh512_param_file
= var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file,
eecdh_grade = var_smtpd_tls_eecdh,
protocols = var_smtpd_enforce_tls ?
var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto :
var_smtpd_tls_proto,
ask_ccert = ask_client_cert,
mdalg = var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst);
else
msg_warn("No server certs available. TLS won't be enabled");
#endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */
#else
msg_warn("TLS has been selected, but TLS support is not compiled in");
#endif
}
}
/*
* flush client.
*/
flush_init();
/*
* EHLO keyword filter.
*/
if (*var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps)
ehlo_discard_maps = maps_create(VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS,
var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps,
DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
/*
* Per-client Milter support.
*/
if (*var_smtpd_milter_maps)
smtpd_milter_maps = maps_create(VAR_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS,
var_smtpd_milter_maps,
DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
/*
* DNS reply filter.
*/
if (*var_smtpd_dns_re_filter)
dns_rr_filter_compile(VAR_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER,
var_smtpd_dns_re_filter);
}
/* post_jail_init - post-jail initialization */
static void post_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
{
/*
* Initialize the receive transparency options: do we want unknown
* recipient checks, address mapping, header_body_checks?.
*/
smtpd_input_transp_mask =
input_transp_mask(VAR_INPUT_TRANSP, var_input_transp);
/*
* Initialize before-queue filter options: do we want speed-matching
* support so that the entire message is received before we contact a
* before-queue content filter?
*/
if (*var_smtpd_proxy_filt)
smtpd_proxy_opts =
smtpd_proxy_parse_opts(VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, var_smtpd_proxy_opts);
/*
* Sanity checks. The queue_minfree value should be at least as large as
* (process_limit * message_size_limit) but that is unpractical, so we
* arbitrarily pick a small multiple of the per-message size limit. This
* helps to avoid many unneeded (re)transmissions.
*/
if (var_queue_minfree > 0
&& var_message_limit > 0
&& var_queue_minfree / 1.5 < var_message_limit)
msg_warn("%s(%lu) should be at least 1.5*%s(%lu)",
VAR_QUEUE_MINFREE, (unsigned long) var_queue_minfree,
VAR_MESSAGE_LIMIT, (unsigned long) var_message_limit);
/*
* Connection rate management.
*/
if (var_smtpd_crate_limit || var_smtpd_cconn_limit
|| var_smtpd_cmail_limit || var_smtpd_crcpt_limit
|| var_smtpd_cntls_limit || var_smtpd_cauth_limit)
anvil_clnt = anvil_clnt_create();
}
MAIL_VERSION_STAMP_DECLARE;
/* main - the main program */
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
static const CONFIG_NINT_TABLE nint_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_SOFT_ERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_SOFT_ERLIM, &var_smtpd_soft_erlim, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_HARD_ERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_HARD_ERLIM, &var_smtpd_hard_erlim, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, DEF_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, &var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit, 1, 0,
VAR_VERIFY_POLL_COUNT, DEF_VERIFY_POLL_COUNT, &var_verify_poll_count, 1, 0,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_rcpt_limit, 1, 0,
VAR_QUEUE_MINFREE, DEF_QUEUE_MINFREE, &var_queue_minfree, 0, 0,
VAR_UNK_CLIENT_CODE, DEF_UNK_CLIENT_CODE, &var_unk_client_code, 0, 0,
VAR_BAD_NAME_CODE, DEF_BAD_NAME_CODE, &var_bad_name_code, 0, 0,
VAR_UNK_NAME_CODE, DEF_UNK_NAME_CODE, &var_unk_name_code, 0, 0,
VAR_UNK_ADDR_CODE, DEF_UNK_ADDR_CODE, &var_unk_addr_code, 0, 0,
VAR_RELAY_CODE, DEF_RELAY_CODE, &var_relay_code, 0, 0,
VAR_MAPS_RBL_CODE, DEF_MAPS_RBL_CODE, &var_maps_rbl_code, 0, 0,
VAR_MAP_REJECT_CODE, DEF_MAP_REJECT_CODE, &var_map_reject_code, 0, 0,
VAR_MAP_DEFER_CODE, DEF_MAP_DEFER_CODE, &var_map_defer_code, 0, 0,
VAR_REJECT_CODE, DEF_REJECT_CODE, &var_reject_code, 0, 0,
VAR_DEFER_CODE, DEF_DEFER_CODE, &var_defer_code, 0, 0,
VAR_NON_FQDN_CODE, DEF_NON_FQDN_CODE, &var_non_fqdn_code, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_OVERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_OVERLIM, &var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, DEF_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, &var_smtpd_hist_thrsh, 1, 0,
VAR_UNV_FROM_RCODE, DEF_UNV_FROM_RCODE, &var_unv_from_rcode, 200, 599,
VAR_UNV_RCPT_RCODE, DEF_UNV_RCPT_RCODE, &var_unv_rcpt_rcode, 200, 599,
VAR_UNV_FROM_DCODE, DEF_UNV_FROM_DCODE, &var_unv_from_dcode, 200, 499,
VAR_UNV_RCPT_DCODE, DEF_UNV_RCPT_DCODE, &var_unv_rcpt_dcode, 200, 499,
VAR_MUL_RCPT_CODE, DEF_MUL_RCPT_CODE, &var_mul_rcpt_code, 0, 0,
VAR_LOCAL_RCPT_CODE, DEF_LOCAL_RCPT_CODE, &var_local_rcpt_code, 0, 0,
VAR_VIRT_ALIAS_CODE, DEF_VIRT_ALIAS_CODE, &var_virt_alias_code, 0, 0,
VAR_VIRT_MAILBOX_CODE, DEF_VIRT_MAILBOX_CODE, &var_virt_mailbox_code, 0, 0,
VAR_RELAY_RCPT_CODE, DEF_RELAY_RCPT_CODE, &var_relay_rcpt_code, 0, 0,
VAR_PLAINTEXT_CODE, DEF_PLAINTEXT_CODE, &var_plaintext_code, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_CRATE_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CRATE_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_crate_limit, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_CCONN_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CCONN_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cconn_limit, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_CMAIL_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CMAIL_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cmail_limit, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_CRCPT_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CRCPT_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_crcpt_limit, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_CNTLS_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CNTLS_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cntls_limit, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_CAUTH_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CAUTH_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cauth_limit, 0, 0,
#ifdef USE_TLS
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, &var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd, 0, 0,
#endif
VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_REQ_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_REQ_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_policy_req_limit, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_policy_try_limit, 1, 0,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_tmout, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_ERR_SLEEP, DEF_SMTPD_ERR_SLEEP, &var_smtpd_err_sleep, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_proxy_tmout, 1, 0,
VAR_VERIFY_POLL_DELAY, DEF_VERIFY_POLL_DELAY, &var_verify_poll_delay, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_policy_tmout, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_IDLE, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_IDLE, &var_smtpd_policy_idle, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TTL, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TTL, &var_smtpd_policy_ttl, 1, 0,
#ifdef USE_TLS
VAR_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_starttls_tmout, 1, 0,
#endif
VAR_MILT_CONN_TIME, DEF_MILT_CONN_TIME, &var_milt_conn_time, 1, 0,
VAR_MILT_CMD_TIME, DEF_MILT_CMD_TIME, &var_milt_cmd_time, 1, 0,
VAR_MILT_MSG_TIME, DEF_MILT_MSG_TIME, &var_milt_msg_time, 1, 0,
VAR_VERIFY_SENDER_TTL, DEF_VERIFY_SENDER_TTL, &var_verify_sender_ttl, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_UPROXY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_UPROXY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_uproxy_tmout, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_DELAY, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_DELAY, &var_smtpd_policy_try_delay, 1, 0,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_BOOL_TABLE bool_table[] = {
VAR_HELO_REQUIRED, DEF_HELO_REQUIRED, &var_helo_required,
VAR_SMTPD_DELAY_REJECT, DEF_SMTPD_DELAY_REJECT, &var_smtpd_delay_reject,
VAR_STRICT_RFC821_ENV, DEF_STRICT_RFC821_ENV, &var_strict_rfc821_env,
VAR_DISABLE_VRFY_CMD, DEF_DISABLE_VRFY_CMD, &var_disable_vrfy_cmd,
VAR_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, DEF_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, &var_allow_untrust_route,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtpd_sasl_enable,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_AUTH_HDR, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_AUTH_HDR, &var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr,
VAR_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, DEF_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, &var_broken_auth_clients,
VAR_SHOW_UNK_RCPT_TABLE, DEF_SHOW_UNK_RCPT_TABLE, &var_show_unk_rcpt_table,
VAR_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_FROM, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_FROM, &var_smtpd_rej_unl_from,
VAR_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_RCPT, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_RCPT, &var_smtpd_rej_unl_rcpt,
VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS, &var_smtpd_use_tls,
VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtpd_enforce_tls,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, &var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, &var_smtpd_tls_auth_only,
#ifdef USE_TLS
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, &var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, &var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, &var_smtpd_tls_received_header,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SET_SESSID, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SET_SESSID, &var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid,
#endif
VAR_SMTPD_PEERNAME_LOOKUP, DEF_SMTPD_PEERNAME_LOOKUP, &var_smtpd_peername_lookup,
VAR_SMTPD_DELAY_OPEN, DEF_SMTPD_DELAY_OPEN, &var_smtpd_delay_open,
VAR_SMTPD_CLIENT_PORT_LOG, DEF_SMTPD_CLIENT_PORT_LOG, &var_smtpd_client_port_log,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_NBOOL_TABLE nbool_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_REC_DEADLINE, DEF_SMTPD_REC_DEADLINE, &var_smtpd_rec_deadline,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_BANNER, DEF_SMTPD_BANNER, &var_smtpd_banner, 1, 0,
VAR_NOTIFY_CLASSES, DEF_NOTIFY_CLASSES, &var_notify_classes, 0, 0,
VAR_CLIENT_CHECKS, DEF_CLIENT_CHECKS, &var_client_checks, 0, 0,
VAR_HELO_CHECKS, DEF_HELO_CHECKS, &var_helo_checks, 0, 0,
VAR_MAIL_CHECKS, DEF_MAIL_CHECKS, &var_mail_checks, 0, 0,
VAR_RELAY_CHECKS, DEF_RELAY_CHECKS, &var_relay_checks, 0, 0,
VAR_RCPT_CHECKS, DEF_RCPT_CHECKS, &var_rcpt_checks, 0, 0,
VAR_ETRN_CHECKS, DEF_ETRN_CHECKS, &var_etrn_checks, 0, 0,
VAR_DATA_CHECKS, DEF_DATA_CHECKS, &var_data_checks, 0, 0,
VAR_EOD_CHECKS, DEF_EOD_CHECKS, &var_eod_checks, 0, 0,
VAR_MAPS_RBL_DOMAINS, DEF_MAPS_RBL_DOMAINS, &var_maps_rbl_domains, 0, 0,
VAR_RBL_REPLY_MAPS, DEF_RBL_REPLY_MAPS, &var_rbl_reply_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_ERROR_RCPT, DEF_ERROR_RCPT, &var_error_rcpt, 1, 0,
VAR_REST_CLASSES, DEF_REST_CLASSES, &var_rest_classes, 0, 0,
VAR_CANONICAL_MAPS, DEF_CANONICAL_MAPS, &var_canonical_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_SEND_CANON_MAPS, DEF_SEND_CANON_MAPS, &var_send_canon_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_RCPT_CANON_MAPS, DEF_RCPT_CANON_MAPS, &var_rcpt_canon_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_VIRT_ALIAS_MAPS, DEF_VIRT_ALIAS_MAPS, &var_virt_alias_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_VIRT_MAILBOX_MAPS, DEF_VIRT_MAILBOX_MAPS, &var_virt_mailbox_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_ALIAS_MAPS, DEF_ALIAS_MAPS, &var_alias_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_LOCAL_RCPT_MAPS, DEF_LOCAL_RCPT_MAPS, &var_local_rcpt_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, &var_smtpd_sasl_opts, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_PATH, &var_smtpd_sasl_path, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE, &var_smtpd_sasl_service, 1, 0,
VAR_CYRUS_CONF_PATH, DEF_CYRUS_CONF_PATH, &var_cyrus_conf_path, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_REALM, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_REALM, &var_smtpd_sasl_realm, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, &var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks, 0, 0,
VAR_FILTER_XPORT, DEF_FILTER_XPORT, &var_filter_xport, 0, 0,
VAR_PERM_MX_NETWORKS, DEF_PERM_MX_NETWORKS, &var_perm_mx_networks, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, &var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, &var_smtpd_noop_cmds, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS, &var_smtpd_forbid_cmds, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, DEF_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, &var_smtpd_null_key, 0, 0,
VAR_RELAY_RCPT_MAPS, DEF_RELAY_RCPT_MAPS, &var_relay_rcpt_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_VERIFY_SENDER, DEF_VERIFY_SENDER, &var_verify_sender, 0, 0,
VAR_VERP_CLIENTS, DEF_VERP_CLIENTS, &var_verp_clients, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_FILT, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_FILT, &var_smtpd_proxy_filt, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_EHLO, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_EHLO, &var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, &var_smtpd_proxy_opts, 0, 0,
VAR_INPUT_TRANSP, DEF_INPUT_TRANSP, &var_input_transp, 0, 0,
VAR_XCLIENT_HOSTS, DEF_XCLIENT_HOSTS, &var_xclient_hosts, 0, 0,
VAR_XFORWARD_HOSTS, DEF_XFORWARD_HOSTS, &var_xforward_hosts, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS, DEF_SMTPD_HOGGERS, &var_smtpd_hoggers, 0, 0,
VAR_LOC_RWR_CLIENTS, DEF_LOC_RWR_CLIENTS, &var_local_rwr_clients, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_WORDS, DEF_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_WORDS, &var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS, &var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps, 0, 0,
#ifdef USE_TLS
VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, DEF_RELAY_CCERTS, &var_smtpd_relay_ccerts, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS, &var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtpd_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_ciph, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_EXCL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_EXCL, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_PROTO, &var_smtpd_tls_proto, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_PROTO, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_EECDH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_EECDH, &var_smtpd_tls_eecdh, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_FPT_DGST, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_FPT_DGST, &var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
#endif
VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_level, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TYPE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_TYPE, &var_smtpd_sasl_type, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_MILTERS, DEF_SMTPD_MILTERS, &var_smtpd_milters, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_CONN_MACROS, DEF_MILT_CONN_MACROS, &var_milt_conn_macros, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_HELO_MACROS, DEF_MILT_HELO_MACROS, &var_milt_helo_macros, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_MAIL_MACROS, DEF_MILT_MAIL_MACROS, &var_milt_mail_macros, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_RCPT_MACROS, DEF_MILT_RCPT_MACROS, &var_milt_rcpt_macros, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_DATA_MACROS, DEF_MILT_DATA_MACROS, &var_milt_data_macros, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_EOH_MACROS, DEF_MILT_EOH_MACROS, &var_milt_eoh_macros, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_EOD_MACROS, DEF_MILT_EOD_MACROS, &var_milt_eod_macros, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_UNK_MACROS, DEF_MILT_UNK_MACROS, &var_milt_unk_macros, 0, 0,
VAR_MILT_PROTOCOL, DEF_MILT_PROTOCOL, &var_milt_protocol, 1, 0,
VAR_MILT_DEF_ACTION, DEF_MILT_DEF_ACTION, &var_milt_def_action, 1, 0,
VAR_MILT_DAEMON_NAME, DEF_MILT_DAEMON_NAME, &var_milt_daemon_name, 1, 0,
VAR_MILT_V, DEF_MILT_V, &var_milt_v, 1, 0,
VAR_MILT_MACRO_DEFLTS, DEF_MILT_MACRO_DEFLTS, &var_milt_macro_deflts, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS, &var_smtpd_milter_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_STRESS, DEF_STRESS, &var_stress, 0, 0,
VAR_UNV_FROM_WHY, DEF_UNV_FROM_WHY, &var_unv_from_why, 0, 0,
VAR_UNV_RCPT_WHY, DEF_UNV_RCPT_WHY, &var_unv_rcpt_why, 0, 0,
VAR_REJECT_TMPF_ACT, DEF_REJECT_TMPF_ACT, &var_reject_tmpf_act, 1, 0,
VAR_UNK_NAME_TF_ACT, DEF_UNK_NAME_TF_ACT, &var_unk_name_tf_act, 1, 0,
VAR_UNK_ADDR_TF_ACT, DEF_UNK_ADDR_TF_ACT, &var_unk_addr_tf_act, 1, 0,
VAR_UNV_RCPT_TF_ACT, DEF_UNV_RCPT_TF_ACT, &var_unv_rcpt_tf_act, 1, 0,
VAR_UNV_FROM_TF_ACT, DEF_UNV_FROM_TF_ACT, &var_unv_from_tf_act, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_CMD_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_CMD_FILTER, &var_smtpd_cmd_filter, 0, 0,
#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
VAR_TLSPROXY_SERVICE, DEF_TLSPROXY_SERVICE, &var_tlsproxy_service, 1, 0,
#endif
VAR_SMTPD_ACL_PERM_LOG, DEF_SMTPD_ACL_PERM_LOG, &var_smtpd_acl_perm_log, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_UPROXY_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_UPROXY_PROTO, &var_smtpd_uproxy_proto, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_DEF_ACTION, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_DEF_ACTION, &var_smtpd_policy_def_action, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_CONTEXT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_CONTEXT, &var_smtpd_policy_context, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, &var_smtpd_dns_re_filter, 0, 0,
0,
};
static const CONFIG_RAW_TABLE raw_table[] = {
VAR_SMTPD_EXP_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_EXP_FILTER, &var_smtpd_exp_filter, 1, 0,
VAR_DEF_RBL_REPLY, DEF_DEF_RBL_REPLY, &var_def_rbl_reply, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_REJ_FOOTER, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_FOOTER, &var_smtpd_rej_footer, 0, 0,
0,
};
/*
* Fingerprint executables and core dumps.
*/
MAIL_VERSION_STAMP_ALLOCATE;
/*
* Pass control to the single-threaded service skeleton.
*/
single_server_main(argc, argv, smtpd_service,
CA_MAIL_SERVER_NINT_TABLE(nint_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_INT_TABLE(int_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_STR_TABLE(str_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_RAW_TABLE(raw_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_BOOL_TABLE(bool_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_NBOOL_TABLE(nbool_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_TIME_TABLE(time_table),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_PRE_INIT(pre_jail_init),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT(pre_accept),
CA_MAIL_SERVER_POST_INIT(post_jail_init),
0);
}